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This thesis addresses the problem of providing trusted individuals with confidential
information about other individuals, in particular, granting access to databases of
personal records using the World–Wide Web. It proposes an access rights manage-
ment system for distributed databases which aims to create and implement organi-
sation structures based on the wishes of the owners and of demands of the users of
the databases. The dissertation describes how current software components could
be used to implement this system; it re–examines the theory of collective choice to
develop mechanisms for generating hierarchies of authorities; it analyses organisa-
tional processes for stability and develops a means of measuring the similarity of
their hierarchies.
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Preface
This thesis attempts to use the principles of the design of political systems for in-
formation processing systems. Political systems are the means by which governments
order the affairs of states and a political system in a liberal democracy uses elections
as a feedback system which allows the subjects of the political system to direct it in
the long–term.
The political systems that govern commercial businesses are not as well evolved —
the only feedback they have formalised is from their shareholders. There should be in-
puts from customers, suppliers and government agencies. The information processing
systems used by businesses reflect this lack of controlled feedback. Most information
systems are designed to solve the problems of a particular management strategy for
a business organisation.
The goal of this thesis is to liberate the management of information from enter-
prises and return it to the people who are its subjects and should be its owners. If
ordinary people can control who has access to their personal information then, the
hope is, it will not be as easily abused. Further than that, the behaviour of honest
people should be the norm, but it is more often the case in modern society that honest
and trustworthy people must prove themselves to be so, because most organisations
have no means of distinguishing between the honest and the dishonest. Such infor-
mation should be made available, so that genuinely honest people would find it easier
to function in society than those who are not.
My hope is that this thesis will stimulate research into and development of infor-
mation systems that rank people and institutions according to different metrics: how
solvent they are, what areas of expertise they have, and, generally, how trustworthy
xi
they are. And from this, be able to give suitably–qualified people more influence over
different aspects of policy. It is, of course, unlikely that this would be the immediate
result and it would seem more sensible to prove this technology with direct research
towards managing resources where the ethical issues would not cause so great an ob-
struction. Computer and telephone network resources would be one such example of
a good proving ground.
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Part I
Trust Broking
Chapter 1
Overview
The original brief for this project was to develop a software system that would
allow a community of individuals to access each other’s information with the owner’s
consent and yet to do so in such a way that:
• That consent could be delegated but never forced
• and there would be no prejudice against an individual for choosing not to release
information
The immediate goal was to realize a means whereby medical practitioners based
in surgeries and hospitals could access the medical records they held on each other’s
patients. Such facilities are already available in Germany [Blo01] and Iceland [And98],
but neither system provides assurances that consent will be obtained, nor that records
will remain confidential.
It became apparent that many of the problems of controlling the release of this
personal information would need to be resolved by a joint decision of the owner of the
database holding the information, the person who wants to use the information and
the person, or persons, who are referred to by it. The decision would resolve whether
the person wanting to use the information was entitled to access it and, if so, how
much of it.
This is a fundamental business process and most people would recognise it as
one they take part in all the time. Even more fundamental than the process is the
Eaves, Ph.D 2000 Page 3
commodity that is traded when the decision to grant access is made. The sole criterion
that both the database owner and the subjects of the records held within it must feel
is satisfied is simply: “Can this new user be trusted not to misuse the information
contained in our records?” and trust is the commodity that is exchanged by all three
parties. Trust is a belief that someone else will keep their promises:
• The subjects of the records trust the owner of the database and the user of their
records.
• Because:
1. The owner of the database promises the subjects to release information on
them to mutually agreed users.
2. The owner of the database promises the subjects to release only the infor-
mation they have agreed to release.
3. The user of the records promises not to misuse the information contained
in the records.
The goal then is to develop systems which will provide individuals with the degree
of trust they require from each other: it is because of that, that the systems and
mechanisms proposed by this research are described as, jointly, providing a trust–
brokerage system.
Broadly, this research is in the area of computer–supported co–operative working
and it is an active field, but has concerned itself with environments where there is
enough implicit trust between all the parties involved that confidentiality safeguards
can be largely omitted in system designs. Hubermann has developed a system known
as Beehive [HK96] which has been employed as the basis for computer–aided engi-
neering systems. There are also proposals for the joint management of investment
portfolios [DSZ95] and there have been conferences discussing a number of digital
library projects [Bat98] which provide on–line texts from a number of sources and
access is only slightly restricted. All of these systems are to some extent predicated
on the existence of virtual organisation — an organisation that has been created and
Eaves, Ph.D 2000 Page 4
designed to fulfil a function within one real organisation or, more usefully, across a
number of them. An interesting paper that describes how a virtual organisation can
be created to fulfil a need is given in [Mil95].
Within the medical profession such systems are not as mechanised, but are devel-
oping a trust model within national organisations [And96a], [DWS99] and standards
for security mechanisms specific to healthcare are being developed within Europe and
elsewhere1.
This Dissertation and Its Structure This dissertation concentrates on provid-
ing co–operative working environments built upon databases of information. The
databases must preserve confidentiality, so it divides naturally into two parts:
• Secure Distributed Processing
• Virtual Organisation for Resource Management
Secure Distributed Processing This part re–examines the basic theory of
data and database security and applies it to a distributed processing environment. A
practical architecture for the secure management of access to any number of databases
is developed and a prototype implementation is discussed.
In the context of medical information systems, this part of the documents describes
mechanisms that must be implemented—such as those proposed by the European
working group [oE96].
Virtual Organisation for Resource Management Originally this section
concerned itself with generating a virtual organisation for access control to databases,
but it is now more general: it addresses the issue of how to manage access to any
resource and the problem of how a virtual organisation for the management of au-
thorisation hierarchies can be evolved from the needs of owners and users. This
introduces three research issues:
1. Forming, analysing and quantifying hierarchies
1[And96b], “Standards”
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2. Resolving conflicts within hierarchies
3. Ensuring the stability of self–organising hierarchies
For medical information systems, this follows the argument of Anderson [And96b]
that the medical profession operates under a collegiate structure: policies for allocat-
ing access rights are applied within autonomous organisations, but must be enforced
within co–operating peer organisations.
This Chapter The remainder of this chapter provides a further introduction to the
research by providing some examples of how it might be used.
1.1 Application: Universally Accessible Personal
Information
In this section, the way in which the affairs of people are managed will be de-
scribed.
The difficulty most people face is that mechanised information processing systems
rely upon them to provide them with input — basically people have to fill in forms.
To add further annoyance, people have to collect the information that the information
processing systems generate about them to be able to fill in more forms — apply for
a bank account, be given a bank account number and a sort code, then arrange a
money transfer by quoting your bank account and bank sort code.
It would be much simpler, and less error–prone, if people had a repository of their
personal information that was already in machine–readable format, but which could
be projected into a human–readable form that people could reorganise. A simple drag
and drop environment would be very attractive. For example, log on to a system, this
generates an identity object which appears as an icon, go to a folder which represents
your bank, make a new cheque, find the identity icon of the person you want to give
the cheque to, drop his identity and one’s own identity icon into the cheque icon to
sign and address the cheque and drop the cheque icon into an e-mail and send it. The
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e–mail application will read the cheque’s identity icons, lookup the e–mail addresses
associated with them and address the e–mail correctly.
Such a system would greatly enhance the operation of information systems. There
are already prototype banking systems that operate in a manner similar to that de-
scribed above and it is hoped that more of them will be developed. The following
discussion looks at the difficulties of mechanising the access and use of personal infor-
mation. The discussion begins with how people manage their confidential information
in the paper–based world we occupy now and then moves on to how they might or-
ganise their information in an electronic environment.
1.1.1 People
Paper Lives
Most people will have a collection of papers in their possession that, more or less,
defines the person they have been and how they stand now:
Certificates a birth certificate, possibly a marriage certificate and, ultimately, a
death certificate will complete the collection.
Qualifications there will be school–leaving certificates, examination results, degree
certificates, driving licences.
Earnings Employers will have provided the Inland Revenue’s P60.
Status Notifications of tax codes, a passport, valid visas, employment permits.
Finances Bank account and credit card statements. Direct debits, standing orders.
Bills Receipts showing bills have been paid, statements from suppliers, which, for
most people, will be the utility bills they have settled.
Memberships Libraries, clubs, professional organisations.
Properties and Contracts One may own a property, rent one or hold a mortgage,
similarly for cars. There may be contracts with managing agents, rental com-
panies and service company warranties.
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Histories There will be one’s medical history; perhaps details of legal cases in which
one may have been involved.
Addresses and Contacts Just about everyone has a list of addresses and phone
numbers listing all the companies and organisations who supply all of the infor-
mation held on them. There will also be contact addresses for oneself and for
friends and business associates.
If one were to bring all this information together it would amount to a complex
inter–related bundle and would suffer from all the typical problems of data collections:
Replication If one were asked to prove one’s identity: one could use one’s passport,
driving licence, cheque card. To prove one’s address: bank statements, driving
licence or utility bills.
Specialist Knowledge Tax codes can only be deciphered by someone familiar with
tax regulations; leasehold agreements need contract lawyers. X–rays, radiogra-
phers.
Inconsistent Driving licences can hold details that are out–of–date. Membership
cards can have mis-spellings.
Unsubstantiable One piece of information can be useless without another to sub-
stantiate it. For example, if one possesses a national insurance card, it is quite
possible to pose as the person whose card it is; there is no substantiation of the
holder’s identity.
Location A piece of paper is easily lost, or one does not have it when one needs it.
Electronic Lives in a Honest World
If we were to take all of the information used to lead one’s life and make it avail-
able electronically, then software applications could be developed, like the chequing
account mentioned above, which would require no paper–based input. The informa-
tion would be easier to manage and to access.
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In an entirely honest world all of our personal information could be placed on a
web–site and we, and others, could freely access it.
A Person’s Web–site The World–Wide Web could be used to host a web–site
which would act as an organised repository of all these documents in electronic form.
They could then be organised to fulfil their different purposes. A diagram of how such
a web–site might be organised is given in figure 1.1. It is owned and administered by
an individual who has had a full professional working life: working in a number of
countries. The web–site could contain the following pages.
John Doe
Addresses
Family and Friends
Advisers
Permits and Licences
Projects Portfolios
Investment Portfolio
Curriculum Vitae
Liquidity Statement
Tax Details
Figure 1.1: Web–site used to provide personal information
1. Addresses
The current contact addresses of the web–site owner would be held. These
would reference his residential property address and his employer’s address.
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2. Family and Friends
The owner might provide references to his wife’s and children’s web–pages;
friends and former business colleagues. He might include his employment and
academic referees here.
3. Advisors
The owner might provide references to his doctor, solicitor, accountant and
others.
4. Permits and Licences
The owner might store references to his driving licences, employment and resi-
dency permits and proof of certain tax exemptions.
5. Projects Portfolios
The owner may have decided to record his work to help in finding suitable
employment, so he would keep web–pages detailing his work, his employers and
so forth.
6. Investment Portfolio
The web–site owner may have made some investments and might want to have
a financial adviser manage them for him, so he might construct a web–page that
contains references to the current value of his investments, where they are held
and the account details.
7. Curriculum Vitae
This composite document would reference to other pages, or part of their con-
tents:
• Addresses
• Projects Portfolios
• Permit and Licences
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• Family and Friends
and would also reference educational qualifications, memberships of professional
organisations.
8. Liquidity Statement
This shows the owner to be solvent and would be used to obtain credit or
accounts. It would reference bank statements, accounts held elsewhere (credit
cards and utility accounts) and property ownerships. It would of course refer
to:
• Investment Portfolio
9. Tax Details
This would be used by the web–site owner’s accountant to pay his taxes. It
would reference statements of his earnings, tax–deductible outgoings and would
contain a reference to the address of his current tax office and possibly his past
offices as well.
Providing Up–to–Date Information A desirable enhancement would be for the
web–site to provide current information: bank account statements could be updated
with each transaction, as could the investment portfolio and any other records that
change frequently.
• Either: provide a link to the provider of the information with the owner’s
reference number to provide an index look–up in a directory service at the
information providers web–site.
• Or: have a dynamic web–page that would create itself on demand and carry
out the look–ups and the formatting of records itself.
• Or: have the information provider issue a new page by e–mail and have that
page replace or be appended to the existing one.
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The first of these two require the same operation: being able to make a remote
query on a database. As an example, consider looking up the owner’s driving licence
in the “Permits and Licences” web–page. The page could simply contain a reference
to the issuing authority of the driving licence, with the index look–up2:
http://www.open.gov.uk/dvla/drivers.htm/driver number?EAVES60762WD9AK
A diagram for the interaction is given in figure 1.2.
Permits and Licences
http://www.open.gov.uk/dvla/drivers.htm/
driver_number?EAVES60762WD9AK
Driving Licence
Data
Database at the
DVLA accessible
over the Internet
Figure 1.2: Using the UK’s Driver Vehicle Licensing Agency
Using the Information With this scheme an individual’s personal information
could be kept up–to–date and available over a universally accessible medium. If
someone wanted to join a library they need not fill in any forms, but could just
present the address of their web–page and have that recorded. The library could
then see if the web–page owner provides enough information for its needs and could
take whatever information it needed from the individual whenever it needed it.
The library would then notify the web–page owner of his new account at the
library and send the address of the remote database that could be queried for his
account details with them.
2The URL used here is fictitious, but most insurance brokers are able to acquire this information
and some make it available in web–based quotation systems.
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Security Problems Of course, no–one should have a web–site like this because
there is no protection of one’s privacy. For example, someone visiting this site could
learn the owner’s credit card details and commit fraud with them.
Electronic Lives in the Real World
Access Control Mechanisms What is is needed to make the web–site secure are
a number of access control mechanisms
• Placed at the entrance to each web–page
• Placed at every remote database that can be queried
The former restricts access to the page, the latter is a restriction put in place by
the owners of the remote database as to who may access the data held on the owner.
The owner would probably be entitled to see the record held on himself, but that
need not be the case. If the owner is able to access his record, he may decide to allow
other people to see it as well.
For example, only the owner of the web–page for “Tax Details” and his accountant
would be allowed to access it, but he may also decide to allow his accountant access
to the tax details held at his different tax offices, see figure 1.3.
Granting Access Rights There would also need to be a mechanism in place to
grant access rights to the web–page owner’s record held in remote database. These
issues have to be resolved:
• Does the web–page owner have the right to grant access to his record to someone
else?
• Does the owner of the database where the record is held want to allow access
to the person the web–page owner proposes?
The latter issue might appear contentious, but the data held at the remote data-
base may have an intellectual copyright attached to it — there may be design doc-
uments in the “Project Portfolios” — or it may give rise to a conflict of interest —
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http://www.open.gov.uk/ir/paye/ne45.htm/nat_ins?WM546789C
Tax Records at North East 45th Tax district
DataDatabase at the Tax
District holding tax
records
Tax Details
Access Controller
John Doe
Ernst & Young
A Friend
Access Controller
John Doe
Ernst & Young
John Doe allows himself,
his accountant and a
friend to check his tax
The Inland Revenue
does not allow "A
Friend" access
Figure 1.3: Access control mechanisms in place for Tax Details
it may contain a company’s information that should not be released to a stockbroker
who might be involved in a rival bid for the company.
The web–page owner and the owner of the database must come to some kind
of agreement and in so doing they would want to be as well–informed as possible
about the individual to whom they are proposing to grant the access rights to. If
that individual were known to the web–page owner then he should appear in his
“Advisors” page or perhaps in his “Family and Friends” pages and if he is there, then
his web–pages could be accessed and it should be possible to gain enough information
about him to make a decision. There would be a system of implicit and explicit
permissions. Company directors would implicitly grant rights to each other to view
information that is common to them in the course of their business, but some rights
may need to be granted explicitly: the right to sign cheques would be explicitly
granted to the finance director, for example.
The mechanism for granting access rights could be anything: e–mail or a secure
web–form. All three parties should be notified and record the rights granted and this
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information should also be made available through a database.
1.1.2 Organisations
Responsibilities So far only the information needs of individuals have been dis-
cussed. The organisations that own the databases that hold individuals’ records would
also want to use the data. Going back to the example of the library the web–page
owner had joined, it will have access rights to some of the “Addresses” information
so that it can send out statements to the web–page owner, but, if it has access to the
address information for all of its borrowers, it can construct a mailing list and sell it
to a direct–mail company and more junk–mail is almost certainly something that the
library’s borrowers would not want.
On the other hand, the library may decide to do something useful with the address
data, it may use it for planning where to build a new library. It is a matter of
intent and a requirement that can be made is that whenever data is required from an
individual, a statement of intent should be made with the request.
A statement of intent is no protection against abuse of the data held in the indi-
vidual’s web–site unless one can show that the data has been properly used and the
only way to do this is for the library to show that it has fulfilled its intent. This would
involve proving to owners of the information that the data has been used correctly.
This is simple enough: if the library accesses an individual’s address record, it
should leave a token with him saying that it will be used to send a statement, when the
statement arrives, it will contain a reference to the token. The token and its reference
can then be reconciled. In effect, every piece of information can be tracked to its
source: one can think of this process as like recording the progress of a note of currency
in the economy by tracking its serial number. There are already mechanisms for
this form of transaction processing in most modern information processing systems:
in particular, web servers have a system of transferring “cookies”, unique session
identities that can be attached to the transactions an individual undertakes.
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Possibilities The possibilities for co–operative information sharing between respon-
sible organisations and individuals are enormous. The health-care industry in partic-
ular could benefit by having near instantaneous access to medical records. Insurers
would be able to evaluate risks better; law enforcers could isolate groups of people
who may demonstrate a propensity to become offenders and take preventive measures;
they could also determine which groups of people are most likely to have crimes com-
mitted against them. Of course such systems would need to protect civil liberties: if
someone were determined as being a potential offender, it must be possible for him
to appeal against that classification.
Part II
Database Security on the
World–Wide Web
Chapter 2
Requirements and Analysis
The original brief for this project was to develop a software system that would
allow medical practitioner’s databases to be accessed securely and safely. In this first
part of the dissertation, a functional design is developed based on existing technology
which could be used for a system that could provide personal information in the
manner described in §1.1.
There are already systems in use that have similarities to that proposed: OncoNet
[Blo01] provides oncological information to a high degree of data security because it
is operated and used by one well–managed organisation.
When access is more open and management more collegiate, then such systems
are more akin to digital libraries [Bat98, MeD98, SRI98]. These are well–funded and
have reached a high degree of sophistication, but, it will be seen, they have a simple
internal organisation, which effectively allows only one level of access.
There are other research projects for the health-care industry; these, too, are
better developed — the LIOM project [LIO99], for example. Although that project
aims to reflect the more complicated internal organisation of the health-care industry,
it is not intended to be self–administering, which this system aims to be. The LIOM
project, like others in this field, uses a meta–data model which has to be maintained
[RHC+96]. This is feasible on a small–scale (100 users or so), but the coordination
effort needed would probably be excessive for larger systems (1000 users).
In the security model proposed by Anderson [And96a] there are recommendations
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for technology, ITSEC standards for operating systems and databases. There are also
recommendations for access control schemes, variants of Role–based access control,
[San98], appear to be most adaptable to the collegiate federation of organisations
proposed by Anderson. There is an implicit argument for a Public Key Infrastructure,
PKI, which could support cross–certification, such as that analysed in [Mau96].
Secure Distributed Computing The system design is also complicated by its
attention to secure distributed computing [Sch94, Bir96], which is a relatively mature
field. Secure computing requires that processes have proven implementations and
execute on a safely constructed computer system with the least privilege needed to
complete successfully: the principal requirement is that it should not be possible for
other non–privileged processes to access any of the information produced or consumed
by the secured processes.
In distributed secure computing, this problem is doubly difficult. One safely
constructed computer system, system A, may hold confidential data, d, and another
safely constructed computer system, system B, may hold a proven implementation
of the process, p, to be used with the data. A may be able to pass d to B securely,
but B cannot be trusted not to compromise it. B can however send its process
implementation, p to A where it could execute and process the data, but A must be
sure that p has no means available to it which would allow it to communicate d by a
covert channel as well as be sure that p does not compromise the integrity of A. This
interaction is fairly simple: more problems ensue if the data from different sources
has to be merged.
Open Distributed Computing The analysis and design process is within the
framework of an Open Distributed Processing, ODP, system, [ISO97b], which is to
address the information processing problem from these five perspectives:
• Enterprise: what has to be achieved
• Information: what information is needed to do it
• Computational: how can that information be obtained or deduced
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• Engineering: what quality of service can be achieved in providing it
• Technological: what technology exists that could be used to achieve it
ODP merely recommends that the system design be addressed from all these
perspectives and that each one could be modelled, if need be — see for example this
discussion of working within the ODP framework [Can96].
The technological model is usually a given because it is the dominant technology
at the time of design. The remaining four models can be traded off against one an-
other. This chapter will be just a first pass over design issues and does nothing more
than describe how such a system might work. Usually one begins with a sketch of
the technology and enterprise models, then one sketches the information and compu-
tational models from the other two models to allow one to produce an engineering
model, which is a set of interacting agents and more or less defines the operation
of the system. The engineering model is then the basis for another iteration of de-
sign, where the enterprise, information and computational issues for each agent are
addressed.
2.1 Technology Model: The World–Wide Web
This section describes the technology available at the time of writing. It will be
seen, as the system is analysed, that the technology is fully capable of achieving what
is required of it. The real design problem is to establish policies for authorising access
and showing that they have been followed. Distinct aspects of information security
should be clarified because they are addressed by different technologies.
• Secure access: the information is protected against indiscriminate access.
• Safe access: the information is protected against indiscriminate use by those
who are allowed to access it.
Incidentally, the reason the World–Wide Web [W3C97] has been chosen as the
communications medium ought to be stated.
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• Wide access: the information can be accessed from as widely available a medium
as is available.
Wide Access — Web Technology As far as end–users are concerned the World–
Wide Web has only:
• Web–browsers
• Web–servers
It is worth mentioning that the Internet protocols underlying the World–Wide
Web can also offer secure electronic mail delivery [RSA99].
Probably the most useful piece of web technology for system designers is Java [SUN98b].
This is an object code interpreted language that runs on a virtual machine; it can be
constrained to only use specific operating system resources (files, sockets and so forth).
This programming language allows system designers to load software from anywhere
on the World–Wide Web and run it on a designated host in a safe environment. This
is absolutely ideal for agent–based software.
Encryption and Authentication Products — Secure Access The capabilities
of this web technology are widely–known and some specifications can be found in
[Cor98]. Most web–browsers can establish secure connections with suitably enabled
web–servers. (The latest version of the secured socket protocol is called Transport
Level Security and is discussed in [Eav99e].)
This hinges upon public–key cryptography and secure repositories for public–key
certificates. The standard governing this is X.509, [X5088], and the certificates are
consequently known as X.509 certificates. They are available widely, at a charge,
from certification authorities such as Thawte, [THA99]. There is some discussion of
their limitations in [Ros95].
There are some well–evolved software security products producing public–key
infrastructures[RSA98].
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Operating Systems and Database Products — Safe Access Operating sys-
tems are now relatively safe. ITSEC [ITS] grades them and, currently, there are a
number of products that have reached the acceptable security levels recommended by
Anderson [And96b]: E3 and above, [UK 96].
Database systems are also graded by ITSEC and there are a number of suitable
products for the system proposed [ill96] and it is possible to integrate these with
web–servers [Cor98]. Most databases support SQL, the Structured Query Language
[Nor96], which provides a set of access control mechanisms which, it will be seen later,
are adequate for the system proposed.
2.2 Enterprise Model: Contracts
The aim is to propose a suite of protocols that will allow access to databases to be
strictly controlled and thereby allow more and qualitatively better information to be
distributed and to simplify, standardise and partly mechanise the procedure whereby
individuals are granted access. This section will describe the relationships between
the parties as a set of contracts in the style of an enterprise modelling language as
described in [ISO97b] and, at slightly greater length, in [Eav99a].
A key argument in Anderson’s model for the security of clinical information sys-
tems is that individual information systems are assumed to be well–managed and align
to the structure of the organisation they serve. The access control mechanisms of these
information systems may use either a Bell–Lapadula [BL73] or Clarke–Wilson [CW87]
mechanism for determining rights. They form part of a collegiate system which has
some federal infrastructure which manages access control lists for the component sys-
tems. Anderson’s argues that the access control system for the access control lists
can only be Clarke–Wilson in form.
This section attempts to develop roˆles that could be used within the federal system,
so that they might be used in a roˆle–based access control system with constraints such
as RBAC2 described in [San98].
In this section, these roˆles will be specified using the principles of deontics [MW93],
which aims to reduce difficult contractual relationships to sets of rules concerning
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rights and duties.
Adjudication and Loss Contracts describe expected behaviour — usually, the
formalisation of an existing behaviour. Each party to a contract believes that the
expected behaviour will be forthcoming because it would be too costly to do otherwise.
Either because it is practically too expensive not to behave as required, (it might
change existing procedures), or, that penalties will be incurred by the party who
breaches the contract. The latter requires that an adjudication service be available
to determine if one party has not complied to the terms of the contract and that that
party be punished and the other recompensed for the loss suffered. The operation of
an adjudication service is quite sophisticated, but is discussed, in outline, in chapter
7; recompense for loss suffered is achieved by surety or insurance. The insurance
industry already has some policies for disclosure of information, but it would be
desirable if they were able to give cover at the time a contract is formed and it should
be a precondition that cover be arranged before granting access. The insurance and
surety process is capable of being mechanised [LMN97]; this paper also discusses how
licences could also be issued for people offering services through web–servers.
2.2.1 Parties
There are four types of party to the contracts. These are specified with respect to
the rights and duties they must possess and should fulfil. These are the entities that
must follow the principles given in Anderson’s model [And96b] and would appear as
roˆles within the federal superstructure of the collegiate organisation.
• Subjects
Subjects are the people (or organisations) on whom information is kept by the
owners of databases.
• Custodians
These individuals are appointed by the subjects; the appointment is usually de
facto, a person’s doctor is obliged to act as their medical representative and is
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therefore the custodian of their medical information. It should be possible to
make the appointment of a custodian explicit and a subject should know who
there custodian is. It may also be possible for a subject to be his own custodian.
The function of a custodian is to make access control decisions for the subjects.
It will almost certainly be necessary that custodians do this, because:
1. Subjects will not usually have the specialist knowledge needed to assess
access requests.
2. Custodians can act on behalf of groups of subjects which have similar
interests.
Subjects will usually delegate decision–making to one (or more) custodians. If
they choose to delegate to a group of custodians, then the subject can choose
from a number of decision processes — e.g. veto, unanimity, majority vote —
how the decision will be taken.
Custodians are responsible for the safety of information. They are not respon-
sible for the security of data storage and transfer of the information. That is
the job of the owner of the database, or databases, upon which the information
is stored and the facilities by which it is communicated. In short, custodians
specify the policies for information use, storage and transfer; owners execute
these policies. Very often the custodian and the owner will be the same person
acting in two roˆles. Within a medical practice, a doctor will make decisions
regarding information safety when he decides what to include in a letter of re-
ferral and will make decisions regarding data security when he chooses to send
the letter of referral by electronic mail.
Custodians should have some legal responsibility to the subjects. Most custo-
dians will be subject to legislation, such as, in the United Kingdom, the Data
Protection Act [DPA84]. It may be useful to think of legislation, and other
policies a custodian should adhere to, as having a custodian, which could be
made an active part of the system.
• Owners
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These people (or organisations) own the databases and the communications
infrastructures that hold and distribute the information held on the subjects.
They follow policies from custodians
The owners will add their own information to that the subjects have provided.
The owners will want to protect this information in the same way that subjects
will want to protect theirs. In this respect they can thought of as a subject who
is its own custodian for all the records in the database.
• Accessors
These are the people (or organisations) who access the databases held by the
owners. Accessors will be assigned a security clearance class and each of these
will have a membership panel of trusted peers who should be known to appro-
priately qualified custodians.
It may prove expedient for accessors to copy those parts of databases that
interest them, add their own interpretations to the data and republish the data
and, in so doing, they become custodians.
Closed Relationships A simple set of relationship rules might help clarify the
entities’ roˆles with respect to one another. The aim here is to ensure that the rela-
tionships are closed, so that the system can be self–governing.
There are four sets of rules.
1. Database management and composition
2. Subject–Record–Custodian
3. Multiple roˆles
4. Accessor permissions
They are expressed as class relationships of the HAS–A and IS–A kind. HAS–
A relationships can be by aggregation or by reference. Aggregation means that one
entity is a composition of the others. The reference relationship means that one entity
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knows about the existence of the others and there is some association between them,
usually ownership or delegation or use.
IS–A can be of two kinds: by generalisation and by template. The latter is
best called the IS–KIND–OF relationship and means that the two classes have the
same meta–class, but have distinct identities and behave autonomously. The IS–A is
usually implemented by inheritance and allows one class to be used in the same way
as the other sharing a more abstract identity and cannot always act autonomously.
Database management and composition This first pair of rules state that
an owner manages a database, which is composed of a set of records. The relationships
are one to many. An owner may manage more than one database.
(Database should be a more general concept because the rules describe control
relationships. The more general concept is one of a Resource. This would include
networking resources. An example of which might be a port number on a host com-
puter. Only databases have been described here because they refer back to subjects
directly.)
Owner
manages
−−−−−→ Database
Database
is−composed−of
−−−−−−−−−→ Setofrecords
and
Record
describes
−−−−−→ Subject
Subject
has
−−−→ Custodian
Subject–Record–Custodian The second pair state that each record maps to
a subject and that each subject has a custodian. This is the most important rule: it
associates data with information.
All the relationships can be one to many. In particular, a subject may have more
than one custodian. There might be a custodian responsible for policy regarding data
encryption of medical records and another responsible for the policy regarding the
disclosure of confidential information.
One to many also implies that if you have obtain a record, it will have a subject
and vice versa .
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Multiple roˆles The following IS–A relationships closes the system, so that all
the entities introduced must have at least one custodian. There are three cases to
cover:
• The database is a record which must describe a subject — this would be itself
and the record would be the database’s meta–data. Each subject must have a
custodian.
• An owner is a subject and must therefore have a custodian.
• A custodian is also a subject and so must have a custodian.
These rules encompass the relationships as they so often arise in practice. That an
owner also acts as a custodian, but in different roˆles — the example of a doctor sending
a letter of referral by e–mail. It also allows a custodian to be his own custodian. This
is useful for expressing supreme legal relationship: governments are only answerable
to themselves.
Database
is
−−−→ Record
Owner
is
−−−→ Subject
Custodian
is
−−−→ Subject
and
Accessor
has
−−−→ Permission
Permission
has
−−−→ Record
Setofcustodians
creates
−−−−→ Setofpermissions
accessor permissions The last three HAS–A relationship state how accessors
are involved. They stand outside the system, because there are no practical means of
enforcing any behaviour upon them. They access records via permissions. Permissions
are created by custodians.
Each permission has a record so the custodians act as a linking entity between
records (and their corresponding subject) and the set of permissions.
Summary The important points are:
• That a database of records has custodians for each of the records contained in
it and for the database as a whole.
Eaves, Ph.D 2000 Page 27
• Subjects, owners and custodians themselves all have one or more custodians.
The latter point makes the system closed and self–governing.
This set of relationships is very similar to the architecture of per-formative agents
proposed by [ISO97b] and also described in [Eav99a].
2.2.2 Grades of Anonymity
A well–known problem with personal information is that anonymity is no real
protection if it is possible to obtain an identity and a profile from one database and
use the profile to isolate some other confidential information from another database
[DSW90]. Anonymity can prove to be an obstacle to legitimate use of data. A
grading of degrees of anonymity might prove useful in specifying access contracts.
This grading, see table 2.1, is illustrated with reference to the medical profession, but
can be used elsewhere.
Class Name to Identity Relationship
Examples
Synonymous Person is named
Personal Physician
Pseudonymous Person goes under an assumed name
Secondary Physicians
Anonymous Person is unnamed.
Researchers and Administrators
Eponymous Group to which person belongs is named.
Researchers and Administrators
Table 2.1: Name to Identity Relationships for Medical Information
Pseudonymous identities are already widely–used in medical research; it allows
a particular patient to be referred to consistently and a thread of discussion can be
developed around that identity.
Eponymous identities are subtly different from anonymous ones, because an indi-
vidual is tagged as belonging to a particular group. Usually, genuinely anonymous
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subject data is partitioned over and over until all the subjects have eponymous identi-
ties. If it is possible to write back to the original record that a particular subject has
been designated as belonging to a particular group, then the subject has an epony-
mous identity. Under some methods of inference control, in particular random sample
queries [Den80], it is not possible to attach any deductions, and therefore eponymous
identities, to particular sets of records.
Some accessors may make local copies of datasets from databases and would add
their own classifications, if these are re–published then the identities would be epony-
mous — because it is possible to use the original database to establish a profile
and, by inference using that profile, obtain the classification made in the copied and
augmented database.
2.2.3 Views of Records
When a record of a subject is released, it should not be the entire record, but
rather a restricted view of the record that contains enough information to allow the
accessor to do their own processing. This is a principle more or less enshrined in most
information system security texts: “The principle of least information”1.
Having a restricted view of a record does allow identities to be restricted to epony-
mous, but anonymity — or at least the anonymity granted by using random sample
queries — requires an additional mechanism.
2.2.4 Duties of a Custodian to a Subject
Custodians are usually practicing professionals in a particular field. The relation-
ship between a custodian and their subjects is usually governed by an accepted code
of practice from a professional body, which is the collective identity of the custodians.
These professional bodies usually grant licences to their members to practice their
profession and there is usually an adjudication procedure to determine if a member
has acted improperly. This is the only contract between custodian and subject that
is needed. The duties of the custodian are to:
1See for example, [Den76].
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1. Grant minimal views to accessors.
2. Inform subjects of:
(a) Classes of accessors granted access to their records.
(b) View of record given to those accessors
(c) Evaluation of risk and insurance of surety gained on their behalf
2.2.5 Duties of the Owner to the Custodian
Owners are instructed by custodians as to whether or not the records for the
custodian’s subjects can be released. The duties of the owner are to:
1. Release no record without prior approval from a Custodian
This is actually required by the Data Protection Act [DPA84].
2. Provide Stated Degree of Anonymity
If a custodian allows a subject’s record to be published then the degree of
anonymity must be upheld.
3. Minimal View of the Record
The custodian will state the view of the record that can be granted to a class
of accessor and will expect no more than that to be released.
4. Minimal Set of Accessors
A custodian will grant access to a particular security class of accessors.
It is usually the case that a lattice model [Den76] of secure information flow is
in force2. This would allow accessors who have a “higher” security clearance to
be given de facto access as well, without having to negotiate with the custodi-
ans. The lattice model is a generalisation of the Bell–LaPadula access control
hierarchy [BL73], which could be described as “read–down, write–up” or an
2Lattice models are described in section §6.3.2. For now they can be thought of as hierarchical
organisation structures.
Eaves, Ph.D 2000 Page 30
accessor at a particular security clearance can read everything graded below his
own grade, but what he writes can only be read by those above his grade.
Whether de facto access is granted should be open to negotiation between cus-
todians and accessors as well.
2.2.6 Duties of the Accessors to the Custodian
The main problem is that accessors may need the right to re–publish the data
they have acquired from a database owner. An accessor could be an organisation and
might need to re–publish the data internally or the accessor may decide to re–publish
to a wider audience.
1. External Re–publication
The accessors must ensure that other accessors be vetted and approved by the
custodians in the same way that they were vetted and approved for access.
2. Internal Re–publication
It may be possible for the accessor to show that his organisation’s own data
security procedures are good enough to provide the custodian with enough
assurance to forgo vetting procedures for every internal accessor.
2.2.7 Duties of the Custodian to the Accessors
If an accessor is denied access then they have a right to know how they can put
themselves in a position whereby they may be granted access.
• Provide justification for denial of access
If an accessor fails to meet particular security clearance requirements they
should be told which so that they can change their clearance.
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2.3 Enterprise Model: Adaptability Issues
There is enough tested and approved technology available to implement a system
that could implement these relationships and provide the means for each entity to
fulfil the duties imposed upon it, the challenge is to design it in such that a way that
authorisation policies can formulated in a semi–automated way and that the system
could be almost wholly self–governing. The use–case scenario for accessors would be
something like this:
1. Reference to a database appears at a secure web–server
2. An accessor requests a particular set of records using secure e–mail from the
relevant custodians
3. Custodians make their decisions and return them by secure e–mail
4. Based on the replies: a set of views for the records is generated and the owner
of the database is instructed to publish it for the accessor’s eyes only
5. Accessor is notified of the views to use
6. Accessor uses secured connections to submit queries to the database on these
generated views
There are a number of problems with this. Firstly, the custodians will make their
decisions based on the current state of the records: a particular epoch of their ex-
istence. The accessor should either be restricted to that epoch or negotiate access
for all subsequent epochs. Only a few databases directly support epochs — Post-
greSQL [PSQ] does — without that different tables would need to be created for each
epoch and separately maintained.
Secondly, the collation of the replies would need to employ some least lower de-
nominator for the records, because some custodians may not grant access to particular
fields within the record.
Thirdly, the process would generate a lot of request traffic, which custodians would
be hard–pressed to keep track of and, therefore, to be consistent when applying their
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own criteria. It would be useful to employ precedents, e.g. a custodian has granted
similar access rights to an accessor who has been classed at a lower level than the
current requesting accessor, is it permissible to allow this accessor the same rights?
This requires a lattice of information flow, which, it was specified above, would be the
subject of negotiation between custodians and accessors. Using precedents requires
that accessors and records be classified. The process of generating precedents can be
accelerated if custodians are also classified, so that clearance gained from a custodian
who is ranked higher than another means that there is no need to secure acceptance
from the lower–ranked.
Fundamentally, custodians would either have to specify rules for access which
could be applied by a mechanical agent on their behalf, or a mechanical agent would
deduce rules from their actions and, after checking them with custodians, add them
to a rule base to be used later. Similar systems to this have been deployed [BW94,
Cas97].
2.4 Roˆle–based Access Control Systems: Informa-
tion Model
The information model proposed is that used for roˆle–based access control sys-
tems. These are described in Sandhu [San98], in which he argues that roˆle–based
access control systems have such a sophisticated information model that they can be
constructed to support all the other important forms of access control system.
Sandhu gives a simple information model, but this has been modernised, using
Booch’s notation [Boo94], and clarified. (A more suitable notation would object role
modelling, [Hal95], which is more easily formalised for implementation, but Booch’s
notation has been used for consistency.)
Objects The principal innovation of Sandhu’s roˆle–based design can be seen in
figure 2.1. Each object in the system has its own set of roˆles associated with it. Each
roˆle acts as an interface to the object. Each roˆle has a set of permissions associated
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with it. Both relationships — object–roˆle and roˆle–permissions — have constraints
objects associated with them.
Epochs and Constraints These permissions can be qualified by applying a set
of constraints, the Epoch constraints.
Although Sandhu specifies that these constraints exist, he does not make it es-
pecially clear what they constitute. This denotation follows the practice in modern
database design that access control rules and data descriptions can be revised so that
the previous generation is still available as a different epoch[ill96]. It will be seen that
a self–organising access control system will need to remember its previous state.
Hierachies The lattice structure of many access control systems is effected by
allowing roˆles to have a hierachy. This is illustrated using the class tree in figure 2.1.
There is an abstract role and this is sub–classed twice for role A and role B and role A
is sub–classed once for role A1. Modern database systems such as PostgreSQL [ill96]
have support for sub–typed data classes.
Subjects Figure 2.2 shows how a subject obtains the set of roˆles by which he may
access the objects. A subject first obtains a session. A session is an engineering entity
that qualifies what roˆles may be used by means of a session constraint entity.
Constraints The session constraint is dependent upon the manner in which the
session is established and is designed to reflect the different ways in which the same
subject may access the system. Access from a physically secure local area network
will be less constrained than from an insecure dial–up line. Other constraints may be
imposed because of accepted usage practice: some records may only be available for
specified dates and times.
Each session may have a different roˆle set. This allows the same subject to act in
the system in a different way.
Constraints A simple information model for constraints entities is given. These
control the system who may access what within the system.
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Figure 2.1: Role–based access control: object information model
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Figure 2.2: Role–based access control: subject information model
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Figure 2.3: Role–based access control: constraint information model
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Summary Sandhu’s model for roˆle–based access control systems is very useful to
this design discussion. It will be seen that most of the design and analysis for this
system will focus on generating the roˆle hierachy and a structure for constraints
objects and the information that must be placed in the constraints objects.
2.5 Computational Model
Most of the computation performed by the system would be to provide its adapt-
ability:
1. Generating views of records
2. Classifying accessors
3. Generating access rules
2.5.1 Generating Views of Records
Custodians would deny access to records or restrict access to certain fields. This
suggests two strategies:
• Either provide a full record with NULL put into the field values where a custo-
dian has denied access.
• Or generate a least common denominator view.
Nulling fields
• Either a new database table has to be created and the modified records inserted,
• Or a set of triggers3 to be generated to insert the NULL values where specified.
Neither of these is particularly desirable: the former requires a new table which
would need to be separately maintained; the latter requires triggers to be written
which would need to check a profile (specified by the custodian) for each record for
every access of the view, which would greatly affect performance.
3SQL allows a function to be invoked when a record is operated upon, see [ISO92].
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Least Common Denominator View The collation procedure to produce the
least common denominator view could employ one of two strategies:
• Maximum field coverage by minimising records included
• Maximum record coverage by minimising fields included
Both of which could be qualified by the accessor stating percentages of coverages
and ranking fields to be included.
2.5.2 Classifying Accessors
Accessors would need to be grouped and then those groups ranked relative to one
another to produce an authorisation lattice. Clearly, there are many policies for this:
most involve some arbitration outside of the information system itself between the
representatives of the different entities.
One procedure would to make use of professional standing within a respected
professional institution. There are many groups extant that could be used as the
basis for accessor control groups. The British Medical Association is the accrediting
professional organisation for practicing doctors in the United Kingdom. The Law
Society for solicitors. Belonging to a professional group implies that one performs a
certain roˆle. It may be necessary to enforce members of groups not to use their group
identity if operating in a roˆle not sanctioned by the group.
Grouping Accessors This is a proposal for system of grouping accessors together
which makes use of modern certification technology. The aim is that accessors and
their groups would be self–regulating.
Each accessor would have an X.509 certificate proving their identity. They would
then need to obtain a proposer and seconder from the group they wish to join. The
proposer and seconder would corroborate the identity of the applicant and make some
recommendation to the membership committee.
This protocol can be secured using a certificate chain and blind–voting protocols
described in [Sch96]. (Certificate chaining is just one message encrypted using the
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private key of one certificate and then by another. Blind voting allows a vote to
be taken which allows each party to prove to themselves that their vote has been
counted, without knowing who else has voted.)
Once an applicant has been granted membership of a group, they would then need
to be issued with a new certificate which would be their group membership. This is an
X.509 certificate with the group acting as the certification authority. In the event that
membership is revoked, the certificate could be made void without inconveniencing
any other members of the group. It also reduces the amount of encryption needed to
just one pass.
(Incidentally, the method proposed above produces a “Web of Trust”. There
are a number of different mechanisms for achieving this, again see [Sch96] and also
[YKB94]).
Ranking Groups There are two other functions that need to be developed for
self–organising groups. They must be able divide themselves up and to merge. This,
combined with an authorisation hierarchy, will allow them to better define who may
access what information. Groups, in this context, are abeyant to set theory and
what is needed is a defining membership function: much as one might say, X is the
set of all odd dice throws. This requires a distance measures which would allow
someone to say that under, a particular distance measure, member x is very similar
to y. Statisticians and actuaries do this all the time, it just remains to develop it for
professional groupings.
Deference For groups and their members to be ranked: the roˆle of the group
(or the function of its members) has to be quantified. The principle of deference is a
useful basis since professional groups apply it. Referring again to the British Medical
Association, it has sub–groups: student members, juniors, general practitioners, con-
sultants and specialists. At the same time, members of the BMA will have different
affiliations to other organisations, the Royal College of Surgeons, British Pædiatric
Association and so forth.
A family doctor with no special pædiatric expertise involved in a pædiatric case
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would be expected to defer to another doctor who is a member of a pæediatric asso-
ciation.
Roˆles and Ontologies This can be quantified by a distance measure. Doctors
would collect accreditations and whoever has the most of them over the range of
issues involved would be ranked above the others. The issues effectively determine
the roˆles. This, again, is a collective choice procedure which will be analysed in more
detail later. Suffice to say, that the members of the groups would rank themselves
within their own groups and rank their groups with respect to others with respect to
their current roˆle. There is no objective ranking between groups, or, come to that
amongst group members, because it depends on the issue at hand, which demands
that individuals take certain roˆles. This concept is explained in more detail in [GI97].
“Issues” is too imprecise a term, so ontology4 will be used in place of it.
Some relationship diagrams might help clarify this. An individual possesses certain
roˆles. The ontology within which the individuals are operating will require that
certain roˆles be fulfilled. With regard to accessors and custodians, these are both
types of individual. This relationship analysis is applicable to both accessors and
custodians, because mappings between the two sets using a common ontology will
help in allocating access views.
Accessor
is−kind−of
−−−−−−→ Individual
Custodian
is−kind−of
−−−−−−→ Individual
and
Individual
has
−−−→ Roles
Ontology
requires
−−−−→ Roles
Given the roˆles and the ontology, an ordering of individuals for an ontology can
be formed.
(Roles, Ontology)
orders
−−−→ Individual
4This is the term used in KIF see chapter §G.
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2.5.3 Classifying Records and Fields
Initially, views of records, and the fields within them, will be classified by the
custodian for each accessor given the ontology. The accessors will themselves be
classified and it should be the case that certain classes of accessors will require certain
types of record view. Consequently, classifications for record views will evolve for
different ontologies. This is another important requirement of the system so that it
can be self–organising: if views are ordered relative to group memberships then it will
be possible to recommend that groups be sub–divided to match information protection
requirements. Conversely, it can be used to simplify access rules by merging similar
groups.
These relationship diagrams might help to make clear how records can be ordered.
A record will have a number of views. Each ontology would require certain views.
Record
has
−−−→ Setofviews and Ontology
requires
−−−−→ Setofviews
Individuals have been ranked relative to one another for a particular ontology, so
if an individual is given access to a view, then granting that permission effectively
orders the views of the records in that ontology.
(Individual, Ontology)
orders
−−−→ V iews
Discussion There are three classification processes at work; the last is a corollary of
the first. This assumes that all the individuals are working within the same ontology.
1. Individuals classify one another
2. Individuals classify views
3. Custodians classify accessors
If the system is bootstrapped by a number of carefully deliberated classification
decisions, then more specific access rules can be generated. When it is not possible
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to apply a rule, it will be resolved by another classification decision by a custodian
and a new rule can be added.
2.5.4 Generating Access Rules
This process relies upon the generation of an information flow model [Den76,
Den82]. Without going into detail, an information flow model requires:
• A security classification scheme that classifies:
1. All views, and
2. All the accessors
Then, for a given set of views, an accessor must have a security classification that
is greater than or equal to the least upper bound of all the views demanded. So, one
can conclude, that computationally it is relatively simple to determine access rights,
if accessors and views are graded.
In figure 2.4, two sets of views are presented: Body Mass Indices, BMI, and
treatment costs. There is a choice of sub–views for each. §2.5.1, paragraph “Least
Common Denominator View”, stated that there are two parameters that a custodian
varies in generating a view for an accessor: the fields in the view and the range of
records. The fields here are the BMI entries in an historical medical record and the
treatment costs. The ranges varied are the age and ethnic groups.
A simple medical practice is shown in figure 2.5. The practice has two organisa-
tional functions: medical and administrative. Referring to the views available, the
medical staff, doctors and nurses, would be given write access to Body Mass Index
data, but not to treatment costs; the administrative staff would be given write access
to treatment costs, but not the BMI data. The owner of the treatment cost data is
the administrative arm of the practice, the owner of the BMI data is the medical arm.
The health authority which reimburses the medical practice for treating people
in its catchment area would need access to treatment costs records for all medical
practices in its area.
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In administering the practice — aligning it to the needs of the health authority
— it would be necessary to value the cost of taking a BMI reading and this would be
discussed at a meeting of the Practice Management Committee. In the classification
of the information held by the practice, the least–upper–bound of the medical and
administrative arms of the practice is the practice management committee.
Nurse
General
Practitioner
Practice
Manager
Clerk
Practice
Management
Committee
General Practice
Auditor
Health Authority
Director
Health Authority
Figure 2.5: Medical practice and health authority
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A medical consultancy is shown in figure 2.6. It has a similar structure to a medical
practice, see figure 2.5, but would also undertake the training of students, who would
be answerable to the consultant. A medical consultancy would undertake research
and would be answerable to a research organisation for any funding it receives.
Researcher
Research
Director
Research Organization
Nurse
Consultant Manager
Secretaries
Consultancy
Management
Committee
Consultancy
Student
Figure 2.6: Consultancy and research body
The difficulty is to join the two organisations’ structures. This would need to be
performed in the appropriate ontology.
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1. Consultancy
The most typical scenario is, of course, that patients would be referred to con-
sultants. The consultant would obtain his own information on the patient. The
patient’s practitioner would expect to be informed of the consultant’s findings.
The consultant might want to use the information he has obtained from the
patient for his research; the consultant should obtain the patient’s consent from
his custodian the patient’s medical practitioner.
2. Research
If the medical practice decided to make available the BMI information it holds,
the medical practice and the health authority would place stipulations on its
release.
2.6 Information Model — Views and Constraints
As stated, the technology to realize this system is already available, so it is not
necessary to detail all of the information the databases and web–servers would need
to operate. The information that is of concern is that needed to provide the newer
features:
1. Granting access to views
2. Provide assurances that each party is keeping its contract with the other.
3. Facilitate classification of accessors and views.
2.6.1 Granting Access to Views
There are two cases to consider:
• Either an access rule exists and can be applied
• Or there is no applicable access rule
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(Bear in mind, that an access rule may actually deny access.)
It is only necessary to consider the latter case, the procedure is simply a custodian
receives a request from an individual who wants to access some specified records.
Clearly, to do this the accessors will need to know who the custodians are and
how they can be contacted.
The custodians will need to know:
1. Accessor’s identity and proof of group memberships
2. Ontology under which the accessor is operating
3. View of the record they require
4. Precedents set by other custodians
5. Precedents set by access rules
The accessor will then be informed of the custodian’s decision. The decision could
then be formalised as a precedent upon which an access rule could be based.
2.6.2 Proofs of Contract Compliance
Most of the information that needs to be retained by the system will simply show
that the duties of each party are being fulfilled. All of this information would be
available from the log files of the databases and web–servers used.
1. Custodian Actions
Views of which records granted by a custodian to which accessors or groups of
accessors. Whether the view is re–publishable by the accessor and whether any
access rules are in force which would allow unvetted access.
If a custodian rejects an accessor’s request for access, then it must retain a
justification for that denial.
2. Owner Actions
Log all transactions by each accessor stating views and records accessed.
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3. Accessor Actions
Retain notifications of access rights granted.
This is the information that would need to be reconciled to show a subject that
either his custodian or a database owner has acted improperly.
2.6.3 Adaptability Support
Enough information has to be retained to classify accessors, and to group them,
and to classify the record views they are granted.
Classifying Accessors Each accessor has to retain the membership certificates
they have been granted by the groups they are members of. The group membership
committees should also retain their justifications of why each member was given
membership.
Classifying Record Views This information can be derived: as custodians grant
views to accessors, their group memberships and the ontology under which they are
working will be known. Consequently, the views can be classified.
2.7 Engineering Model
The engineering of an information system usually concerns itself with how services
can perform best. This is usually a choice between resilience and speed. This infor-
mation system has very different primary requirements: security and safety, and, as
noted above, this is a secure distributed processing problem. There are two functions
that must be engineered safely and securely: the protocol and formatting of messages
and the processing of them.
1. Security
• Integrity
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• Confidentiality
• Authentication
2. Safety
• Authorisation
• Information Flow
• Inference Control
There is no problem with message security, well–proven protocols, like Transport
Level Security [Eav99e] and its predecessors, the Secure Socket Layers [FKK95] are
supported by web–servers and web–browsers. It is the safety of the processing that
needs to be considered. The most important point is that a process is effectively an
accessor and any process that operates on secured data should have the appropriate
security clearance. A security clearance would be required both for the implementa-
tion of the process and the host machine it runs on. This has long been recognised in
secure processing, see [Ash99] for more explanation on the difficulties this gives rise
to.
Security clearance for implementations is needed because they may possess covert
channels of communication, see, for example, [TGC90] and security clearance for the
host machine is required because the process owner, or a corrupt systems adminis-
trator, could trace the process as it runs and capture any information it holds.
Secure process implementations and secure execution environments are collectively
known as a Secure Computing Base; the need for which has been well–known for some
time [Den82]; the difficulties of developing a secure computing base for mobile agent–
based systems are discussed in [ST93].
2.7.1 Functional Specifications
The database access system proposed has the following functions to fulfil:
• Memberships accreditation
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• Database broking
• Access negotiation
• Query formulation
• Query delivery
• Results delivery
• Results presentation
Memberships Accreditation The accessors would organise group memberships
amongst themselves at a web–server which supports secure transactions. This would
require that the professional organisations that accessors would belong to have a
Certification Authority, CA, available. (Thawte [THA99], for example, offers a cross–
certification service.)
Database broking At a web–server, access to which may also be secured, accessors
would see which databases are available to them to negotiate access to. This is
essentially a trading service, [ISO97c]. This would seem the sensible point to put
them in contact with the database owners and begin the process of access negotiation.
Access Negotiation There are three processes that could be followed:
• Access by rule
• Access by custodian consent
• Both of the above
If there is a rule that can be followed, then it is simply a matter of checking the
accessor’s credentials (group memberships) with the requirements of the rule for the
given database and the stated ontology of the accessor.
The other two require that either all the custodians be contacted or those custo-
dians who have not delegated to a rule.
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Some agent has to be put in place that can:
• Apply access rules
• Obtain access decisions from custodians
Query formulation Most accessors would not want to formulate queries using
standard SQL. They would probably use some kind of forms interface, as is common
with most commercial web–based databases [ill96], but this might be specific to their
ontology and may be recommended by their professional organisation.
Query delivery The query, once formulated as SQL, would be encrypted and sub-
mitted to the database back-end. The query should be archived as evidence in the
event of misuse.
Results delivery The results of the query may need post–processing to minimise
the opportunities for inference5. The results would also need to be archived as evi-
dence.
Results presentation Again, it is unlikely that accessors would be able to use
the results in the format returned by the database and some post–processing may be
required to present the results in a usable format for them.
2.7.2 Agents
The agents for the system can now be specified following the functional specifica-
tions:
1. Accessor Memberships Agent
2. Database Trader
3. Access Negotiator
5See [Den82] for inference control mechanisms.
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4. Query Formulator
5. Query Delivery Agent
6. Results Delivery Agent
7. Results Presentation Agent
2.8 Enterprise Models: System Agents
As stated there are three parties to each access contract:
• Owner
• Accessor
• Custodians (Owner is a custodian of the database as a whole)
The functions performed by each agent have been listed and briefly described. It
is now necessary to specify who has responsibility for providing each agent’s secure
computing base and who uses it and to whom the secure computing base must provide
assurances. Table 2.2 clarifies this. Supplier indicates which of the parties should
provide the secure computing base, Users is a list of the parties who would use the
agent, Assurances to is the list of those it must provide assurances to. (Bear in mind,
again, that the owner of the database is also the custodian of it as a whole.) The
concept of a supra–organisation has to be introduced — Supra–accessors etc. — they
vet their own members or act, collectively, on their behalf.
What is unusual about these “ownership, use and trust” relationships is that they
are tri–partite. Most relationships between entities in systems are bi–partite. All bi–
partite system interactions can be reduced to be (produce, consume), but tri–partite
relationships have to introduce a second interaction which is to observe the produce–
consume interaction: (produce, consume) and ((produce, consume), observe). Ob-
servation is achieved by having the producer and consume both sign the information
they produce and consume and using that as a product the observer consumes. The
observer would reconcile the information produced and consumed.
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System Secure Computing Base
Agent Suppliers Users Assurances to
Accessor Memberships Agent Supra–accessors Accessors Owners, Custodians
Database Trader Supra–owners Accessors Owners, Custodians
Access Negotiator Supra–custodians Accessors Custodians
Query Formulator Supra–accessors Accessors Accessors
Query Delivery Agent Owner Accessors Custodians
Results Delivery Agent Owner Accessors Custodians
Results Presentation Agent Supra–custodians Accessors Custodians
Table 2.2: Ownership, trust and use relationships for system agents
As Spreitzer [ST93] has pointed out, one secure computing base will do for all
parties, if they are all satisfied that the computing base is secure enough for all of
them.
2.9 Engineering Model
It is now possible to specify the system. Booch [Boo94] object interaction diagrams
are used here. (The class relationship diagrams are not given.) The interaction
diagrams are easy to understand.
1. Objects are described by Name : — the name may be omitted. The attributes
of the object are listed under the name and class. Very often one of the attributes
an object possesses is a back–reference to the object that contains it.
2. The short arrows are method invocations by one object onto another. The
arrows terminated by a small circle are the return values of the method.
3. The lines connecting objects denote that the object sending a message has the
object reference to the recipient a priori : it is part of the object’s state when
the interaction starts. Object references can be qualified by an F if the object
is a field of the one referring to it.
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4. New object references are obtained as the interaction proceeds by returning an
object reference as the result of a method invocation.
5. Objects can create other objects. The creation call is the name of the class with
the construction parameters. An arrow to the object indicates which has been
produced.
In the text, classes are denoted by this style Class, objects by this A.
2.9.1 Accessor Memberships Agent
Every accessor is initially an object of class Member. Each one of which has been
issued an X.509 certificate, encapsulated in an object of class Credential.
When an Member object applies to join a group, Group, it follows the object
interactions shown in figure 2.7. Object A has a credential B and applies to join
group G having credential H . The group has a membership committee which vets the
application and, if successful, asks a certification authority to create a new credential
specifying C that states A is a member of G. This credential is then passed back to
A, who accretes it for its own use.
(Note in the interaction diagram, theMembership Committee object has a reference
to the prospective Member. This is just shorthand. Ordinarily, the new credential
would be sent back to A by G.)
2.9.2 Database Trader
This system agent is best provided by some collective agency for the owners of
the databases — Supra–owners.
Custodians will want to prevent database owners from publishing their databases
indiscriminately, because it will mean they will have to vet too many access requests
and possibly incur greater risks of disclosure. The database trader has to provide
assurances to them.
Database owners will want to specify which type of accessors be allowed to know
what databases they possess.
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Figure 2.7: Accessor Memberships Agent
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(This is not specified in the interaction diagrams: the database trader should also
provide a justification for any denial of access to an accessor.)
It should be apparent that publishing the database at a trader is a similar access
control problem to that of determining whether access to the records to a particular
accessor is allowed.
The interaction shown in figure 2.8 shows how a member would obtain a list of
databases. Each database has a set of views and each set of views contains a statement
of its relevant ontology.
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Figure 2.8: Trader Agent
Once the member has obtained a reference to a database, it can interrogate it
to see what ontologies it can be used for and the current set of groups who have
designated as existing in that ontology. This is illustrated in 2.9.
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2.9.3 Access Negotiator
The Access Negotiator agent is best provided by a collective agency acting on behalf
of the custodians — Supra–custodians. It services the requests of the accessors and
provides assurances to the custodians.
Figure 2.10 shows the arrangement of the objects, before access negotiation begins
in earnest. A submits a request to the Access Negotiator G stating his credentials,
the database Z and set of views Y A wishes to access. Because A has been able in
figure 2.9 to interrogate the database directly, it can supply a subset of its credentials
B which it knows will satisfy the criteria.
The Access Negotiator would be empowered to determine if A has supplied a set
of credentials B which do entitle A to access the requested views Y in Z by referring
to a SetOfPrecedents for the SetOfViews Y . This is not detailed in an interaction
diagram. In this activity, the access negotiator simply acts as an access control list
enforcer.
The real work of access negotiation is shown in figure 2.11. The Access Negotiator
passes the access request to the SetOfCustodians. Each of the custodians would obtain
the ontology and the groups working within that ontology for the views requested by
the Member object making the request and the ontologies and groups of the Member
by referring to the SetOfCredentials supplied by the Member object.
If the SetOfCustodians collectively agree that the Member object should be allowed
access they would create a new Precedent object allowing members of group G to
access views Y .
Incidentally, it may be necessary to create a new group with corresponding cre-
dentials to allow a particular accessor a set of views.
2.9.4 Query Processing
A set of four agents form a call and reply chain. The incomplete object interaction
diagram appears in figure 2.12. TheMember object instructs a Factory object to create
the objects using the SetOfCredentials B to access the database Z, the views may need
to be provided if the accessor has a choice of views available to him. The remainder
E
a
v
es
,
P
h
.D
2
0
0
0
P
a
g
e
59
Z:Database
OntologyZ:Database
Ontology
G:Access
Negotiator
SetOfDatabases
A:Member
1. 
ac
ce
ss
Re
qu
es
t(Z
,B,
Y)
B:SetOfCredentials
:Certification
Authority
SetOfCredentials
H:Credential
G
Z:Database
SetOfViews
SetOfCustodians
X:SetOfCustodians
Z
Y:SetOfViews
Z
FF
F
ig
u
re
2.
10
:
A
cc
es
s
N
eg
ot
ia
to
r
A
ge
n
t
E
a
v
es
,
P
h
.D
2
0
0
0
P
a
g
e
60
Z:Database
SetOfViews
SetOfCustodians
X:SetOfCustodians
Z
G:Access
Negotiator
SetOfDatabases
1. accessRequest(Z,B,Y)
P:SetOfPrecedents
Ontology
SetOfViews
Y:SetOfViews
Z
O:Ontology
O:Ontology
G:SetOfGroups
G: SetOfGroups
O
1. getOntology()
O 2. getGroups()
G
B:SetOfCredentials
1.
 g
et
Gr
ou
ps
()
G1:SetOfGroups
O1
3. adjudicate(G1,O1,G, O, Y)
2. getOntology()
G1

O1
R
R:Precedent
G1
Y1
4. Precedent(G1, Y1)
R
F
ig
u
re
2.
11
:
C
u
st
o
d
ia
n
s
es
ta
b
li
sh
in
g
n
ew
p
re
ce
d
en
ts
Eaves, Ph.D 2000 Page 61
of the object interaction is not diagrammed, but it would consist of formulating a
query, which would then send it on to Q2, which would encrypt it correctly for the
database, and would probably share an encryption key with R2. R2 would send the
results on to R1 which would then return them to the accessor.
Queries submitted and results delivered would need to signed and returned to the
respective originators as part of the observation procedure. Again, this is not detailed
in the interaction diagram.
Query Formulator
The view granted to the accessor will provide meta–data describing its contents.
Although this information could be construed as being sensitive, there seems little
point in protecting this, so the query formulator can be wholly owned by the accessor.
Query Delivery Agent
This agent is responsible for delivering the query securely to the database that
can answer it. This agent is responsible for collecting the query from the query
formulator. Constructing a message containing the query. Having that query signed
as originating from the accessor and sending it. On receipt, the server at the database
would check the signature and so be able to check that the accessor submitting the
query has the right privileges to do so.
The database owner knows best how to do this, but the query has to be logged,
should evidence of a breach of trust between owners and custodians be needed.
Results Delivery Agent
The results will contain classified information and they need to be logged to prove
breach of trust if needed. As pointed out above, there may be a need to perform
post–processing, so the results delivery agent should be owned by the custodians.
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2.9.5 Results Presentation Agent
The results are classified, so the presentation agent has to be owned by the custo-
dians. The accessor would collect the results from the agent using a secure channel.
2.10 Summary
The design issues that have arisen from this analysis are that lattices of informa-
tion flow are needed.
• Each accessor would require a set of security clearances assigned to them
• Each view of the records available in the databases must be assigned a security
clearance
• Each of the system agents must have a security clearance
• Each secure computing base must have a security clearance.
It should be possible to generate these lattices by interpreting the following infor-
mation:
• Hierarchy of group memberships produced by accessors’ supra–organisations
• Adjudications by custodians of views granted to accessors
• Hierarchy of secure computing bases.
Methods of generating lattices will be addressed later.
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Chapter 3
Access to a Database
Chapter 2 took the functionality — and the security features — of databases very
much for granted. This chapter sets that right, with a positive result: SQL databases
do have the functionality to support an adaptable information service. The previous
chapter proposed a system architecture, this chapter is a technical analysis of the
capabilities of the most important component of that system.
3.1 Issues
All that is required is that a database can be shared by two sets of users: “native”
local users and World–Wide Web-based remote users. This produces its own set of
issues:
• Capabilities
• Ownership and Autonomy
• Portability and Adaptability
• Security and Safety
The first of these addresses how different databases grant or deny access — what
information and computations can be performed by them. The second addresses:
how much can a database owner allow a foreign administrator to operate upon the
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database. Thirdly, how flexible is database access technology, can it adapt to a client’s
environment or must the client adapt to it. Finally, can databases be secured and
how safe are they.
3.1.1 Capabilities of Databases
What follows is a brief summary of the differences in design between a number of
databases1 that support SQL. The differences considered are how may the database be
secured. Currently, SQL is at version 2.0 or that standardised in 1992. Unfortunately,
there are three types of SQL conformance: full, intermediate and entry.
Meta–data SQL–conformant databases have different internal architectures, since
it depends on the type of SQL conformance as to whether catalogues must be
provided. Catalogues and schema are implemented as tables, so it is possible to
emulate them. Only in full–SQL is it required that the full set of procedures to
manipulate catalogues be available. Catalogues contain schema. If catalogues
are supported then at least the Information Schema must be contained in each
catalogue. The information schema contains meta-data about tables, views and
procedures. It will contain names and descriptions of fields and the behaviour
of procedures. All persistent objects named by a schema are associated with
the authorisation identifier of the schema. When an SQL–session is started a
cluster of catalogues is assigned to the session.
Relations Relations are tables or views and all SQL databases support both.
Accessing Two aspects to this: security and loading. Most SQL databases support
the access control primitives. These are “Revoke” and “Grant” for a named user
or group and are only applicable to relations. Rights are not associated with
procedures. As for loading, most databases can limit the number of clients that
can simultaneously access it, but not all of them allow clients to be differentiated
between internal and external users.
1Oracle, Informix, Postgres and Illustria[ill96].
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Rules Some databases support an additional “rules” or “triggers” feature which is
relatively recent and should be required in the next issue of the SQL standard.
A rule allows one to specify actions to carry out in addition to or instead of
the invoker’s action to select, update, delete or insert a record. One of those
actions is to do nothing. The rule concept was originally introduced to allow
indices to be updated or for exported keys to be updated. A “where” clause is
permitted which allows one to perform any tests on or with a user’s identity.
So this mechanism could be used to check whether a record can be released to
a given user or not. Unfortunately, the behaviour of rules is difficult to specify
and, consequently, implementations vary. The main point of debate is whether
a rule is to be applied to a table or a record — with records inheriting rules
from tables.
To secure SQL databases potentially every accessor would need to be given an
information schema of the set of views and procedures to use. And there would need
to be a corresponding set of grant and revoke commands issued on those views.
The only rights that can be granted or revoked are select, insert, update or delete.
There is no means of preventing the execution of a procedure, but there is no need
to, since one can only operate upon relations and access to them is constrained.
In addition, full SQL con-formant systems support the propagation of grant rights
by allowing a user to grant the “WITH GRANT OPTION” to another. This partic-
ular feature is very useful for delegation and re–publication and is discussed in more
detail later §3.1.4.
3.1.2 Ownership and Autonomy
Most organisations regret that their own database administrators have complete
access rights to their information and so are unlikely to extend those rights to an
external administrator. Further to that most databases are so complex, it is unlikely
that any administrator would allow an external administrator to create views for
each group of external accessors, but both of these requirements are a necessity for
the system proposed.
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3.1.3 Portability and Adaptability
Portability addresses how easily a system can be used in a different technological
environment. Adaptability: how easily that system can be modified for a different
end-user.
Portability A residual problem when remotely accessing a database has been the
lack of any standard for the database driver. This problem has been eliminated by
the adoption of the Open Database Connectivity, ODBC, standard, see [Nor96] for
references. It provides an addressing scheme that can locate databases on remote
hosts and specify how access should be gained (user-name and password). It does
not propose a standard protocol. ODBC drivers are still specific to the databases
they drive — a client side needs to be installed for each type of database. There is
directory service, one simply has to know the correct form of the address.
It is now possible to use a platform independent database querying engine, namely
the Java Database Connectivity package. It relies upon each database having a Uni-
form Resource Locator, URL, and the JDBC manager attempts to load a driver class
having a specified relationship to the URL. The driver class can be loaded over the
network, this means that client machines can be configured for accessing a particu-
lar database with no down-time. Also, because URLs are used to locate databases,
the directory service is a world-wide browser and one can use catalogues of URLs to
locate the resources needed.
Adaptability Because a URL is used to specify the driver class and the driver
class can be loaded over the network, it is possible to load a different driver class for
the same database: one that might have different access rights available or access to
different catalogues.
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3.1.4 Security and Safety
Security
This topic covers practical aspects of database access. Can the queries and re-
sults sent to and received from a database be confidential to the client? The simple
answer is yes, but most databases do not support secured channels directly, it is
necessary to have an encrypting and decrypting agent placed in the communications
channel between client and server database. Using the JDBC package, it is possible to
write a custom driver which encrypts queries and sends to them its decrypting coun-
terpart which would then forward the query to the database and then encrypt the
results. More sophisticated protocols can be implemented by using remote procedure
calls between the encrypting and decrypting agents, such as the scheme described
in [Eav99d]. These could negotiate keys, add sequence numbers and perform time–
stamping transparently to the client and server.
Safety
Views One of the assumptions made in chapter 2 was that accessors would use
negotiated views of records and that these could be made safe by granting rights to
a set of accessors and revoking rights from all others.
There are two authorities which justify this: Minsky [Min76] and Denning [Den89].
Also one needs to consider how access rights might be propagated.
Branding, Tickets and Capabilities Minsky [Min76] describes a concept
called branding. Essentially, every data type is branded and each user has a set
of brands that can be accessed. This is easily realized for a database in the following
way:
DataType V iew and Brand Username
Although this might seem facile, SQL is one of the few data access languages that
supports branding. It is not possible to brand objects in most other programming
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languages because there is no access control mechanism which could require a brand.
It is possible to implement branding in object–oriented programming languages that
support a call–back mechanism, but this is cumbersome. Only Java has institution-
alised it with the SecurityManager, GuardedObject and the Permission classes of their
security architecture [SUN98a, GS98]. An object–oriented system presents an ad-
ditional problem for branding, because it might be desirable to brand a base class
and allow access to it, but not to branded derived classes. Java avoids this problem
by only allowing implementation classes to be extensions of GuardedObject — not
interfaces or abstract base classes.
Finally, it should be said that object–oriented database access languages, such as
those proposed by the Object Database Management Group [Cat93], have not really
addressed security issues in their language proposals. It is well–known that safe
and secure programming needs to be implemented in the programming language2.
Denning in [Den89] advocated a database system known as System–R, developed
by IBM, which supported branding and had other attractive features. The query
language developed for System–R was the prototype for SQL.
It should be added that branding is now considered to be a variant of ticket–(or
capability–)based authorisation. An accessor must be in possession of a valid “ticket”
to access an object [BW94].
Subjects, Objects and Rights On the occasions that authorisation systems
are discussed it will be necessary to use some special terminology. This is a pre´cis of
a description found in [JLS76]. Users of an information system are usually designated
as subjects3 and the data entities they access as objects. Which subjects may access
which objects is specified by a lattice model: this acts as an organisation hierarchy,
lattice models have useful properties which are discussed in §6.3.2.
Every subject and object has a specified access classification. It is this that deter-
mines whether access is granted. There are just two access rights — read and write
2Again, see Denning’s discussion of flow control in [Den82].
3This kind of subject is different from the subject that was described in the requirements chap-
ter 2. Subject in an authorisation context would be an accessor in the context of the system
requirements.
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— and one special right: invoke and two meta–rights, take and grant. These latter
two are discussed in detail in the next section, but it should be pointed out that the
grant right is something of a misnomer, it does include the ability to deny a right as
well. There is one relationship which is ownership.
The create and destroy rights can be thought of as the right to invoke the create
operation on a factory object or the destroy operation on an object itself.
The creator of an object is its initial owner. Ownership can be transferred and
shared. Subjects are not owned by any other subject or object. All objects are owned.
Subjects can create and destroy objects and objects can create and destroy objects
if they are the owner of the object or the owner grants permission to invoke the destroy
operation. Subjects can only be created and destroyed by some special means.
A subject can also take on the roˆle of an object, but an object cannot take on
the roˆle of a subject. Subjects may try to access other objects, objects other objects
and, because subjects are also objects, subjects may try to access other subjects and
objects subjects.
Because every subject or object may access every other subject or object, then,
as far as data access is concerned, they can all be thought of as objects. This makes
the rule for granting access easier to express:
Access is only granted if the accessing object has a high enough security
clearance for the object it wishes to access for the specified right.
There are two other rights which are more subtle in their operation. These are
discussed next.
Taking and Granting Rights Denning in [Den82] gives a fairly complete dis-
cussion of the difficulties of taking and granting rights to data objects. In particular,
the “Take–Grant” model of Jones, Lipton and Snyder [JLS76]. This model is con-
structed as follows: between a subject S possessing certain access rights and a data
object O which requires particular access rights, there must exist a path of actions
to take or grant rights from and to other agents before S can access O.
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Take A take action is performed by S, or an entity acting on the behest of S ′, and
takes access rights from others.
Grant A grant action is performed by another agent R who grants access rights to
S or an agent, S ′, acting for it.
Clearly, if S is to access O, then S must find a tg–connected (t for “take”, g for
“grant”) path to O. Jones, Lipton and Snyder show that this path can be found in
linear time. They introduce the concepts of bridges and islands. Islands are maximal
tg–connected subgraphs of subjects only, where everyone may take whatever rights
the others (on the island) have. A bridge is a tg–connected path which gains access
to an island — a chain of take actions is an example of a bridge. An initial span is a
bridge to an island from a user. Figure 3.1 shows a principal p, using an initial span
to reach an island where p′ has a tg–path across a bridge to another island where a
terminal span from s′ to s gains access to an object x.
This is exactly what people do every day when they make use of computer systems.
They log-on — the initial span — they are placed in the island of their group and
may access particular objects because of that.
As for databases, SQL only supports a “GRANT” action — there is a corre-
sponding “REVOKE” action — and it is quite difficult to conceive of a system that
actually employs a “TAKE” action. Bishop [Bis81] argues that take actions are only
performed by privileged users — the superuser in a Unix system, Administrator under
Windows and the DBA, database administrator, under most SQL systems — because
they are able to grant rights to whomsoever they wish. It could be argued that if a
user in one role, such as system administrator, grants to himself in another role, an
ordinary user, a right that he would not normally have, then this constitutes a take
action. It would seem then, that a take action is a grant action that does not require
inducing the owner of the right to grant it.
In which case, there are many examples of take actions. If one inspects the
CERT Coordination Centre’s archives, see [CER98] for example, it is all too clear
that there are many ingenious ways to take rights. A common method is to force an
overrun on a statically allocated command buffer, which, if correctly formatted, will
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overrun into another more privileged command buffer which can then make an illegal
grant command. These are implementation errors which one can only hope would
not appear in well–designed software — CERT do issue guidelines for application
programmers.
SQL users can only grant access rights, this requires the owner’s permission which
must be negotiated. If that negotiation is subject to peer review, such as the group
membership committees, then one must hope that such membership committees will
not grant membership rights lightly.
This, still, may not be a sufficient safeguard, because it may be the case that
members of a group have access rights they do not use, but, were they to make use
of them, they would have access to data they should not have.
It is therefore necessary to require that as security clearance lattices are con-
structed, it must be proven that there is no access path from lower classes to infor-
mation accessible to only higher classes and as Jones et al.make clear, this is possible
in linear time.
Republishing Databases There are two aspects to republication that need to
be considered. Firstly, if a user has legitimate access to the database through a safe
system, what prevents him from republishing it through an unsafe system. Secondly,
it would be desirable if a group can decide to grant a limited right of republication
to a sub–group, under the ægis of one of its members, and possibly to allow access
to other accessors who may not have been vetted by the group, but who are vouched
for by the member to whom the republication rights have been granted.
The former can be dismissed quickly. It is practically impossible to prevent re-
publication of material gathered electronically, but it can be costly to do. Some
web–browsers now have the ability to deny the user the ability to print or save a
web–page [SUN99] (and not store the page in a local cache), but it is possible to
capture the page by other means.
It is the cost of republishing without permission that makes republication with
permission so attractive that system designers should it make easy to do. SQL fortu-
nately makes provision for this facility, but does not require that it be implemented:
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it is the “GRANT” “WITH GRANT OPTION”: it grants to a user the right to grant
the named right. This is exactly what is needed to give to one trusted accessor the
ability to name his own group of accessors without having to duplicate the database.
Unfortunately, it will probably be the case that the people he wants to grant access
to will not be members of any groups known to the database owner. However, if it
is possible for the trusted accessor to give certificates to the members of his group of
accessors, then it should be possible to give them a security clearance.
Chapter 4
A Prototype System
This chapter describes a prototype database access system which is a proof of
concept development for many of the ideas and analysis discussed so far.
In the chapter discussing requirements, chapter 2, emphasis was placed upon
making the relationships between the different parties closed, see §2.2.1, so that the
management of access rights could be self–governing.
The prototype developed implements some key processes described in §2.9.
• Access negotiator agent in figure 2.10.
• Custodians establishing new precedents in figure 2.11.
The latter of these is the self–governing process and the former triggers its oper-
ation.
Some other processes were implemented for convenience: the database trader
agent figure 2.8 and there is a simple means of submitting queries and receiving
formatted replies figure 2.12.
The implementation is far from complete. The procedures implemented might
allow one to claim the system is safe, but it is by no means secure. There is no
encryption and no certificate technology has been deployed; so, data transfer is all in
cleartext and authentication is rudimentary.
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4.1 Technological Components
The prototype system contains just two components:
• A Web–server Jigsaw [Jig]
The web–server is unusual because it is wholly implemented in Java . This
makes the use of software agents much simpler — they can loaded into the
web–server and work within its secure environment. The web–server acts as the
secure computing environment for all users — accessors, owners and custodians.
Referring to §2.7.2 the agents that were implemented in the prototype were
implemented as Java classes which were loaded and run by the web–server.
• A Database PostgreSQL [PSQ]
This database system does provide some advanced features not usually found
in similar products. It did not prove necessary to use them. The real attrac-
tion of using this product is that the source code for the database and for the
Java Database Connectivity driver [Eav97] is freely available.
The prototype system’s security features are very limited. The requirements for
the system and whether they were implemented are listed in table 4.1 and 4.2.
4.2 System Agents
Regarding the implementation status of the agents §2.7.2:
1. Accessor Memberships Agent
Not implemented. There are suitable systems available, for example, a moder-
ated e–mail list would suffice for some applications. The prototype system used
the configuration feature of the Jigsaw web–server to add new members.
2. Database Trader
Implemented. It is possible for database owners to post the URLs of their
databases to the Jigsaw web–server.
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Requirement Status Notes
Secure
web–server
access
No There is currently no
web–server written in
Java that can implement
secured channels. Even if
there were, it would be
difficult to obtain a licence
for the cryptographic
technology.
Secure
database
access
No Again the web–server
cannot support secured
channels and, because the
JDBC driver is also written
in Java , neither can the
driver.
Safe database
access
Yes Only makes use of
user-name and password
pair and the basic
authorisation mechanism
available within the
hypertext transfer protocol.
Table 4.1: Prototype system: implementation vs. requirements (I)
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Requirement Status Notes
Certificate
Technology
No Certification Authority
servers are costly and are
effectively just a modern
replacement for user-names
and passwords.
Re–
publication
No PostgreSQLdoes not
support the “GRANT”
“WITH GRANT
OPTION”.
Adaptive
Capabilities
Yes This is the whole point of
the prototype and a simple
rule–adding system was
implemented.
Table 4.2: Prototype system: implementation vs. requirements (II)
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3. Access Negotiator
This is the key feature and both of its parts, figures 2.10 and 2.11, have been
implemented, and there no adaptive access control.
4. Query Formulator
Not implemented. There are suitable systems available. There was a JDBC–
based database query agent freely available, but this has been superseded by a
commercial product. In the prototype, one can only submit queries on the name
fields and one receives the whole record, from the assigned view, in return.
5. Query Delivery Agent
Implemented. A query delivery agent is part of the database driver that is
supplied by the database owner to the accessor.
6. Results Delivery Agent
Implemented in the same way as the results delivery agent.
7. Results Presentation Agent
Implemented. The accessor can choose which results format is used. The classes
to present the data are posted to the web–server.
Most of the information needed to prove that the contracts between the parties
have been adhered to §2.6.2 is available from the web–server’s logs. These would need
to be reconciled with the database logs of the queries submitted and results returned.
4.3 Adaptive Components
The systems needed to provide adaptability support, §2.5, are not part of the
prototype. They are more experimental and need a surer mathematical basis before
they can be implemented.
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4.4 Software
This section describes which parts of the system were implemented by which
component of the software. The software is described in more detail in appendix B.
The software used by the web–server to implement the functions of the system has a
different engineering configuration.
4.4.1 Implementation Engineering
1. Database driver
This provides the following system agents:
• Query Delivery Agent
• Results Delivery Agent
2. Queriers
This provides:
• Query Formulator
3. Formatters
This provides:
• Results Presentation Agent
The following agents have not been implemented in a way in which they can be
recognised as agents.
• Access Negotiator — the access request component is implemented as a web–
form; if access is granted, it is carried out using the configuration tools of the
web–server.
• Database Trader — appear as web–pages within the web–server describing the
databases available.
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4.4.2 Design Engineering
1. Accessor Memberships Agent
This was implemented by using the configuration features of Jigsaw and there-
fore custodians interacted with a set of web–pages. As new users (or accessors)
were added to the system, they were made part of the UserRepository. Each
user is allocated to a “Realm” which approximates to their ontology. (Unfor-
tunately, a user can have only one realm in this implementation of Jigsaw .)
The UserRepository actually makes use of a database as well. The idea under-
lying this is that each custodian, or supra–group for custodians, would provide
a database of their members. Access to this database would be subject to a
contract between the web–server provider and the supra–group administrators.
2. Database Trader
This was implemented using an HTML form within the web–server known as
the ResourceAdder. A database owner fills in the form on the web–server de-
scribing the database he plans to make available. He must provide URLs for a
suitable JDBC database driver and for compatible query formulator agent —
QueryByNames.
The JDBC database driver provides the two delivery agents (query and results).
The query formulator provided is a simple one that only allows a single query
by a patient name to be submitted.
3. Access Negotiator
This has been implemented as a web-page form which generates an e–mail which
is processed by an e–mail filtering program operated by the custodian. If the
custodian grants access, an e–mail is sent to the owner who then creates the view
granted, a user identity and posts a new database resource to the web–server.
The UserRepository is then modified by the owner using the configuration editor
of the web–server. Periodically, e–mail messages were sent to users to tell them
which database resources were available to them.
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There is also some simple rule application. When the e–mail from the web–
server is sent to the custodian, the custodian is informed in that message who
else from which realms has been granted what views. The custodian can reply to
the e–mail specifying which of these is applicable can be applied to the incoming
access request.
4. Query Formulator
A simple version of a query formulator was implemented and appears as the
resource QueryByNames in the web–server.
5. Query Delivery Agent
This is provided by the database owner when it posts the URL of the database
into the database trader.
6. Results Delivery Agent
Same as the Query Delivery Agent.
7. Results Presentation Agent
This is posted with the database driver at the database trader. It need not
be provided by the database owner, it is a set of text–processors which are
compatible with the output of the database.
4.5 Testing and Discussion
4.5.1 Tests
A fairly large database (1400 records) was made available. Two sets of tests:
functional and performance.
Functional One set of tests showed that it was possible for accessors to send e–mail
messages to custodians who could then instruct database owners to add views and
that the users were notified of the views now available to them.
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Another set of tests showed that the queries presented at the web–server were
satisfied in exactly the same way as they would have been had there been no web-
server interceding.
Performance The test conditions are summarised below:
1. Machines
Sub-system Machine Load
Client Web-Browser Sun SparcStation 50MHz less than 10%
Web-server Sun Ultra 5.10 30%
Database Sun SparcStation 50MHz less than 10%
Table 4.3: Test: Machines
2. Query Parameters
(a) Select on indexed key
(b) Display 38 field record
3. Database Parameters
(a) 1356 records in table
(b) Query satisfied in 4.5 seconds with text formatting by the database acting
alone.
The results were:
Quality Time (seconds)
Startup: Worst 45
Startup: Best 25
Worst 30
Best 10
Table 4.4: Database Query Access Times
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Some analysis The web-server system is a lot slower than the database alone:
up to ten times slower on start-up and a constant 3 times slower when running.
1. Implementation: The performance has the characteristic of Java systems, which
is that first time operation is particularly slow, since the Java virtual machine
must load all the classes needed. Thereafter, access can be faster, but Java
memory management is non-deterministic because classes are unloaded if space
becomes cramped.
2. Communication Overheads: the browser is connected to the web-server which is
connected to the database twice, once for the meta-data and once for the query.
PostgreSQL operates by receiving a query on one process — the postmaster —
and forking another process for the connection and processing the query. When
using the database’s own front–end, the forking has been performed already
and the same process is used for both meta–data and data enquiries.
3. Extra Processing: the web-server implementation formats the query results into
an HTML table which the PostgreSQL query frontend does not. The implemen-
tation of this formatting code is quite a general parser, so it is fairly inefficient.
Some discussion There is unlikely to be much improvement in performance
from running the processes on the same machine, since most operating systems treat
internal pipes in the same way as remote sockets.
Despite there being three processes involved there is not much parallelism to
exploit: the only opportunity might be with sparse queries in a very large database,
one could could be retrieved and formatted while the next is sought at the database.
There is one very real reason why performance suffers:
• Looking up catalogues on each query submission
HTTP is a stateless protocol — the server holds no state — the client must present
all credentials on every access. The client only presents his identifier when accessing
the server, so a call has to be made to the database to collect the catalogue and the
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view and then another call to submit the query and the results. When one considers
this, it becomes clear why the best performance of the system is at least twice as slow
that of the PostgreSQL frontend.
The obvious improvement is to cache the catalogues against each accessor. This
is quite feasible in Java , it would be possible to hold catalogues against a cookie1
associated with the client at the web–server. Unfortunately, caching is troublesome
to implement. It might be the case that a view is revised, in which the catalogues
held in the client’s cache at the server would be out–of–date. This might lead to a
security breach.
Lately, Java has added a better database access facilities under the Enterprise
Beans framework. This manages cookies and reuses a pool of database connections.
Future implementations of web–based database access products should use this tech-
nology.
4.5.2 Discussion
The proposed system’s use of agent technology has been proven in concept and
it only remains to consider how it might be improved and extended to provide all of
the functionality given in §2.7.
Improved Implementation The performance can be improved with a cache for
catalogues and improved implementations of the formatting functions. However, as
always with software systems, it is best not to concentrate any coding effort on improv-
ing performance until the design is complete, but the need for improved performance
must be recognised in the design.
4.6 Realizing the Proposed System
The prototype system is quite similar to the proposed system in its use of agent
technology: the database driver contains the query and results delivery agents, which
1Cookies are just randomly generated signatures which both a client and a server hold, effectively
a session identifier.
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do the bulk of the work. The query formulator and results presentation agents are
pieces of software that the accessor runs. The former uses the catalogues generated
for the accessor, the latter uses the results when delivered. The prototype system
does not implement re–publication, but it would be relatively easy for it to do so.
To secure the system: encryption and certificate technologies have to be used
and each agent implementation has to be signed with a manifest so that accessors,
owners and custodians can be sure that the agent implementations are authorised.
Encryption is available, certificates can be bought and there are application develop-
ment libraries that allow the two to be used together. Application signatures under
certificates are already available. The only difficulty is to implement and integrate it
all.
Integrating the application signatures for the agent implementations of the query
formulator and results presentation agents would take the form of presenting them
on the the web–pages where they are selected. The server at the database can check
the signature of the query delivery agent and the web–server can check the signature
of the results delivery agent.
All of the agents — query and results delivery, query formulator and results pre-
sentation — would need to be assured that they have been invoked on a mutually
acceptable secure computing base, (SCB). This SCB would need to sign the messages
going between client, web–server and database as well.
There is currently no well–evolved technology to do this. The only method that
is appropriate is secured remote procedure calls. There is a proposal to extend the
remote procedure call system of Java to support this [Eav99d]. When there is a solid
technology on which to base these interactions then the system will be fully realizable.
The prototype does not perform any adaptive work — it does not attempt to
classify views granted, secure computing bases or accessors.
Part III
Political Control Mechanisms
Chapter 5
Political Control of Access
Privileges
The first part of this dissertation has described sophisticated mechanisms for se-
curing data and making information safe, all of which would require that policies be
specified stating what information may be accessed by whom, §2.5.4 — when and
where data may be accessed would also need to be made plain. It is the notion of
policies and the formulation of them that prompts one to consider using political
procedures to control them.
As will be seen, this thinking is not entirely new but it does not appear to have
been openly acknowledged that policy–making for system management is a politi-
cal process. Add to that, that politics is not as amenable to quantitative analysis
as economics. There are many excellent mathematical analyses of the operation of
auctions, see [MRS90], for example, but, in comparison, there are relatively few that
describe how an organisation structures itself.
The remainder of this chapter describes how authorisation systems can be thought
of as political systems and introduces the quantifiable concept of norms. It then briefly
describes some more suitable languages for communicating rules and concludes with
a discussion of the enterprise: its goals and norms.
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5.1 Authorisation Policies for Databases
Access control policies will be discussed in this section. The same terminology
used in §3.1.4 in the paragraphs Subjects, Objects and Rights and Taking and Granting
Rights will be used. The rules described there will be changed here to demonstrate
how different access control policies are implemented.
5.1.1 Mandatory and Discretionary Access Control Policies
The formulation of authorisation policies can be carried out in, broadly, two ways1:
mandatory or discretionary access control.
Before describing the differences between them, it is best to describe what they
have in common. Both systems are under control of an administrator. The adminis-
trator is the only entity that can create subjects. In access control system design, the
systems are idealised. It is not possible to copy an object and use it in place of the
original. This is form of object protection is cryptographically feasible see [GS98].
Mandatory access control If the lattice of information flows between subjects
and objects cannot be changed by the subjects while the system is operational, then
access control is mandatory. This is the case with military systems which use variants
of the Bell–LaPadula model [BL73].
The rights management rules for mandatory access control systems are as follows:
1. Ownership may not be transferred or shared by any subjects or objects. Only
the administrator can change ownership. When ownership is changed, the object
can be thought of as being destroyed and created anew. One would then apply
§3.
2. When a subject creates an object, the object’s access rights are fixed in that
state and can only be changed by the administrator.
3. When a subject reads an object and modifies it, a new object is created and
rule §2 is applied.
1This is a summary of a longer, illustrated argument in [Eav99a]
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4. The take and grant rights are denied to all except the administrator.
Usually, the delete right is denied to all except the administrator.
Discretionary access control The alternative is to allow enough information to
flow within a system so that subjects and objects can interact with one another. They
will then evolve a lattice of information flows by specifying security clearances for the
objects they create between themselves — Discretionary Access Control. This is the
case in most operating systems and SQL databases. A system administrator creates
an initial set of subjects and objects and the initial lattice flows by allocating the
subjects and objects to groups. As each subject or object creates another object, it
can specify which groups may access it. Only the system administrator can create
subjects and give them group memberships.
1. Rules §1, §3 from mandatory access control are applicable.
2. When a subject creates an object, the object’s access rights may only be changed
by the owner.
3. All owners possess the grant right, but the grant right may only be possessed
by owners. It may not itself be granted. The take right is denied to all except
the administrator.
Usually the delete right is available to owners and may be granted to others.
Unix System V release 4 This system of rights is the same as that found in Unix
operating system since System V release 4, (SVR4). System V release 3 and prior
versions allowed owners to transfer ownership which proved to be a major security
flaw. It has made inter-working between subjects more difficult.
Berkeley Standard Distribution 5.2 Unix The BSD of Unix overcame the
security problems of transferring ownership in a much more flexible way. It does so
by applying set semantics to access control. Each subject has a group of his own, of
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which he is the sole member and there are additional groups of which he is also a
member. When a user changes group ownership of a file, it can only be to a group
of which he is a member of; in this way subjects can act in a limited way as an
administrator.
BSD also allows designated areas to belong to a particular group. The setgid bit
of a directory can be set and this ensures that every file in that directory belongs to
the group of the directory, which was set by the subject when he created the directory.
Only the administrator can create subjects and groups, but the subjects now have
a means of administering group membership of objects indirectly. What subjects
designate as belonging to a group defines the membership of the group. For example,
if there are three users a, b, c and four groups W , X , Y and Z, such that W = {a, b},
X = {a, c}, Y = {b, c} and Z = {a, b, c}. If a grantr to Z o then he allows everyone to
read it, but if a grantr to W o then only a and b may read o.
(The problem with conventional operating systems is that b may now copy o and
make it available to c, which may not have been what a intended. This is not allowed
in an idealised system.)
SQL Finally in this section, the discretionary access control system of SQL must
be analysed: it is essentially the same as Unix SVR4, but allows a grant right. The
grant right can be constrained to grant only read or write from objects. In effect, this
gives to table owners in databases a setgid bit on any of the views they create from
the table.
5.1.2 Authoritarian and Self–governing Access Control
Authoritarian Both mandatory and discretionary access control policies are effec-
tively authoritarian because of the privileged position of the administrator. Under
the more liberal schemes used in BSD and SQL, it is possible for the subjects to de-
termine the information flow, but the administrator controls group membership and
subject creation.
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Self–governing For a system to be self–governing the privileged roˆle of the admin-
istrator must be removed by distributing it amongst the subjects. They will vote
collectively to specify group membership and whether new subjects can be admitted.
Subjects could then choose to migrate to groups which are able to accept them
and would be able to provide them with better information. The act of migrating to
a different group with a different collective administration is very similar to electing a
political leader. It is, in fact, a generalisation of the election process. This is a simplifi-
cation of political control that is used in the analysis of a well–known economic policy
issue: the Tiebout model [Tie56]. It can be thought of as an adaptive optimisation
problem [KMP95] where voters cluster around norms of their expectations.
5.1.3 Adaptive Discretionary Access Control Policies
There are some system proposals which attempt to discern norms of behaviour
and use them to constrain the information flows between the subjects and objects of a
system. Minsky proposes a system of laws under which software systems would work
[Min89, Min95]. A paper by Rabitti et al. [RBKW91] describes additional autho-
risation generation mechanisms to support the lattice model for an object–oriented
database. The innovation of the system is that it generates its authorisation policy as
it operates by generalising current behaviour to form norms. Authorisation is viewed
as having three dimensions:
Expression Authorisations specified by users, which are known as explicit and those
that are derived by the system, known as implicit.
Direction An authorisation can be positive, stating what may be done, or negative
stating what may not be done.
Strength An authorisation may be strong, in which case it may not be overridden, or
weak, in which case it can. Strong authorisations can be thought of as axiomatic.
This model has been extended [BW94] and a recent contribution by Castano
[Cas97] introduces metrics that can be used to generate norms, including:
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• Operation compatibility
• Subject similarity co–efficient
• Authorisation compatibility
• Semantic correspondence
• Clustering of subjects
All of which seem to be methods of ascertaining if different subjects (or objects)
belong to the same type. If the subjects and objects are typed already, then some
concrete questions can be resolved by using abstract rules. If a subject z is able to
grant rights to an object o, if z grantr to x o and type(x) = type(y) then z grantr to y o
is implied.
5.1.4 Preferential Logics and Operators
If two organisations are to share information, then a new organisation is formed
which contains the authorisation hierarchy of both. This requires that the two infor-
mation flow lattices be combined and this, in turn, requires a well–defined logic to do
so. There has been some research into preferential logics [ARS98] and some useful
operators have been defined. This work is based on graph–theoretical analysis of the
flow lattices which is something taken up later in this dissertation.
5.2 Suitable Languages
If preferential logics are to operate on authorisation hierarchies of organisations
using databases, the combined hierarchy will need to be communicated to all inter-
ested parties. There are already some suitable languages for this purpose.
KQML The Knowledge Query Manipulation Language is an agent–communication
language and is described in [Fin93]. It is part language and part protocol.
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KIF The Knowledge Interchange Format is an ontology definition language defined
in [GF92].
Both of these languages are explained in more detail in appendix G. For the time
being, KIF would be used to define the boundaries within which agents may operate,
(see §2.5.2, paragraph Ranking Groups.) KQML would be used to communicate KIF
descriptions of group membership lists and rules to the different databases.
The attraction of KQML is that it is a more enterprise–oriented language and has
been proposed for governing the interactions of agents. KIF is a formal language
which would define the information model for a set of collaborating organisations.
5.3 Enterprises, Goals and Norms
In chapter 2 the Open Distributed Processing modelling perspectives were intro-
duced. The least understood of these is the enterprise model. It is considered to
be a statement of the goals that an enterprise wishes to achieve — it would include
“The Mission Statement” — and the management structure that coordinates the en-
terprise to achieve its mission. An enterprise is a network of performative, constative
and normative agents.
Performative A performative agent can claim that it has carried out some action:
Executive function.
Constative A constative agent can judge if the action has been carried out: Judicial
function.
Normative A normative agent determines which performative agent should do what
task and which constative agent should verify it: Legislative function.
Most information processing systems have performative and constative agents
which are machine–processes, but the normative agents are usually human.
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Example: A Library System designers allow policies to be specified for the num-
ber of books that may be borrowed simultaneously for particular classes of borrowers.
They also allow policies for fines to be specified. The policies actually in place at a
particular library will vary.
Implicit in the design of the system are norms of behaviour expected from borrow-
ers. The local policies can be tuned to the behaviour of the borrowers at a particular
library when the library system is installed.
The enterprise model for the library system has been specified in part by both
the designers of the library systems (the policies that may be effected) and its ad-
ministrators (how those policies are put into effect). The library system will have
many performative and constative agents: when a borrower takes a book out a per-
formative agent initiates a process which will invoke a constative agent to determine
if the borrower would exceed his quota. The only normative agents are the library
administrators who determine the local policies. It may be possible to have adapting
normative agents which are programs — they might, for example, set the level of
fines relative to a cost index, for example.
But if there are new norms of behaviour: can the enterprise model’s system of
normative agents cater for them? A simple case might be a new class of borrower, the
system designers may have made it possible to add new classes of user. A normative
agent, in the form of one of the library administrators, will then add a new class of
user and allocate people to it.
But some norms of behaviour may be not be so easy to cater for. For example, if
borrowers feel that fines are too high and borrowing periods are too short, they might
organise some collective action: they choose to take their full quota of books out and
return them on the same day. This appears to have no effect on the library system
other than an increase in turnover, but it is very annoying for the library staff.
Under these circumstances, would it be possible to cater for this new behaviour by
the borrowers? Would it be possible, for example, to charge for re–shelving if books
are returned too soon? Would it be possible to isolate the borrowers who are taking
part in the collective action and enforce the re–shelving cost on them alone? Would
it be possible to invoke a new process altogether, for example, preventing users from
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entering the library if they appear to be taking part in the collective action. If that
were the case, how could a borrower appeal against the decision to bar him.
Most library systems, like most information systems, do not have the degree of
flexibility needed to integrate new policies based on new norms of behaviour without
significant re–engineering. There are even fewer information systems that are able to
generate and instigate new polices without human intervention.
5.4 Summary
Political processes cater for changes in norms of behaviour: the judiciary reports
increased numbers of adjudications, the executive reports increased workloads, the
legislative modifies the law to accommodate the changes in behaviour observed by
the judiciary and legislature.
By contrast, information systems are usually incapable of changing to accommo-
date new norms of behaviour. One of the reasons for this is that it was, until recently,
very difficult to re–engineer an information system. As can be demonstrated with the
prototype system described earlier, chapter 4, processes can be specified by the inter-
actions of agents and these agents can be replaced, upgraded and relocated without
any loss of service.
The remainder of this dissertation addresses norms of behaviour and how to isolate
them.
Chapter 6
Preference Aggregation
The database access system proposed should provide some adaptive discretionary
access control partly supported by automated deduction based on a rule-base of prece-
dents §5.1. There will be some relevant information available within the system on
which to base these decisions §2.6.1, but it is unquantified. This chapter concentrates
on finding general quantification methods — preference aggregation and collective
choice procedures.
6.1 Generating Security Hierarchies
Generating security hierarchies is an exercise in classification. This section de-
scribes the information that needs to be classified. This is a generalisation of the
descriptions and examples given in §2.5.4.
Information The information available is derived from the relationships in §2.2.1
and §2.5.2:
• Databases hold records
• Views are made up of sets of fields
• Views are made up of sets of record ranges
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• Custodians make views
• Accessors hold views
• Accessors have group memberships
Group membership is effected by issuing certificates as described in the engineering
model §2.9, in particular in figure 2.7.
Rules There are information–ordering rules which are derived from the ranking of
individuals and their membership of groups, see §2.5.2 paragraph Roˆles and Ontolo-
gies.
1. A set of fields may be accessed by an ontology.
2. There is some set of group memberships which maps an accessor to an ontology.
3. Within each group, members rank one another by seniority.
and because of this, information can be ordered.
Two consistency rules can be added.
• The most senior member of an ontology is allowed access to a maximal set of
records for the view.
• The most senior member of an ontology is allowed access to a maximal set of
fields in the view.
Hierarchies Seniority hierarchies are needed for the following:
• Within groups
• Within an ontology, i.e. across groups.
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Voting Processes Votes will need to be taken within an ontology to determine:
• Which fields, and
• Which records
it would be desirable to access. Accessors vote by making requests of custodians.
Votes will need to be taken from custodians to determine:
• Which fields, and
• Which records, by
• Which accessors
can be accessed. Custodians vote by granting (or denying) requests. Custodians may
also create views to meet accessors’ requirements.
Note Bene Groups are usually of a broad professional concern, e.g.British Medi-
cal Association, Royal College of Surgeons; ontologies will usually be project–related,
e.g. “study of cellular immune responses against KSHV in HIV infected patients dur-
ing anti-retroviral treatment”.
Only groups rank, ontologies inherit the rankings from groups, but groups have to
be ranked relative to one another or seniority levels within groups have to be equated
with those in other groups. This may give rise to anomalies, it will be seen later that
these anomalies should appear in the preference hierarchies and, hopefully, will be
detected before the combined preference hierarchy is put in place.
6.2 Preferences, Values and Norms
In section §5.1.2, it was argued that a self–organising access control system would
allow subjects wishing to access objects a choice of groups to join. These groups
would emerge around norms of behaviour. In section §2.5.2, it was argued that an
ordering for individuals could be used to form new groupings which would better
align with the ordering of views of data in different ontologies.
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What is needed is a means of converting the preference hierarchies derived from
classifying individuals and data views into norms of behaviour which would then be
used to reclassify groups. To do this, a metric is needed.
That there is a means to do this is partly justified by Swanson et al. [SBM97].
Swanson, a theoretical accountant, analyses the function of money in economies and
notes that it is used as an indicative measure of abstract quantities such as: “worth”,
“liquidity” and “earnings potential” in real instances. Anyone who analyses systems
within an object–oriented programming paradigm knows the distinction between a
class and an object: an object is an instance of a class. In the real world, classes are
an artificial construct and there are only objects, so given an object, how does one
know to which class it belongs in a particular context. So, for example, a particular
dog would belong to the class Canine and possibly the class Pet. A metric is needed
to measure how many of the qualities of Pet exist in this dog.
A class is an expected norm of behaviour and classification involves ranking be-
haviours relative to one another. If one could say that a class has a set of behaviours
with expected rankings, then it would be possible to state, with some statistical cer-
tainty, if an object could belong to a class if its actual rankings for its behaviours are
close to the expected rankings of the class.
6.2.1 Norms from Preferences
Norms are expressed by means of preferences. Table 6.1 is a simple voting proce-
dure that illustrates a difficulty in collective choice theory [Eav99a], which is known
as Susceptibility to Irrelevant Alternatives.
Policy and Ranking
Voter w x y z
i 4(3) 3(-) 2(2) 1(1)
j 4(3) 3(-) 2(2) 1(1)
k 1(1) 2(-) 4(3) 3(2)
9(7) 8(-) 8(7) 5(4)
Table 6.1: The Borda “Preferendum”
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There are three voters: i, j, k and they are asked to rank:
• Four policies: w, x, y, z — rankings in plain text
• Three policies: w, y, z — rankings given in brackets
Using the Borda Preferendum voting system to aggregate their preferences, the
results are:
• Four policies: w > x, x = y, y > z
• Three policies: w = y, y > z
When there were four policies, it was quite clear that w was preferred to y, but with
only three policies w and y are equally favoured. An anomaly like this undermines
confidence in political choice.
6.2.2 Values from Preferences
Voters i and j rank w > x > y > z and voter k y > z > x > w. They all agree
that y > z, but not on w > x. If one were to group y with z to form y′ and w with
x to form w′, then they disagree on the merits on w′ > y′. This seems to indicate
that the two groups of voters {i, j} and {k} have different values at a higher level of
abstraction.
To give this example a little more intuitive credibility, the three voters, i, j and
k, have been asked to rank four individuals w, x, y and z on their ability to fulfil a
task. This poll of their opinions has actually revealed that one voter has a different
idea (or value) of what is the most important ability needed to fulfil this task: for
example, i and j may have concurred that “trustworthiness” is the most important
ability. k feels that “trustworthiness” is important, but that some other quality such
as “ability to take the initiative” is more important.
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6.2.3 Values are Relative
Put simply, {i, j} have assessed {w, x, y, z} with a different set of values from {k}.
Discerning the underlying values of voters provides two courses of action, which could
be used to eliminate the effect of an irrelevant issue, the courses are:
• Either: refine the issues
• Or: refine the voters
Refining Issues Refining the issues would require conditional questions to be
posed. For example: “Rank w, x, y, z in order of their trustworthiness” and “Rank
w, x, y, x in order of their ability to take the initiative”.
Refining Voters Refining the voters is simply discarding or downgrading the rank-
ings of voters who do not meet one norm. Although this might seem undemocratic,
most proportional representation voting systems do this.
6.2.4 Trading Goals
In the management of information systems, it is not appropriate that more ab-
stract goals be traded against one another. For example, some users may require an
information system to be “safe” and some require it to be “fast”. Safe and fast are
abstract. The users will request quite specific features: the general goal of safe may
appear as a wish-list of a dozen or more safety features; the general goal of fast as
another dozen or so. If these were presented on a combined wish-list, and a vote
taken, then if the voters were equally split between those who want a fast system
and those who want a safe system, then the resulting system would have some fast
features, some safe, but fulfil the requirements of neither.
The more fruitful approach is to find those who want the system to be safe and
those who wish it to be fast and separate them so that they use different, relatively
autonomous information systems.
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6.3 Organisational Structure
6.3.1 Managing Database Access
To relate this work to the management of database access hierarchies, Castano et
al.proposed a number of metrics to determine similarities of usage between subject
and operations. They are described in section §5.1.3. These metrics could be used to
inform a custodian of a record if the accessor requesting access was behaving normally
for someone with the accessor’s interests.
All that is known of a potential accessor is his group memberships and the view
of the records he wishes to see. There are also precedents set by others which could
be used.
There would also need to be a set of measures that would rank the trustworthiness
of different secure computing environments.
6.3.2 Lattices as Organisational Structures
The metrics referred to above and described in section §5.1.3 are just some of
those that might prove to be useful in helping a custodian decide if access should be
granted to a set of records. There will no doubt be other metrics that might prove
to be useful. What has to be addressed is how one should go about quantifying the
choices that custodians have made vis a` vis those who have been allowed access to
records.
The metrics will be distance measures which effectively measure two orthogonal
qualities:
• Trustworthiness
• Relevance
These are used to form lattices: the vertical dimension indicates the degree of
trustworthiness, the horizontal dimension indicates the degree of relevance to an on-
tology. Referring again to the medical profession: seniority should be a reliable
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Comparor Comparee(s) Qualities Notes
Custodian Accessor Group memberships
Subject similarity: specifies
how similar the custodian is
to the accessor
Accessor Accessor’s
Peers in
Group(s)
Group memberships
Subject similarity: specifies
how similar the accessor is
to other members of his
own group(s)
Accessor Accessor’s
Peers in
Group(s)
Views
Authorisation
compatibility: specifies how
similar the accessor’s
requested view is to that
used by others in the same
group(s)
Accessor Other acces-
sors with Ac-
cess
Group memberships
Authorisation
compatibility: specifies how
similar the accessor is to
those who have access
Table 6.2: Comparative metrics for Security Clearance Class Membership
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trustworthiness measure and the field of medical work would be a suitable relevance
measure: so a General Practitioner conducting private research into cardiology would
be ranked lower than a consultant cardiologist with respect to cardiology, but the
cardiologist would be ranked lower than the GP with respect to general practice
issues.
These lattices are the basis for the structure of an organisation (or community):
they form an organisation chart of the relationships that exist between groups. Or-
ganisation charts take the form of multi–way trees and lattices can be forced to take
the same structure. This is done by introducing lowest and highest common points
to all of the branches and creating joining groups where cycles or multiple choices
exist. An example, is given in figure 6.1
A B
C D
DF
Low
A B
AB
C
F
DE
High
Figure 6.1: A lattice produced from a set of preferences
The custodians will be called voters when discussing preference aggregation, since
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their choices are effectively votes. Each custodian/voter will have their own lattice
of preferences for the different types of accessors. The problem is to aggregate their
personal lattices with those of their peers to form an aggregate lattice.
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6.4 About Preference Aggregation
6.4.1 History and Importance
A leading contributor to the field of decision theory (to which preference aggre-
gation belongs) feels that computer–aided decision–making would take the following
form.
Computers will play an increasingly important role in applications dur-
ing the next century. Along with routine tasks of data compression and
high speed analysis, computers will have ever more sophisticated programs
to ferret out interactively the most salient features of decision problems
and structure problems accordingly. A few well–directed questions about
values, acceptable risks and probabilities will yield a proposed solution or
menu of solutions. Programs will discern the most likely directions for
improvements and determine their promise by means of challenge ques-
tions. Sensitivity analyses that account for vagueness in preferences and
probability judgements, and tend to discount marginal improvements, will
be standard1.
There are a number of problems with preference aggregation: it is a collective
choice procedure and whenever there are more than two choices from which voters
can choose there is no method of choosing that cannot be subverted by sophisticated
voting strategies2. This does not invalidate collective choice procedures that decide
between more than two options, it means that one must be cautious when interpreting
the results.
6.4.2 Structure and Notes
Before moving onto the analysis of preference aggregation, it is best to clarify
some terms. This notation is the same as that used in [Eav99a]. The mechanics of
the analysis will use graph theory, unfamiliar terms can be found in the appendix
E. There are a number of examples of the operations, these are also given in the
appendix.
1[Fis91] This paper is also an excellent summary of key results and the directions that research
in decision theory is taking.
2Based on the theorems of Arrow, [Arr63], and summarised in [Eav99a].
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Preferences and Indifferences
Indifferences A weak ordering allows voters to express their indifference between
two choices. A strong ordering does not allow indifferences. A weak ordering is a
tri–state logic. Indifference is represented by =, x = y. Preference is, incidentally,
represented by > or <.
Transitivity It is usually assumed that preference relations are transitive, i.e.x > y
and y > z then x > z.
Lattices
Acyclic A lattice of preferences must be an acyclic structure. It is usually assumed
that individuals will not have a cycle in their own lattice of preferences, but when
aggregated it is possible a cycle will arise. The voting paradox, see table 6.3 and
figure 6.2, is a simple, and irreducible, example of this.
Voter Ranking
A x > y > z
B z > x > y
C y > z > x
Table 6.3: The voting paradox
Referring to the figure showing a lattice produced from a set of preferences, figure
6.1, it can be seen that cycles can be removed by grouping classes together. In the case
of the voting paradox, this is not possible, since all classes are equally highly–rated.
Unanimities These are very useful. A unanimity is a preference upon which ev-
eryone concurs. A unanimity can be said to express a Pareto–optimal3 choice and
there are degrees of paretian choice.
3See [Eav99a] for the original definition in the context of economic welfare.
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A x
y z
B x
y z
x
y z
A + B + C x
y z
C
Figure 6.2: The voting paradox
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6.4.3 Methods and Representations
The remainder of this chapter looks at methods and representations that could
be used to form, manipulate and quantify the ordering of lattices of preferences.
Essentially, individuals preference ordering superimposed upon one another give rise
to a connected graph, which has to be reduced to a spanning tree which will be the
collective preference hierarchy. This is a well–analysed task of graph theory [Chr75],
but there are a choice of spanning trees for a graph, the preference hierarchy has to
be the most preferred.
To simplify preference hierarchies to spanning trees, a number of graph and set
manipulation techniques have to be used and some distance measures developed.
1. Cycles
These are the principal indicator of an anomaly in choice. They have to be
detected and, in some way, eliminated.
2. Unanimities
It will be seen that unanimities can be used to partition lattices and can there-
fore be used to simplify them, which will allow anomalies to be avoided.
3. Chains and Anti–chains
Another useful structural indicator is the length of each chain in a lattice and
the number of anti–chains in the lattice. Chains and anti–chains are described
in appendix E, but they can be thought of the branches of a lattice. Each chain
has at its head an anti–chain. There will always be at least as many anti-chains
as chains. A small number of chains of similar length will give rise to fewer
anomalies than a large number of chains of dissimilar lengths.
4. Distance measures
A useful distance measure will be introduced which will allow lattices to be
compared to one another. This, combined with a knowledge of the chain/anti–
chain composition of the lattice will allow less anomalous but sufficiently similar
lattices to be chosen.
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5. Deciding Sets
There are alliances between voters on issues. A method of determining the
underlying values of voters will be introduced which will allow issues to be
grouped together within lattices.
6.5 Cycles and Topological Entropy
The most obvious sign of an anomaly of choice is a cycle in a preference lattice.
An aggregate preference lattice should be free of cycles or the effect of cycles should
be controlled.
1. Complete Cycles
A complete cycle can be interpreted as the voters assessing policies with values
which are entirely different. The voting paradox, figure 6.2 is an example of a
complete cycle.
2. Incomplete Cycles
A cycle that is not complete is a statement that a group of people differ on
the merits of some subset of policies. This may be due to the policies being
too similar or too different. An example of this is the Borda Preferendum
anomaly in 6.1. In the former case, the “conflict” represented by the cycle may
be manageable by eliminating one of the policies. In the latter case, it would
be best to partition the voters and allow them to resolve their differences using
some arbitration process.
The following two methods are recommended for detecting and quantifying the
effect of cycles.
6.5.1 Using an Adjacency Matrix
Meyer and Brown [MB98] have developed a measure which they call the topological
entropy of voting preferences4. It enumerates cycles and their length.
4Topological entropy is more formally defined in [AKM65].
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Using the adjacency matrix representation for each individual’s preferences — the
graphs of which and the matrices themselves are given in appendix E — these can be
added together and normalised by dividing by #I = n = 3 to give:
F =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Fi =
1
n
(FA + FB + FC) =


1 1
3
2
3
2
3
1 1
3
1
3
2
3
1


Following Meyer and Brown [MB98], the topological entropy of a choice matrix F
can be expressed thus:
ΛF = max(Eigenvalue of F )
S(F ) = log ΛF
The value of ΛF gives the length of the longest cycle were one to generate F
n.
If logarithms are taken to the base n then an entropy of 1 indicates a policy cycle
of length n and an entropy of 0 a policy cycle of length 1, i.e. only each policy with
itself. For this example, S = 0.690759. (This is different from Meyer and Brown’s
formulation as they had applied simple majority rule to the matrix F , effected by
rounding up to 1 or down to 0.) By not applying the social choice function, one can
analyse how the choices of the individuals would be interpreted by a social choice
function.
Unfortunately, this is not as useful a measure as one might hope. The graph
representation, and thus the matrix form, does not handle statements of indifference
particularly well. For example, a > c, b > c and a > c, b > c, a = b have different
representations:
F1 =


1 0 0
0 1 0
1 1 1

 , F2 =


1 0 1
1 1 0
1 1 1


and correspondingly different entropies: S(F1) = 0, S(F2) = 0.63093 because the
largest eigenvalue for each is 1 and 2 respectively.
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6.5.2 Using a Transition Matrix
Probably better is to follow the approach used in games theory [BO82] and use
transition matrices5. In the language of probability theory, either voter A,B or C will
get their way — assuming they are statistically independent, which means that they
would vote sincerely. One transition matrix can be formed by addition, if one assumes
they are equally probable to influence the election. The formation of the transition
matrices is not difficult but is long–winded, so it is described in the appendix E.
Normalisation here simply ensures that the sum of the probabilities in each row6
continues to be 1. The final result is very easy to interpret: the probability of the
system reaching a state where a, b or c is more dominant than the other is exactly
equal 1
3
so a = b = c. More formally, using the formulation of the matrices described
in the appendix E.
F =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Fi =
1
n
(FA + FB + FC) =


1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3


Although it is now self–evident in this example that no one policy is preferred over
the others, the method is to find the eigenvalue that has the value 1 and the most
probable final state of the system will be described by the corresponding eigenvector,
which specifies the probability of each policy being in force in the infinitely long–term.
An entropy measure can then be generated from this steady state probability vector
in the usual way.
The transition matrix representation is more intuitive for indifferences, for a = b >
c, the matrix would be
( 1
2
1
2
0
1
2
1
2
0
1
2
1
2
0
)
, i.e. indifference means equiprobable. Unfortunately,
this representation is still not satisfactory, since mutual indifference has the same
representation as a mutual contra–position, i.e. if a > b > c and c > b > a for two
voters and a = b = c for another two voters both would yield the same steady state
5This approach has been used by at least one other author to show that ergodic Markov processes
are in fact voting processes [Mat77], so that would substantiate its use here.
6Some authors prefer column sums to be 1 and so use the transpose of the matrix.
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eigenvector and entropy, but, with the former, the two voters are in conflict over the
relative merits of a and c and, in the latter, they are in agreement.
Nonetheless, this formulation of topological entropy is still quite useful for exam-
ining the effect of irrelevant alternatives, see table 6.1, which has a transition matrix
representation as follows
FA, FB =


1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0


, FC =


0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0


in the first, four option case and when the second–ranked option is removed, the
matrices are
FA, FB =


1 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0

 , FC =


0 0 1
0 1 0
0 1 0


Four Options Three Options
Borda Order w > x = y > z w = y > z
Markov Order w > x > y > z w > y > z
Probabilities 12
23
, 6
23
, 3
23
, 2
23
6
11
, 3
11
, 2
11
Entropy 0.843 0.905619
Table 6.4: Topological Entropy for the Borda “Preferendum” with and without an
irrelevant alternative
Referring to table 6.4, it is clear that the order produced by the transition matrices
preserves the supremacy of option w over y. Neither method ranks x as being the
same as y — which is another anomaly of the Borda Preferendum — but it preserves
the ordering of y over z.
(A Mathematica package is available that calculates the topological entropy using
transition matrices [Eav99c].)
Incidentally, this entropy measure as described only yields the entropy of the
largest cycle: it may be the case that there are a number of lesser cycles, and that
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would mean that the entropy of the system is greater, since there is more confusion
over its content.
6.6 Unanimities
The preceding section looked at measures that detected and quantified the length
of a cycle in an aggregation of a set of lattices, where the aggregation was achieved by
simple addition to produce a likelihood of a particular policy being chosen amongst
all others. A number of difficulties arose from that discussion. These are addressed
now and, it will be seen, that the exploitation of any unanimous choices can be used
to isolate cycles so that they can resolved.
1. Policies or Policy Preference
It will prove to be more useful to determine which policy preference is most
often, or unilaterally, stated. For example, in the discussion of table 6.4, it was
clear that all parties preferred y over z. If this were represented in a graph, it
would be clear that one edge is traversed more than any of the others. This can
be used as a measure of how well–ordered a preference hierarchy.
If an edge (policy preference) is always traversed in one direction, then, it is a
pareto–optimal preference: one policy, x, is always preferred over another, y,
but other policies may be preferred to x.
2. Similarities or Contrasts
Under a strong ordering, two statements by voters A and B of x > y and y > x
respectively could indicate:
• Either: a juxtaposition: A and B have entirely different values and that
x and y are also different from one another and exemplify the differences
between voters A and B.
• Or: a similarity: A and B have similar values and that x and y both
embody that same value, so that A and B are unable to sincerely and
consistently choose between x and y.
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This problem does not exist with a weak–ordering, but in an aggregation it can
be obscured: an equal number preferring x > y and y > x would suggest x = y
in the aggregate.
Pareto–optimality is a desirable quality for a edge in an aggregate preference
lattice7 and it is denoted here as unanimity. In their paper, Batteau et al. [BBM81]
defined two forms of Paretian choice: weak and strong. The former was defined as
the case when all voters agree on x > y for one, or more, y and the latter was defined
as the case where all agree on x > y for all possible y. It will be seen that both forms
can be discerned using methods described here (a strong pareto choice is, in fact, a
source).
What is needed is an additional fitness measure that highlights if a set of preference
lattices contain Pareto–optimal statements of preference.
If one can find some unanimities, so much the better, but, if there are no unanim-
ities, one simply has to remove enough voters or enough policies to produce one (or
more). Both of which are quite meaningful ways of partitioning the two sets, since a
unanimity is a value.
Definition 6.6.1 (Preference and Indifference Graphs). This simple innovation
makes use of two graphs to represent the lattice. One graph will represent the strong
orderings between the vertices and will be the transitive closure of the directed graph.
The other will be an undirected graph expressing the indifferences, which will, usually,
contain mostly isolated vertices.
The directed graph will be the preference graph P–graph and the undirected graph
will be the indifference graph I–graph.
6.6.1 P–graph aggregates
The preference lattices will be aggregated in some optimal way for a particular
voting rule. Aggregate weights will be assigned to each directed edge — the aggregates
7Sen [Sen77] proposed that pareto–optimality should be ranked higher than simple majority
preference and [FN79] has quantified this.
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of the di-graphs is a 2–di-graph, i.e. a multi–graph with at most two directed edges
between each pair of vertices, going in opposite directions.
Definition 6.6.2 (For and Against–Weights). If the P–graphs are aggregated then
for any pair of policies u, v two weights will be assigned to each directed edge between
the pair of policies. The greater will be known as the for–weight and the lesser will be
known as the against–weight. The vertex having the greater for–weight with respect
to another vertex will be said to dominate in aggregate the other vertex.
6.6.2 Unanimities, Sources and Sinks
Definition 6.6.3 (Unanimity). When an edge within an aggregate of the P–graphs
has a zero against–weight and a non–zero for–weight then it will be called a unanimity.
A complete cycle does not prohibit or invalidate a unanimity, since the latter is
a statement of preference between just two (or more) policies. The other policies,
which cause the cycle, can be dismissed as irrelevant alternatives, if need be.
Definition 6.6.4 (Simple unanimity). A unanimity ~uv is called simple if it is the
only unanimity which involves either u or v.
Note that a unanimity can be a compound simple unanimity, e.g. ~uvw, if ~uv and
~vw are both simple unanimities.
Definition 6.6.5 (Complex unanimity). A complex unanimity ~uv is one where
either u or v is not unanimously linked to another unanimity of the other. For
example: ~uv, ~uw are both unanimous, but not ~vw.
A unanimity may prove to be a sink or a source.
It may arise that each vertex of an incomplete cycle is part of a unanimity. It
might be helpful to interpret this as follows: all the voters may agree that w is the
best policy, but each voter ranks the other policies x, y and z differently. These
definitions for cycles will be used:
Definition 6.6.6 (A Dominated Cycle). If each vertex in an incomplete cycle is
dominated by the same vertex, then this configuration is a dominated cycle.
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The voters are agreed on what is best, but cannot agree on what is worst. For
example, all prefer w to a cycle of x, y and z.
Definition 6.6.7 (A Dominating Cycle). If each vertex in an incomplete cycle
dominates the same vertex, then that cycle is known as a dominating cycle.
The voters are agreed on what is worse, but cannot agree on what is best. For
example, all prefer x, y or z to w.
It should be apparent that a complex unanimity is a form of cycle, since two (or
more) policies have a policy which unanimously dominates the cycle or is dominated
by it. Complex unanimities can be treated as if they were one of the cycles.
Definition 6.6.8 (Condensed Aggregate I–Graph). If all individuals have the
same sub–set of vertices connected in their respective I–graphs then that sub–set can
be reduced to one “super–vertex” and this change can be carried over to the individual
P–graphs.
In effect, the individuals are unanimous in their indifference between particular
policy pairs.
Definition 6.6.9 (Condensed Aggregate P–Graph). A condensed graph of the
aggregate P–graph can be formed by reducing a sub–set of vertices to a single super–
vertex if the sub–set of vertices forms one of the following configurations:
1. A simple unanimity including compound simple unanimities
2. A dominated cycle
3. A dominating cycle
A cycle may also be a complex unanimity.
The point of doing this is that it simplifies the aggregate graph. Simple unanimity
can be replaced by the dominating vertex without loss of information, but the cycles
may not. In effect, the resolution of the cycle has been deferred. This appears to be
the process followed in [Den82] when producing a lattice from a set of relationships,
see figure 6.1.
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6.6.3 Unanimous Properties
Common Indifferences This simple algorithm can be used to determine if any of
the vertices in the I–graphs contain the same indifferences.
Rule 6.6.1 (Common Indifferences). The algorithm is as follows:
1. Form the adjacency matrix for the I–graph of each individual.
2. Form the intersection of the adjacency matrices,
⋂
iA(i). If any element of the
resulting matrix is non–zero, then the edge represents a common indifference.
For and Against–Weights
Rule 6.6.2 (For and Against–Weights). For a set of preference lattices: let i
range over the voters, let u and v range over the policy vertices.
1. Form the P and I–graphs, P (i) and I(i) for each individual.
2. Find any common indifferences and carry them from the aggregate I–graph to
the P–graphs.
3. Form the reach matrices for the P–graphs for each individual: Q(i).
4. Form the sum of the reach matrices, ΣiQ(i).
The resulting aggregate matrix Q will have a central diagonal of zeroes and the
entries can be evaluated for their properties.
All the other elements of the matrix quv will have a complementary edge qvu, the
following conditions apply:
1. quv ≥ 1 and qvu = 0
Then there is a unanimity of u > v
2. quv > qvu
Then preference u > v has a for–weight of quv and an against–weight of qvu.
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3. Σvqvu = 0 i.e. a row is zero
Then u is a source.
4. Σuqvu = 0 i.e. a column is zero
Then v is a sink.
One can also find just the unanimities by performing a logical conjunction of all
the matrices and locating the entries that remain true.
6.6.4 Degree Of Unanimity
Given that it is possible to find unanimities within aggregate graphs, it would be
useful to have an entropy metric based upon it. Entropy is a probabilistic measure
and it is required that the total number of events needs to be calculated and also the
number of events observed.
Unfortunately, there is no simple calculation for the total number of different
preference orders given a set of policies, because using weak ordering complicates the
formation of the permutations. The algorithm for the calculation of the total number
of preference orders is relatively simple however, but there are no tables that can be
consulted, so:
Rule 6.6.3 (Preference Orders). The total number of different weak preference
orders for n policies can be calculated as follows:
1. Generate all the partitions8 of n.
2. Calculate the number of permutations for each partition, call this N(partitions).
3. For each partition find the number of ways in which the policies could be allo-
cated to the elements of the partition, N(policies).
4. Multiply N(partitions) by N(policies) for each partition and sum them together.
ΣpartitionsN(policies) N(partitions) (6.1)
8 [Ski90], p. 56
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A Mathematica package is available [Eav99c] that performs the calculation. Table
6.5 lists the total number of different preference orders for up to 6 policies and clearly
shows how large the search space becomes.
Policies Orders
1 1
2 3
3 13
4 75
5 541
6 4683
Table 6.5: Number of Different Preference Orderings for n policies
As for the number of events observed (or distinct P–graphs produced by the
voters) the data needed for the entropy calculation is the count of voters for each
distinct P–graph. A suitable entropy metric will be presented in the next chapter.
For now, if an entropy metric is available, then there are two entropy values for a
preference hierarchy that can be calculated. These will give an indication of the
degree of cohesion amongst the voters:
1. P–graphs before condensing
2. P–graphs after condensing
The entropy of the former will indicate how varied the opinion of the voters is
with respect to the totality of choices available to them. The latter is best used
in generating a conditional entropy amongst the voters. Just to illustrate why one
would need both figures: consider two sets of votes, A and B, the same issues but
different equal numbers of voters. Both yield only two distinct P–graphs with the
same proportion of voters supporting each: in vote A, the two P–graphs share no
unanimities, while in vote B there are a number of unanimities which can be exploited
which allow both P–graphs to be combined to one. In vote A there is still complete
disagreement, but in vote B, apart from perhaps some “agreements to differ” in
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the form of incomplete cycles, there is enough general agreement to form a single
preference lattice.
6.7 Chains
The form and number of chains and anti–chains is a useful indicator of the struc-
ture of aggregate lattice. These concepts are described more precisely and references
are given in appendix E. Briefly, one can say that a chain is an arm of the lattice
and an anti–chain can be formed from all those elements in each chain that are not
directly connected.
Under some circumstances, it may prove preferable that there be a few long chains
and one short anti–chain. The anti–chain will contain all the maximal elements of a
preference hierarchy and each chain will contain one element from the anti–chain.
For example, a company with a manager and a clerk in each of four departments
has four chains and four anti–chains. The length of each chain is two. If each manager
is responsible to a director and the directors meet together on a board, then there
are four chains and no anti–chains. The anti–chains are removed by the board of
directors where all conflicts are resolved. The length of each chain is now three.
To eliminate all the anti–chains it is necessary to extend all the chains by one. If
a chain is long, it is more likely to produce a cycle under preference aggregation.
6.7.1 Size of Largest Anti–Chain
An important theorem regarding the Decomposition of Partial Orders can be used
as a fitness measure. (A partially ordered set is a set of orderings and is the most ap-
propriate mathematical structure to use for the analysis of preference hierarchies.) It
is relatively easy to compute the maximum anti–chain of a partially–ordered set (and
therefore a preference lattice). The largest anti–chain is the maximum independent
set of the order. The theorem is given in appendix E.
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6.8 Distance Functions
The problem of preference aggregation has been addressed by researchers in other
fields with different goals. In particular, statisticians have researched pairwise com-
parisons, there are two papers which have a direct relevance to preference aggregation
as described here: Thompson and Remage [TR64] which deals with generating rank-
ings from sets of pairwise comparisons each of which form a strong ordering; and,
Singh and Thompson [ST68] which generates rankings from weak orderings. Singh
and Thompson’s paper is the basis of what follows: all theorems, corollaries and
lemmas are due to them. Unfortunately, Singh and Thompson analyse preferences
with the goal of producing alternative rankings, effectively “league tables”, of all the
policies rather than an aggregate lattice, but their analysis is also valid for the latter.
6.8.1 Bigraphs
Singh and Thompson define a bigraph, 〈X,C ∪D〉, which has a set of vertices X ,
C contains all the statements of indifference and D all the statements of preference —
the I– and P–graphs respectively as described above §6.6.1. They make a distinction
between circuits, which are directed cycles, and loops, which are cycles that may
contain undirected edges. They also define semi–completeness — a generalisation of
completeness — a lattice can be said to be semi–complete if for every distinct xi, xj
in X , i 6= j, there exists a path between xi and xj or vice–versa. With these they are
able to state the following theorem:
Partial Rank Order
Theorem 6.8.1 (Partial Rank Order). A partial rank order P is an ordering of
the elements of X = {x1, . . . , xm}, so for P = {p1, p2, . . . , pm}, then each pi ∈ P ≡
xj ∈ X. P is a effectively a permutation of X. A relation R is a partial rank order
when (pj , pi) 6∈ R whenever j > i. A partial rank order is reflexive, anti–symmetric
and transitive.
• A relation R on X determines at least one partial rank order iff it is loop–free
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• A relation R on X determines a unique partial rank order iff it is loop–free and
semi–complete.
This simply states that for any graph, if there are no loops, then a ranking of the
elements can be imposed. It does not specify how the elements of X are compared
to one another.
Pairwise Comparisons Three relations are introduced which permit pairwise com-
parisons; they are: E, equivalence; T , strong order; W , weak order.
Definition 6.8.1 (Indirect Relations). Let T be a strong order relation (asym-
metric, anti–reflexive and transitive), E be an equivalence relation (symmetric, re-
flexive and transitive) and W be a weak order relation (reflexive and transitive). For
any pair (x, y) of elements of X :
1. (x, y) ∈ E iff x = y or they are in the same loop of C ∪D.
2. (x, y) ∈ W iff x = y or there is a path from x to y in C ∪D.
3. (x, y) ∈ T iff there is a directed path from x to y in C ∪D.
Using these definitions it is possible to develop the following theorems for 〈X,C ∪
D〉.
1. There is at least one partial rank order
Theorem 6.8.2. In which case, the following conditions are equivalent:
• C ∪D is circuit–free.
• T is a preference relation.
• T is loop–free.
• T determines at least one partial rank order on X.
So a preference relation T defines a partial rank order if it is loop–free.
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Corollary 6.8.1. T determines at least one partial rank order, P = {p1, p2, . . . , pm},
on X for (pi, pi+1) ∈ W for i = 1, 2, . . . , m− 1 iff C ∪D is semi–complete and
circuit free.
Lemma 6.8.1. W is a partial rank order iff C = ∅ and D is circuit–free.
2. Exactly one partial rank order
Theorem 6.8.3. The following conditions are equivalent:
• C = ∅, D is circuit–free and semi–complete.
• W is a simple order (transitive, anti–symmetric and reflexive).
• T is loop–free and complete.
• T determines a unique partial rank order on X.
Corollary 6.8.2. T determines a unique partial rank order, P = {p1, p2, . . . , pm},
on X for (pi, pi+1) ∈ D for i = 1, 2, . . . , m − 1 iff C = ∅ and (pi, pj) ∈ D for
i > j.
6.8.2 Changing the Orientation of Edges
Bigraphs are not always circuit–free and it will be necessary to change the orien-
tation of edges to make them so. There are three ways an edge can be re–oriented:
1. Reverse the direction of a directed edge.
2. Assign a direction to an undirected edge.
3. Make a directed edge undirected.
If an aggregate graph is generated, it can be forced to be circuit–free by applying
a combination of re–orientations. How many of these, and which of the three they
are, can form the basis of a distance metric.
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Singh and Thompson prove a theorem which states that it is immaterial if one
deletes edges or re–orients them. This might at first seem contentious, but if one bears
in mind that a partial rank order is a transitive relation, then deleting an edge would
remove a circuit and the transitivity of the relation would retain some preferences.
For any graph there is a class of maximal circuit–free sub–bigraphs each one of which
forms a partial rank order.
Theorem 6.8.4. If C1 ∪ D1 is a maximal circuit–free sub–bigraph of a complete
bigraph C ∪D, then T (C1 ∪D1) determines a unique partial rank order iff C1 = ∅.
The maximal circuit–free sub–bigraphs can be enumerated by generating all of
the Hamiltonian paths.
Theorem 6.8.5. If C ∪D is a complete bi–graph, then there is a one–to–one corre-
spondence between the maximal circuit–free sub–bigraphsD1 of C∪D and Hamiltonian
paths in C ∪D.
6.8.3 Maximum Likelihood Preference Relations
Probability Function Fortunately, Singh and Thompson developed their graph–
theoretical analysis into a probabilistic model. Unfortunately, some more notation
has to be introduced.
Notation 6.8.1. X the set of policies, X = {x1, x2, . . . , xm}. Typical elements xi
and xj . Each distinct pair of elements is compared in, statistically, independent
trials to yield:
(xi, xj) An ordered pair of X which can be either xi → xj or xj → xi or xi = xj .
Each comparison may be carried out nij > 0 times.
I is the set of all subscript pairs (i, j) that have been compared and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m.
The total number of comparisons is n and n ≤
(
m
2
)
.
πij is a population parameter and is the probability that the voters prefer xi to xj ,
viz.P (xi → xj).
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γij is a population parameter and is the probability that the chooser is indifferent
between xi and xj , viz.P (xi = xj).
sij and tij are the number of times that πij and γij occur respectively.
These can then be used as parameters to a multinomial distribution. (The multi-
nomial distribution is the binomial but has more than two outcomes.) This distribu-
tion is used to determine the probability that the number of statements of preference
of one policy over another πij is exactly equal to the number of times of times a
preference is stated. It measures the strength of a preference: how often it is stated
against how often the chooser is indifferent between them. This equates to the graph–
theoretic notion that traversing an arc between nodes in the same direction is a better
measure of order than counting the number of times a node is chosen, see §6.6.
sij + sji + tij = nij
πij + πji + γij = 1
γij = γji
P (πij =
sij
nij
, πji =
sji
nij
, γij =
tij
nij
) = ΠI
nij !
sij!sji!tij !
π
sij
ij π
sji
ji γ
tij
ij
(6.2)
Because πij, πji and γij sum to one, it is possible to eliminate πji and use just πij
and γij as the parameters. In which case, because there are n parameters in I, the
set of all pairings, there are 2n parameters in all.
What is needed now is a measure of the most likely preference ordering: this can
be represented as a point πˆ being the ordered pair (πˆij , γˆij). A sequence of these will
form a preference relation T (π) in a more constrained portion ω of the search space
Ω.
Notation 6.8.2. Ω is the parameter space, a subset of 2n dimensional space.
π is a typical point in Ω.
πˆ is the maximum likelihood estimate of π. It will have coordinates drawn from:
πˆij =
sij
nij
and γˆij =
tij
nij
.
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ω and T (π) T (π) is a preference relation over some portion ω of Ω.
π¯ is the maximum likelihood estimate of πˆ which is restricted to ω, i.e. to where T (π)
is in force.
It is now possible to form a maximum likelihood measure. (Maximum–likelihood
is analogous to the traditional entropy measure p log(1
p
), but does not necessarily
have the same properties. Statisticians use it as a variance measure.) It is used as
estimator, it can be formulated thus:
L(π) = ΣInij(πˆij log πij + γˆij log γij) (6.3)
which, when maximised in ω, will yield T (π¯), which is the maximum likelihood
ordering of the elements of X .
Graphs and Voting Rules Referring again to the graph [X,C ∪D], C is the
I–graph of indifferences and D is the P–graph of preferences. T (π) can be defined
thus:
Definition 6.8.2. (xi, xj) ∈ T (π) iff Path(xi, xj) in C(π) ∪D(π), where:
D(π) (xi, xj) ∈ D(π) iff πij > max(πji, γij).
C(π) (xi, xj) ∈ C(π) iff γij > max(πij , πji).
This definition also defines a particular sub–graph of [X,C ∪ D] which will be
called [X,C(π) ∪D(π)].
In effect, this defines a pair of voting rules for this distance function, which is
simple majority, but requires that the “for”–vote be greater then the “don’t care”–
vote as well. It has similarities to the normalised simplexes used by Saari [Saa94], an
illustration is given in figure 6.3.
Singh and Thompson’s result does hinge upon the definitions of T (π) and [X,C(π)∪
D(π)], but it should be the case that they can be adapted to different voting rules9.
9Theorem 10 of [ST68] is the key to this argument since it relies on the properties of the voting
rules.
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Figure 6.3: Simplex for Voting
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Under these voting rules, if one requires a unique strong ordering of a complete
set of comparisons, i.e. there exists a T (π¯) that is contained in D(π), which is what
most theoretical political scientists want, then it can be safely calculated that any
such order:
• Either: just does not exist, i.e. there are no strong orderings at all.
• Or: a strong ordering exists, but is not more likely than any weak orderings.
• Or: there is a strong ordering and it is maximally likely, in which case it will
be unique.
Minimising Uncertainty An interesting insight by Thompson and Remage [TR64]
is as follows: the uncertainty of a single comparison of xi to xj is:
Uij = −(πij log πij + πji log πji + γij log γij) (6.4)
For all nij comparisons of xi to xj the uncertainty is: nijUij and for all comparisons:
U(π) =
∑
I
nijUij
From which it is clear that L(π) = −Uij but in a specified subset of ω only, so
maximising the likelihood of L(π) is equivalent to minimising the uncertainty of U(π).
Thompson and Remage [TR64] make it quite clear by stating that U(π) represents
the total number of sample preferences which are violated by the ranking T (π).
An Example Table 6.6 contains some illustrative data for four optionsX = {x1, x2, x3, x4}.
From this an aggregate bigraph has been generated, see figure 6.4, which is not circuit–
free.
All of the possible maximal circuit–free sub–bigraphs have been enumerated in
figure 6.5 and each of these has its own preference order, π1, π2, π3, π4, π5, π6.
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(ij) ∈ I sij tij sji (πˆij , γˆij)
(12) 2 1 3 (1
3
, 1
6
)
(13) 4 1 1 (2
3
, 1
6
)
(14) 0 4 2 (0, 2
3
)
(23) 1 3 2 (1
6
, 1
2
)
(24) 1 2 3 (1
6
, 1
3
)
(34) 4 0 2 (2
3
, 0)
Table 6.6: Paired comparisons, m = 4, nij = 6 for all i and j
x
1
x
2
x
3
x
4
Figure 6.4: Aggregate bigraph from table 6.6
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Figure 6.5: Maximal sub–bigraphs of bigraph in figure 6.4
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For each of these the uncertainty has been calculated and is shown in table 6.7.
From which it is clear that the most certain order is π4 : (x1 = x4) > (x2 = x3),
but this is a weak ordering; there are two strong orderings which are equally certain:
π2 : x1 > x3 > x4 > x2 and π3 : x2 > x1 > x3 > x4, which differ markedly in their
ranking of x2.
π (π12, γ12) (π13, γ13) (π14, γ14) (π13, γ23) (π24, γ24) (π34, γ34) U(π)
π1 (
5
12
, 1
6
) (2
3
, 1
6
) (0, 2
3
) (1
6
, 1
2
) (1
6
, 1
3
) (1
2
, 0) 2.279224
π2 (
5
12
, 1
6
) (2
3
, 1
6
) (0, 1
2
) (1
6
, 5
12
) (1
6
, 1
3
) (2
3
, 0) 2.286507
π3 (
1
3
, 1
6
) (2
3
, 1
6
) (0, 1
2
) (1
6
, 5
12
) (1
6
, 5
12
) (2
3
, 0) 2.286507
π4 (
1
3
, 1
6
) ( 5
12
, 1
6
) (0, 2
3
) (1
6
, 1
2
) (1
6
, 5
12
) (2
3
, 0) 2.234382
π5 (
1
3
, 1
6
) ( 5
12
, 1
6
) (0, 1
2
) (1
6
, 5
12
) (1
6
, 1
3
) (2
3
, 0) 2.348982
π6 (
1
3
, 1
6
) (2
3
, 1
6
) (0, 1
2
) (1
6
, 5
12
) (1
6
, 1
3
) (1
2
, 0) 2.303824
Table 6.7: Sub–bigraphs uncertainty rankings
Finally, it can be said that Thompson and Remage’s work provides a good analytic
method of determining which of a set of orderings is most preferred and it gives us
the ability to choose between popular weak orderings which are less decisive, in that
they cannot differentiate between as wide a range of choices, and less popular strong
orderings which are more decisive.
A popular weak ordering is less prone to anomalies of choice than a strong one,
but is not as useful in decision–making. Computationally, this calculation is not
particularly difficult. The search space sizes are given in table 6.5. For this search
space of four policies, table 6.5 requires a maximum of 75 running totals to be kept
for the voter population.
6.9 Deciding Sets
Deciding sets are those groups of voters whose support is needed to win a vote.
This concept is clarified (and re–named) in a paper by Batteau et al. , [BBM81], as the
preventing set. Most people would know them as coalitions, but they can be decisive
without actually imposing their preferences for policies. In this sense, a deciding set
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acts as a dictator or, more typically, as a vetoer.
Voters usually express their values by grouping sets of issues together and setting
them against other sets of issues. Under some circumstances, a “Kingmaker” group
[How89] can emerge, which has an unfair influence according to Arrow’s theorems
[Eav99a]. If one were to analyse an issue space then it would be necessary to search
it for all the voter alignments that might give rise to “Kingmaker” groups emerging.
The space is large, given by (6.1). This problem would be a simpler variant of the
bin–packing problem, which is known to be NP–complete. There are some efficient
genetic algorithms for the bin–packing problem [Fal94] and these could be adapted
to search for voter alignments.
6.9.1 Spectral Analysis of Ranked Data
A paper by Diaconis [Dia89] introduced some interesting analysis of ranked data
which is a Borda preferendum, see table 6.1: f(π) =
(
1 2 3 4 5
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
)
= n, i.e.π is a
ranked order 1 to 5 of 5 policies such that x1 > x2 > x3 > x4 > x5 and n voters have
chosen this ordering. Diaconis then introduces a suite of first–order functions which
return counts, let j be the index of the policy xj , then:
δipi(j) =


1 if π(j) = i
0 otherwise
Or, simply, the count of all those who place policy xj in position i.
And a suite of unordered second–order functions which return counts thus:
δ{i,i′},{pi(j),pi(j′)} =


1 if π(j) = i and π(j′) = i′
0 otherwise
Or the count of all those who:
• Either: place candidate xj in position i and candidate xj′ in position i
′
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• Or: place candidate xj in position i
′ and candidate xj′ in position i
It is also possible to have a set of ordered second–order functions written thus:
δ(i,i′),(pi(j),pi(j′)) which returns the count of all those who place in the order xj at i and
xj′ at i
′.
And it is possible to have higher orders still, unordered and ordered.
In his paper, Diaconis used these functions to analyse the data of an election
that used a proportional representation voting system and demonstrated that the
election contained two main types of voters A and B who voted on two issue blocks
x′ = (x1, x3) and y
′ = (x4, x5), in the following way: A, x
′ > y′ and B, y′ > x′.
This analysis would yield fitness metrics for selection. It would be used to partition
the voters and the issues, so that each partition would demonstrate fewer cycles and
more unanimities.
The computational complexity of spectral analysis is very high. It requires reparti-
tioning the search space for each possible combination. If it is compared to calculation
of distance between preference orderings given in §6.8 which required no more than
keeping 75 running totals for a four choice system, spectral analysis would require
4! · 75 totals to be kept.
6.10 In Conclusion
A comprehensive set of analytic techniques have been presented which should
allow aggregate hierarchies of preferences to be generated from individual statements
of preferences with an option to choose either a strong– or weak–ordering and to
quantify how acceptable they would be to the individuals. Other techniques have
been described which would allow voters and issues to be partitioned so that the level
of acceptance within those sub–groupings could be higher.
What this brings to the discussion of collective choice procedures is a reinterpre-
tation of the limitations of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem [Eav99a] using information
theory: it is impossible to design a representative collective choice procedure that
can select one from more than two issues if the preference orderings have too high an
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entropy. If the preference orderings are sufficiently well–ordered, the collective choice
cannot be subverted by a perverse and sophisticated clique.
The principal entropy measure is due to Thompson et al. and is given by (6.4).
This allows a choice between strong and weak–orderings to be made. It should be
possible to develop this to use Diaconis’ spectral analysis of collective choices to
generate preference orderings for different sub–groups of the voters.
In short, the Thompson metric allows issues to be merged, the Diaconis method
allows voters to be merged. Unfortunately, the computational burden for this latter
measure would be very high, see §6.9, so only the Thompson and Remage method
will be used in the remainder of the analysis in this dissertation.
Chapter 7
Stability of Self–Organisation
From the discussion in chapters 2 and 3 it was made clear that software technology
is mature enough to support a self–organising database access system, but it was also
apparent that such a system would need precisely specified policies in order to operate.
Chapters 5 and 6 showed that these policies would necessarily be aggregations of
preference hierarchies.
Chapter 6 introduced some distance measures which could be used to compare
different preference hierarchies. This chapter uses distance measures to produce a self–
stabilising system of interacting agents, which act autonomously but are controlled by
their own peers. Essentially, this chapter addresses whether a self–organising system
based on group memberships can be active enough to allow policies to emerge, but
stable enough so that the agents do not follow inconsistent policies in a short time
period.
7.1 Formation of Cultures
The system of creating access hierarchies based on group memberships is very
similar to a series of simulations carried out by Axelrod [AAEC96], which were an
attempt to elucidate the processes underlying the adoption of standards in industry
[Axe95].
Axelrod’s analytical method is unusual in that he constructs systems which have
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agents that have very simple behaviour. He then allows the agents to interact in
a series of simulations and then analyses the behaviour of the system as a whole.
The hope is that by specifying the behaviour of the agents, what Axelrod describes
as small–scale behaviour, it is possible to control the large–scale behaviour of the
system.
Axelrod gives a number of common–place examples of the formation of cultures.
Consider nightclubs: people visiting nightclubs often want to meet other people going
there and they try to emulate one another’s style of dress and manners. A set of
features that might be considered important at nightclubs would be: hair length and
cut, style of dress, dancing style and so on and so forth. So a person who dances in
a particular way might see someone who dances in the same way and would choose
to become more alike to them in the hope they might meet. To do this, that person
might change their haircut. Now another person with the same haircut may choose
to change his dancing style. If this behaviour continues, then either all the people
visiting this nightclub will look the same and dance in the same way, or cliques will
emerge. One group of people will dress and dance in one particular way and another
group will do so in another particular way, which can be more or less incompatible.
If these two cliques are completely incompatible, they can never become alike to one
another, because they have nothing in common to begin with. It may also be the
case, that there are a number of competing cliques who are slightly incompatible;
they interact with one another only rarely and there is no long–term effect. It may
also be the case that the cliques interact with one another so often that there is no
discernible similarity between the people visiting the nightclub from night to night.
Surprisingly, many systems where standards have evolved are very similar in op-
eration. Consider the variation of standards for electricity supply: for consumers in
the United States, 120 volts at 60 hertz is the standard; in Europe, 240 volts at 50
hertz. In the US, industry uses 380 volts three phase, in Europe 440 volts. This kind
of dissimilarity goes right across the electricity supply industry. Similar arguments
can be made for the evolution of the metric and imperial measurement systems, or
the morphology of human (and programming) languages. There do appear unique
similarities that cut across all systems: for example, even though people in the United
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Kingdom drive on the left and people in the Europe drive on the right, the system of
traffic law is very similar: pedestrian crossings, giving way at junctions and so on.
To add some formalism, using the evolution of culture in a nightclub as an ex-
ample, the way people visiting a nightclub choose to become similar to one another
is the small–scale behaviour, the appearance of the nightclub and its constellation of
cliques is the large–scale behaviour. Each individual’s small–scale behaviour is based
on a particular probability distribution which is time–invariant and will be different
from everyone else’s. The large–scale behaviour probability distribution is the super-
position of all of the small–scale behaviours and may aggregate to something quite
predictable: in the same way that the sum of a set of independent random variables
can be assumed to behave as a normal distribution.
Consider the quality control of paint colours. The manufacturing of paint is a
sophisticated process, the amount of dye added can vary because of changes in the
granularity of the dye powder interacting with variation of tolerances in the injection
heads, which can also interact with the frequency and thoroughness of the head–
cleaning procedures. One should also consider variations in the temperature of the
oil resin, the efficacy of the mixing motors, variations in phase in power supply. All
these factors can be approximated as independent random variables, because the
causality of one set is counteracted by the causality of another.
A statistician if asked to make an estimate of the intensity of a colour of a tin of
paint would not attempt to analyse the whole of the paint manufacturing process but
would simply assume the final probability distribution is a normal one.
Axelrod’s cultural evolution model aims to perform the same simplification: to
determine a simple probability distribution for the large–scale behaviour of the sys-
tem, but he allows himself the facility to control one causal probability distribution
for the components of the larger system.
7.1.1 Small–Scale Behaviour
The simulation model employed by Axelrod was deceptively simple and is an
example of the use of cellular automata simulation [vN66]. Each agent was given a
Eaves, Ph.D 2000 Page 140
fixed set of features A = {a1, a2, . . . , an}, each feature had an enumerated set of values,
known as the traits, for that feature. The traits were initially randomly generated
and assigned to the features.
Definition 7.1.1 (Distance Functions). Axelrod developed a simple similarity func-
tion S(·, ·) which was used to evaluate how alike two agents were. If X and Y are
their respective sets of features, with each feature being xi or yi respectively, then if
the features had the same trait, xi = yi, a 1 is scored, otherwise 0.
This describes the behaviour of the trait comparator.
s(xi, yi) =


0 xi 6= yi
1 xi = yi if features have same trait
(7.1)
This describes the behaviour of the feature set comparator.
S(X, Y ) =
i=n∑
i=1
s(xi, yi) (7.2)
This is Axelrod’s similarity function. Clearly, two agents, X , Y , are identical if
S(X, Y ) = n. Therefore a distance function would be
d(X, Y ) , n− S(X, Y ) (7.3)
This can then be used as the basis for an interaction criterion. For example, if
d(X, Y ) is equal to at least 1 the agents can interact, if d(X, Y ) is greater than one
they are more likely to interact. If it is zero, they will be unable to interact.
Definition 7.1.2 (Interaction Criterion). Axelrod used a simple dice–throw to
simulate human decision–making, the uniform distribution: U(0, 1). The distance
between two agents must then be scaled to fall within [0, 1], so a factor of k is intro-
duced. An offset of ǫ can be set in the range [0, 1] to make interactions less likely.
k · d(X, Y ) + ǫ < U(0, 1) (7.4)
The interaction would be that X would choose from Y a feature that was different
from its own and accrete it, i.e. set a feature to have the same trait as Y .
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It should be clear from the specification of the change procedure that each agent
is biased towards agents that are similar to itself. For agents to interact, it is required
that k · d(X, Y ) + ǫ > 0. The choice of k and ǫ determine under what small–scale
conditions interactions cease. If ǫ were zero and k = 1
n
, then no interaction can take
place if the agents are completely dissimilar. But setting ǫ to 1
n
and k = 1
n
· (1 + 1
n
)
would mean there would be no interaction even if the agents had one identical trait.
7.1.2 Local convergence leads to global polarisation
The software simulation Axelrod used has been replicated [Eav99b]. The agent to
undergo the accretion was randomly chosen; the parameters of the simulations were
initially:
• 5 features
• 10 traits per feature
• 100 agents
• 4 neighbours
• Topology was a square field
This is quite a testing culture. There are
(
105
10
)
different individuals to choose from.
A significant emergent property appeared that is typical of large systems:
A particular trait would become current within a group, this would make members
of that group more attractive to one another and they would exchange more traits
until their features were identical to one another. Should such a group encounter
another group that had undergone the same process, it would be relatively improbable
that they would be able to interact. In this way, islands of homogeneity emerged.
Typical Culture This can be seen in the following density and three–dimensional
height plot, see figures 7.1 and 7.2 respectively, both of which are reasonably typical.
The features have been mapped to a continuous valued metric using the function
given by (7.5) and then logged to the base n so that the metric is linear, see (7.6):
Eaves, Ph.D 2000 Page 142
h(A) = n0 · a0 + n
1 · a1 + · · ·+ n
n−1 · an (7.5)
hˆ =
ln h(a)
lnn
(7.6)
Density plot This is shown as a pair of plots in figure 7.1. It maps the identity
metric to a red–green–blue colour–code. The location of an agent can be determined
from the x and y axes. The colours form into blocks where the agents are similar.
The upper plot is the state of the system before interaction commences, the lower
when it has reached stasis and no more interaction is possible.
Height plot Colour density plots show where regions of identical agents have
formed, but do not clearly show how incompatible the regions are. It is difficult to
tell if a yellow region is incompatible with a blue. There may be hint of blue colour
in the yellow or vice versa . This is even more difficult if the plots are only viewed in
grey-scale.
Incompatible regions are easy to see using the height plot in figure 7.2. The z axis
is marked id and the physical location of the individual is specified by the x and y
axes as with density plots. The surface marked by the solid lines is the initial state.
The surface marked by the dotted lines is the final state.
If the difference in height between two plateaus is greater than 1 unit then the
regions are incompatible — if ǫ = 0 and k = 1
n
in (7.4).
The two types of plot are complimentary. It is difficult to interpret one without the
other. The density plot shows compatibilities clearly, the height plot incompatibilities.
The distribution of the varieties is given in table 7.1.
7.1.3 Large–Scale Behaviour
The model is a Markov process with absorbing states [Pap84, p. 396, “Birth Pro-
cesses”], so it should settle after some initial transient behaviour, but may, possibly,
possess limit cycles.
In Axelrod’s analysis, these following points were considered important:
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Figure 7.1: Density plots of the evolving culture of figure 7.2
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Figure 7.2: Surface plot of an evolving culture at t0 and t∞
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1. How many areas of dissimilarity?
2. How many different areas of dissimilarity?
3. How large were they relative to one another?
4. How quickly did the system stabilise?
Metrics Axelrod’s method of to determine the fluctuation of the areas of dissimilar-
ity used time–series plotting and peak detection. A set of metrics were developed that
more conveniently measured the qualities of regions. Some system activity metrics
were also introduced.
η is an efficiency measure and is the ratio of the number of interactions to the number
of selections in each period. This is used to measure system activity.
S(v) The entropy of the different varieties of agents on the field. This is a single
metric for measuring variance, S(v) is a normalised entropy, i.e. 0 ≤ S(v) ≤ 1.
S(v) = −
1
lnN
ΣNv pv ln pv (7.7)
pv is the probability of selecting an agent having variety v, simply
nv
N
; N is
the maximum number of varieties that can exist simultaneously, which, in this
case, is the same as the total number of agents that can exist simultaneously,
in these simulations N = 10 × 10. The variety entropy is the measure of the
homogeneity of the agents in the population as a whole, when it is zero, the
population has only one variety of agent and no further interaction is possible.
S(c) The compatibility entropy is a measure of how compatible the varieties are with
one another. The probability on which the measure is based is that of an agent
of variety u interacting with an agent of variety v, denoted by u ∧ v:
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P (u ∧ v) = P (u)P (v|u) + P (v)P (u|v)
where
P (w) =
nw
N
P (x|w) =
nx
N − nw
The event u ∧ u is not acted upon, so it is removed from the probability space
as are the events u∧ v when u is not compatible with v — the agents can only
interact with one another if they are similar in one feature and have at least
one dissimilar feature. The events that form part of the entropy measure do
not cover the entire event space, so they need to be normalised. Once that is
done, the entropy can be formed in the usual way. The entropy metric is itself
normalised using the factor
(
N
2
)
, i.e. the maximum number of pairs of different
agents it would be possible to have.
S(c) = −
1
ln
(
N
2
)Σ(N2 )u,v P (u ∧ v) lnP (u ∧ v) (7.8)
When the compatibility entropy is zero, every agent is of an incompatible variety
with every other agent and no further interaction is possible. It is possible for a
system to have a non–zero compatibility entropy and for no further interaction
to be possible; this would arise if two (or more) “islands” of compatible agents
are separated by a sea of agents with which they are incompatible.
Stasis Condition Because the system may fall into a limit cycle, a condition needs
to be put into place that will cause the simulation to terminate. Neither of the entropy
metrics is useful for this, so a simple test is to see if the number of varieties has changed
over a certain number of periods. (This actually needs to be improved upon, because
under some short duration limit cycles the number of varieties does change. This is
inavoidable, it will be argued later that this model shows chaotic behaviour and the
length of limit cycles is a fractal number.)
Eaves, Ph.D 2000 Page 147
Typical Metrics and some Characterisation The plot of these metrics against
time for the culture whose initial and final states are shown in figure 7.1 appears in
figure 7.3. The horizontal axis, marked T, represents the number of cycles.
Neither the variety nor the compatibility entropy has reached zero, but after 25
periods of no activity and no change in the number of varieties, the system is static.
Entropy drives activity, the higher the entropy of the system the greater the activity
can be. One can divide the activity of the system into four broad epochs:
1. Grouping and Simplifying - Anarchy
Entropy is high and the activity η rises quickly and is relatively constant for the
first epoch [0, 20]; the entropies fall rapidly. The compatibility entropy is more
or less synchronised with the variety entropy, meaning that as a new variety is
formed it is compatible with the majority of other varieties (which one would
expect, since there are so many varieties around.) The end of the anarchic epoch
is characterised by an entropy dip. This is due to some traits being annihilated
at the edges of the square. There is a lull in activity during this dip.
2. Migrating - Collectivism
During the epoch [20, 40], the activity increases, but the entropies remain rel-
atively constant. Critically, the compatibility entropy increases and is slightly
advanced in phase relative to the variety entropy: implying that an interaction
between two agents generates another agent having a different variety. The
traits are migrating across the population.
3. Concentration - Oligarchy
Epoch [40, 70] has a constant level of activity, but both entropies begin to
fall: no more new varieties are being generated and varieties are forming into
incompatible groups. The compatibility entropy now falls behind the variety
entropy in phase and the difference between the two increases. This implies that
when two agents interact the agent is either unchanged or becomes identical to
the neighbour with which it interacted.
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Figure 7.3: Entropies and activity for the evolving culture in figure 7.1
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4. Isolation and Stasis - Authoritarianism
From [70, 90] the activity falls as do the entropies. The compatibility entropy
falling behind in phase and having more pointed peaks than the variety entropy.
By period 90, the system is inactive.
At the end of the simulation there are 10 varieties: these are ordered and inter–
related as shown in table 7.1. The first–ranked is incompatible with all the others and
has a numeric majority over all the others combined. It is now a perennial dictator,
it cannot be changed and has a numeric majority.
Order Identity Number Compatible with
1 1 8 3 5 8 56 none
2 6 7 1 6 5 27 3, 8, 9, 10
3 8 5 6 6 7 5 7, 8, 10
4 7 2 2 4 9 3 5, 6
5 5 3 8 4 2 2 6, 7
6 3 6 8 4 5 2 4, 5, 9
7 9 3 5 8 4 2 3, 5, 8
8 2 7 6 8 1 1 2, 3, 10
9 6 8 1 1 5 1 2, 6, 10
10 6 7 7 6 7 1 2, 3, 8, 9
Table 7.1: Identities in an evolved culture
Some Expected Deductions The activity plot in figure 7.3 shows that the system
stabilised in 90 periods — each period allows up to a hundred interactions. Axelrod
was able to substantiate some intuitive deductions:
1. More features, More interaction
The more features agents possessed the more likely they were to interact. The
efficiency η had a higher average. (There were no conclusions as to its expected
distribution.)
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2. More traits, Less interaction
The more traits per feature the less likely agents were to interact. The efficiency
η would be lower in this case.
3. Bigger neighbourhoods, More interaction
The larger the neighbourhood (that is, the number of adjacent neighbours), the
more likely agents were to interact.
An Unexpected Deduction The relative spread of regions of dissimilarity and
their distinctness proved to be less intuitive. Axelrod found that the larger the system,
the fewer the number of dissimilar regions. The explanation for this is rather subtle:
traits migrate across the system on a random walk [Pap84, p. 389]; the more random
the system is, the further they will progress, the system is random for longer if it
is larger; therefore, the larger the system, the wider the spread of a particular trait,
therefore the less likely it is that the trait will be confined to one isolationist group.
This result can be interpreted as a thermodynamic effect: the system is a hot liquid
that is cooling, substances dissolve in it and are dispersed by Brownian motion; the
greater the volume of liquid the more mixing takes place.
This observation also helps in understanding the variation in the number of dis-
tinct regions. On the whole, one variety will tend to dominate all others: it is prob-
abilistically more likely to reach stasis in this way. If two blocks of varieties were to
form which were, more or less, of equal size and they were identical in every respect
except one, then a limit cycle would develop. At the border between the two blocks,
some would accrete a trait and join the other block while a similar number would
accrete the other trait and join the other block. Figure 7.4 shows a density plot which
has three blocks surrounded by a fourth. The block of three are compatible with one
another and differ very slightly from the block surrounding. Figure 7.5 shows the
metrics over time, the system behaves very much as any other would up to period
200, thereafter it enters a cycle.
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Figure 7.4: Density plot for competing varieties in a culture at t0 and t800
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7.1.4 The Collective Choice Interpretation
Axelrod modified the cultural model in a number of ways and drew further con-
clusions which will prove to be useful later. The relationship between features and
traits can be interpreted as a collective choice procedure.
Axelrod’s Investigations Axelrod’s simple model does help to explain large–scale
system behaviour given an intuitively appealing small–scale behaviour. Axelrod inves-
tigated the effects of different topologies and different stochastic inputs for selection
— in particular, selecting central agents more often, because traits can be destroyed
at the edges — and the initial allocation of traits — using a Gaussian distribution,
to see how much the final varieties could vary from a variety of Gaussian averages.
Axelrod chose not to vary the rules agents used to accrete traits. This does affect
how the model can be used to make a collective choice.
Collective Choice Interpretation The earlier analysis of preference hierarchies
and preference aggregation, see chapter 6, gives an insight into the operation of the
cultural model as a collective choice procedure.
Assume there are three issues, a, b, c, a system must determine the relative strengths
of each of them given that each agent (or voter) is allowed to express a preference
ordering using, for simplicity, a strong ordering. The orderings, D, is the set given in
(7.9).
D = {a > b > c, a > c > b, b > c > a, b > a > c, c > b > a, c > a > b} (7.9)
If the features are F = 〈a > b, a > c, b > c〉 and the traits for each feature are
T = {1,−1} then an agent preferring a > b > c would have a feature set of traits:
〈1, 1, 1〉, and an agent having a > c > b would have 〈1, 1,−1〉. If these two agents
interacted they would quickly settle their differences on the relative merits of c and b
and form a single variety of agent, similarly for agents preferring b and c.
If an agent preferring a were to interact with an agent preferring b then 〈1, 1, 1〉
meeting 〈−1,−1, 1〉 would allow them to exchange their primary preference and the
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internal state of the receiver would become inconsistent, so the criterion for interaction
is that the two agents must agree on two preferences before they can interact.
This interpretation is valid for a wider issue set and for weak orderings, the choice
of the number of traits on which to agree does become more complicated. Referring
to table 6.5, for three issues there are 13 different weak orderings of those issues with
respect to one another. The features would be F = 〈a > b, a > c, b > c〉 and the trait
set would be {1, 0,−1}. An agent having a preference ordering: a > b > c would
have a feature set: 〈1, 1, 1〉 and a = b = c would be 〈0, 0, 0〉.
It is possible to be more liberal in this interpretation. If one has n issues and the
number of orderings is O(n), as given by table 6.5, if one then wants to simplify the
orderings to some sub–set, then one should set the number of features #(F ) and the
number of traits #(T ) so that #(F ) ·#(T ) < O(n). The cultural model then acts as
a genetic algorithm, but of a peculiar kind: it crosses varieties with one another, but
does not mutate, and requires no global fitness function.
One must then impose some kind of topology that allows each variety to interact
with every other. This need not be a mesh topology, because the traits only have to
find a migration path. A spanning tree for the preference orderings will suffice and it
is easy enough to set a size for a useful spanning tree using (7.10), where n is, once
again, the number of issues to be resolved.
Σni=1
(
n
i
)
(7.10)
The cultural model can then be thought of as collective choice procedure that
forms a spanning tree of a well–ordered graph. Unlike the techniques given in §6.5,
it is a stochastically–driven heuristic method. It attempts to reduce a prefereence
ordering search space of order O(n) to a strongly–ordered subset of those orderings
where some of the issues have been merged by allowing a weak–ordering.
(The fact that some of the feature sets produced during the operation of the
cultural model may give rise to inconsistent states can be justified in the same way as
it is with genetic algorithms. It is simply a transient state that allows new varieties
to be developed. This is argued more persuasively in [Dav91].)
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7.2 Formation of Cultures under Peer Pressure
Axelrod’s simple behavioural rule and the large–scale effects it appears to intro-
duce is discussed first. A new rule is introduced and a system using it is simulated
and the results analysed.
7.2.1 Egoistic Behaviour
The small–scale behaviour that agents follow is described in the title of figure 7.2
as Egoistic. Each agent can accrete a trait from one of its neighbours regardless of
the state of its other neighbours.
Increasing Heterogeneity Some of the simulations conducted used a smaller play-
ing field (5 by 5) with only 3 features and 3 traits per feature. These show that agents
can quickly agree to not differentiate amongst themselves, see figure 7.6. (The axes
are labelled in the same way as in 7.2: identity, id, on the vertical axis, location within
the playing surface on the x and y axes.)
It is unlikely that a wholly homogeneous culture should arise with a larger more
complex playing field, but it is usually the case that one variety of agent wholly
dominates the others. It might be desirable to control the degree of variety.
Restricting the migration of traits Of particular interest for information secu-
rity is how a small sophisticated group might be able to enforce a consensus that
certain views should be globally accessible. Figure 7.7 illustrates this. Here, two
agents placed at the origin and at (4, 0) have seen their principal traits migrate across
almost the whole of the surface.
It would be desirable that there be distinct regions having access to particular
views/traits, but it is not desirable that views/traits migrate indiscriminately across
regions.
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Culture stabilization under Egoistic behaviour
Figure 7.6: Culture that evolves to homogeneity
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Figure 7.7: Culture unduly influenced by some agents
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7.2.2 Peer Agreement
Another simple behaviour that could be employed by an agent is to require that
one of its other neighbours also be compatible with the neighbour from which it
would accrete the trait. Unfortunately, to make this rule more precise a modal logic
is required. Modal logics are briefly discussed in appendix F.
The model under which an agent x operates is denoted U = 〈W, . . . ,P〉. Con-
taining a set of agents W, which are its neighbours {y1, . . . , yn z1, . . . , zn} and a set
of truths, the traits, distributed amongst the worlds, P = {P0, . . . , PN}.
Egoistic Behaviour Firstly, egoistic behaviour can be more formally specified.
The probabilistic fuzziness of U(0, 1) in (7.4) is not given in this formal specifica-
tion. The form is of a schema, the conditions above the line must appertain and the
condition below the line can be enforced.
U
|=
x
Pi ∧ ¬Pj ∧ ♦(Pi ∧ Pj)
U
|=
x
Pj
(7.11)
x has been selected and holds the trait Pi but not Pj. There is another agent in
his neighbourhood where both Pi and Pj are held. x accretes Pj
1 (Incidentally, i is
not equal to j because Pi ∧ ¬Pj would be false.)
Peer Agreement Behaviour A form of peer agreement behaviour can be ex-
pressed thus:
U
|=
x
Pi ∧ ¬Pj ∧ ♦(Pi ∧ Pj)
U
|=
x
♦(Pj ∧ ¬Pi) ∨ ♦(Pk ∧ ¬Pj ∧ ♦(Pk ∧ Pj))
U
|=
x
Pj
(7.12)
1The class of modal logic employed has to be irreflexive. In particular any axiom which prevents
♦(Pi ∧ Pj) = ♦Pi ∧ ♦Pj , i.e.Pi and Pj must reside in the same agent.
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The first condition is the same as in (7.11). The second has two parts, there is
someone else in the neighbourhood who:
• Either: holds Pj but not Pi.
• Or: could also accrete Pj , i.e. is compatible with z in some other way.
This form of behaviour — implemented as the class PeerPossible in [Eav99b] —
is effectively a membership rule. If z is the holder of Pj who also holds Pi, then x
proposes Pj and someone, y, seconds it.
In the former case, if the number of neighbours is limited to four (as they are in
the Axelrod square topology) then five may vote and a majority, x, y and z, have
stated that they are compatible with Pj — z votes “for” because it already holds Pj,
the other two, x and y, because they hold something that z also holds.
7.2.3 Some Expectations
1. Slower Trait Migration and More Probable Limit Cycles
Clearly, one can expect the rate of trait migration to be slower. A trait not
already extant in a neighbourhood will have to wait for a trait that is extant to
join it, before it can propose itself. If trait migration is very slow and in pairs,
it might be the case that traits repeatedly cross and re–cross the field without
actually appearing in the same agent together. This could lead to very long
limit cycles.
2. Edge Effects
Under egoistic behaviour, if a trait becomes isolated at an edge, it had one less
degree of freedom in the direction in which it could migrate. Trait migration
on a square field tends to be from the centre to the edges. Under PeerPossible
behaviour it should be the case that traits will be more difficult to dislodge from
the edges, because the neighbourhood they belong to has one less voter, but,
as proposer and a seconder are still needed, three out of four must concur; at
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the corners, the condition is even more stringent, requiring three out of three
to concur.
3. Dormancy and Second Waves
The edge effects might lead to agents being able to preserve traits at the edges
and corners so that as the system stabilises, and the traits held at the centre
migrate outward, the traits held at the edges would overcome the traits that
originated from the centre. This would lead to a second wave of activity.
7.2.4 Some Results
A set of simulations was undertaken using PeerPossible behaviour instead of Ego-
istic. The model is susceptible to the effects of different starting conditions — the
initial allocation of traits to each individual,
(
105
100
)
different configurations — and the
number of different sequences of interactions — 100200 for a typical 200 period run.
Nonetheless, some useful results were observed. A typical pair of density plots and
an activity plot appear as figures 7.8 and 7.9 respectively.
Large–scale behaviours PeerPossible is similar to Egoistic behaviour in that it
gives rise to diverse populations which can either be ultimately quiescent or fall into
a limit cycle. PeerPossible leads to limit–cycling populations more often than Egoistic
— as was expected. Unlike Egoistic behaviour these can be predicted and can remain
relatively stable. PeerPossible behaviour very often results in limit cycles between
comparably sized groups, but these are more or less defined after 200 periods (this is
discussed in more detail later.)
This can be summarised:
• If the system does stabilise quickly, it invariably results in one dominant variety.
• If the system takes longer to stabilise, then a limit cycle with a dominant variety
varying in the number of members is the usual result.
An analogy to political systems might be useful here: systems that stabilise rapidly
to an authoritarian regime are similar in behaviour to third world political systems
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Figure 7.8: Peer Agreement Density Plot at t0 and t∞
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— an immutable consensus emerges; systems that exhibit limit cycles are comparable
to first world political systems — a variable consensus emerges.
Whether a population will stabilise quickly can be determined quite reliably by
the changes in its entropy characteristics as it evolves.
Figure 7.8 shows different identities are usually attached to an edge. This is also
true of cultures produced by egoistic behaviour, but it appears to be more marked
for PeerPossible behaviour. This is a result that was also expected.
An interesting and useful side–effect of slower trait migration is that large–scale
behaviour becomes more predictable because traits are more likely to cluster in their
original locations and individuals at the edges tend to become the dominating variety.
Referring to figure 7.8, there are two large distinct regions:
• The turquoise lower left–hand side
The colours in the lower left–hand side corner of the initial state are more often
of the turquoise hue that will prove to be dominant. There are some agents on
the edge, at (0, 0), (0, 3) and (0, 7), that are already of colour that will prove to
be dominant in that corner. Note that (0, 7) and (0, 10), already closely related
to the dominant turquoise, have joined the red variety.
• The garnet upper right–hand side
This area appears to have been constructed in response to the turquoise area.
There are no explicitly garnet individuals in the initial populations, the final
colour appears to be a blend of red and the light puce coloured individuals.
Notice that the individuals in the upper corners are unchanged throughout the
evolution.
System Activity Referring to the four epochs that were characterised for egoistic
behaviour, there are some differences for PeerPossible:
1. Anarchy
The anarchic period appears to last about twice as long as it does under egoistic
behaviour, as one might expect, because the level of activity is about half. When
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both entropies fall to 0.6 the collectivistic epoch commences. It also exhibits
the dip associated with traits being annihilated at the edges.
2. Collectivism
This is markedly different from egoistic behaviour. The entropy falls throughout
the collectivistic epoch — meaning that the system is organising itself faster.
Other than that, it behaves in a similar manner: the difference between the
variety and compatibility entropy reduces and the latter leads the former.
3. Oligarchy
Under egoistic behaviour, this epoch is marked by a fall in entropy, and an
increasing difference between variety and compatibility entropies which leads
to a phase lead becoming a lag. Under PeerPossible behaviour only the phase
change is noticeable, because the entropy has fallen to critical during the period
of collectivism.
4. Authoritarianism
The authoritarian epoch is the same under both egoistic and PeerPossible be-
haviour.
Generally PeerPossible behaviour has a level of activity that is 10% lower than
egoistic but takes about twice as long to stabilise. The latter is commensurate with
the requirement under PeerPossible behaviour that an individual must gain a corrob-
orating neighbour — suggesting that two agents, probabilistically, take twice as long
to agree as one — but the level of activity is not half of what it was under egoistic
behaviour. This would suggest that PeerPossible behaviour is more efficient — in
that, the interactions between agents are not as often undone.
Limit Cycles PeerPossible behaviour, as predicted, does suffer more from limit
cycles. In a set of 32 simulations only 11 reached stasis. It would seem that the
limit cycle is the preferred global behaviour for local PeerPossible behaviour. A good
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Figure 7.10: Peer Agreement Density Plot at t0 and t1100
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example of a limit cycle’s activity appears in figure 7.11. The state of the agents
appears in figure 7.10.
Although the system cannot reach stasis, which is arrived at when the number
of varieties is constant for 25 periods, the system has been more or less stable since
period 200, which is quite typical of PeerPossible systems. Looking at the state of the
agents, one variety has dominated the others and, because of the lack of variation of
the variety entropy, has done so for some time.
One could be fairly confident in saying that when the variety entropy has fallen
below 50% and the compatibility entropy is less than the variety entropy, a system is
probably stable, in that the dominant variety will remain so.
It appears to be very rare for a system in a limit cycle with a dominant variety to
further evolve so that variety is no longer dominant.
7.2.5 Some Conclusions
PeerPossible behaviour does seem to lead to more predictable systems which, more
often than not, avoids an authoritarian terminal state and that trait accretions are
less frequently reversed later.
7.3 Predictability of Large–Scale Behaviour
The simulation model has been used to determine emergent properties of large–
scale behaviour given different small–scale behaviours. In §7.1.3 it was seen that larger
playing fields led to more homogeneous cultures. The simulations used to demonstrate
this property were highly stochastic: individuals were given random traits, they were
then randomly located and then in each period randomly chosen to interact with one
another.
It is also hoped that this analysis of the evolution of cultures can give us some
assurance that, were a system allowed to organise itself, it would consistently arrive
at more or less the same set of cultures if the individuals within it start with the
same traits and behave in the same way. This would mean that a safe access control
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management system would arrive at very much the same allocations of access rights
if the individuals start with the same interests.
In the context of the simulation model developed above, some assurance must be
gained that the final state of the system is statistically independent of the location
of the individuals and when they are chosen to interact with one another.
Before describing the experiments that were conducted to provide this assurance,
some insight will be gained from the analytic research that has been conducted in
this field.
7.3.1 Analytic Research
Essentially, some guidance is needed on how to construct a simulation model whose
final state will be almost wholly dependent on the initial states of the individuals:
their location with respect to one another and the sequence they interact with one
another is not important.
Voter Models and Initial Distributions
Axelrod pointed out in his paper [AAEC96], that the simulation model is a variant
of the voter model in which a particle aligns itself with its neighbours based on whether
they hold the same value or not.
Consonant voting Bramson and Griffeath, [BG80], have made a comprehensive
analysis of voter models having only one trait. They quote results showing that voters
in one– or two–dimensional space tend to converge weakly to a majority, either for
or against, which is dependent only on the initial ratio of voters for and against. The
voter model they analysed was a consonant voter model meaning that a voter aligned
himself to be the same as his neighbours.
Bramson and Griffeath’s main interest was to establish conditions under which
the process would be ergodic, i.e.under what conditions limit cycles would not occur.
They showed, analytically, that in one–dimensional systems the consonant voting
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model for one trait individuals was ergodic, but for more than two or more dimensions,
i.e. four neighbours or more, it was not ergodic.
They also showed that even though two– or more dimensional systems might not
be ergodic, the ratio law still applied. In that, the probability of the system attaining
a state where the ratio of for and against voters was reversed from the initial state of
the system was ergodic: under a consonant voting model, the same simple majority
will be maintained. There were a number of provisos to this. If the ratio was close to
1
2
there was as a possibility of short excursions when the majority would be reversed,
but not indefinitely.
Dissonant voting Bramson and Griffeath’s paper also analysed dissonant voting
models and discovered that they were unable to ascertain whether the ergodicity the-
orems they had developed could be shown or not. Their analytical technique was
lacking because dissonance introduced cumulatively larger probabilities of dissimi-
larity. It appears that, under dissonant behaviour, chaotic behaviour can develop
which can lead to very long limit cycles which may not hold an initial majority in
place. This can be demonstrated with reference to another of Axelrod’s behavioural
investigations.
The basis of Axelrod’s simulation is a simple behavioural interaction, which is best
expressed in modal logic. The modal logic expression is a useful formalisation, but
it has proved difficult to extend it to describe the dynamics of interacting systems.
Axelrod’s cultural model was preceded by, and is, in some ways, an extension of, the
Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma — IPD, see [Stu97] for example. Each prisoner has one
neighbour, so it a very simple model under Bramson and Griffeath’s analysis, but the
dynamics can be very complex. An analysis of the simple interaction underlying the
IPD was carried out by Mar [MD94]. He showed that this could lead to a system which
possessed chaotic self–similar behaviour if one of the prisoners acted consistently
dissonantly.
Unfortunately, consonance and dissonance become non–bivalent concepts when
more than one trait is involved and the properties of the distance metric and the
behavioural rule that uses it become important.
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Because of this property, it is not possible to make any useful predictions about
large–scale behaviour in dissonant systems. Axelrod’s cultural model can move from
a disordered to an ordered state with predictable large–scale behaviour, but it cannot
move from an ordered state to a more disordered one and remain predictable.
The relative consonance of PeerPossible Referring to the behavioural mod-
els that have been investigated: PeerPossible behaviour, it was noted in §7.2.5, gives
rise to fewer trait reversals than Egoistic. This would suggest that PeerPossible is a
more consonant rule.
Topologies and Initial Distributions
Bramson and Griffeath’s one trait voter models were immune to changes in topol-
ogy. There was no difference in large–scale behaviour if the voters were laid out on
squares, circles, cylinders, toroids or spheres. When the voters have more than one
trait, superposition effects occur which make topology important. An analysis of the
effects of topology leads to a concept called meta–behaviour and suggests topologies
that will be more predictable.
Meta–behaviour and Topology As pointed out in the discussion of the PeerPos-
sible behaviour, agents located at the corners are more intransigent than those on the
edges who are more intransigent than those in the centre because corner agents have
only two neighbours, edge agents three and inner agents four.
It may be that the limiting distribution of identities is towards their meta–
behaviour determined by their intransigence which is, in turn, determined by the
number of neighbours they have.
Squares This would mean that for a square topology, there would be three types
of meta–behaviour. The corner agents separate the groups of edge agents from one
another and vice versa; this would suggest a mean of nine varieties would evolve: four
different corner varieties, four different edge varieties and one variety for the inner
agents. The inner agents would outnumber the corner and edge agents when, for a
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square having sides of length L: (L − 2)2 > 4(L − 1), i.e.L ≥ 7 and the number of
agents is 49.
The inner agents would align themselves to have one variety and would then
separate the other types of agent from one another preventing them from coalescing.
A useful analogy to a political system might help here: the United States of Amer-
ica has more than 49 states and has a relatively stable political spectrum. Changes
to the constitution of the United States must be ratified by 66% of the legislative
assemblies of its constituent states. This closely approximates to the allocation of
behaviours in the behavioural model.
Circles The number of meta–behaviours can only be changed by using a differ-
ent topology.
A circular topology could be constructed as a coiled helix — like a string of beads.
The two end–agents would have two neighbours. The edge agents would form one
outer circle and the inner agents would be all the agents within that circle: giving
rise to three meta–behaviours. There would then be four varieties: two types of
end–agent, one type of edge agent (they are now connected) and one type of inner
agent.
The two end–agents could then be connected to one another to give one agent
with three neighbours, i.e. another edge agent. There would then be only two meta–
behaviours. The number of inner agents would exceed the number of edge agents
when π(r − 1)2 > 4πr, i.e. r ≥ 4 or the total number of agents is greater than 49.
This topology has been called the Mo¨bian circle by Axelrod in [Axe97].
The inner agents would align themselves to have one variety and would then be
able to dominate the other group of edge agents. This circle is a more responsive
topology than the square, because the edge agents would be in the majority given
one defection by an inner agent. That is, it reduces to a simple majority voting model.
The Axelrod cultural model can thus reduce a random selection of behaviours to
a choice between two aggregated behaviours:
• A conservative policy held by agents at the edge
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• A broad consensus policy held in the centre
Axelrod conducted a number of simulations to determine if this was the emergent
property for circular topologies and the result was more or less in the affirmative, see
[Axe97].
7.3.2 Experimental Investigation
From the analysis above, it would appear that this model would lead to more
predictable large–scale behaviour:
• PeerPossible small–scale behaviour
• Mo¨bian circle
• More than 49 agents
The following experimental procedure was carried out in addition to Axelrod’s
experiments: generate one set of agents and place them randomly on a Mo¨bian circle
and allow the system to interact. When stasis was reached, the final set of varieties
of agent was recorded and the experiment repeated with another random allocation
of the same agents.
Regions These results agree closely with those of Axelrod’s for the Mo¨bian circle
where the simulations produced just two varieties for 70% of the simulations and these
simulations reached an authoritarian state. 20% of simulations resulted in either,
three varieties which were all mutually incompatible and reached stasis, or, three
varieties which remained compatible but the system did not reach stasis. When three
varieties emerged it was invariably the case that two large varieties were incompatible
and separated by a small buffer region occupied by the third small variety. This buffer
region invariably contained the two agents that linked the outer edge with the inner
core.
The remaining 10% of the simulations seemed to be a variant of the buffer region
where there were two varieties in the buffer zone, which were incompatible with one
of its neighbouring zones.
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No simulation resulted in more than four varieties. Clearly, this is very consistent
large–scale behaviour.
Varieties The simulations proved to be less decisive with regard to final varieties.
The initial population of agents was seeded using a binomial distribution of twelve
traits for half of their features and a uniform distribution of twelve for the remainder.
The binomial distribution was a throw of two six–sided dice2. The conditions for the
simulation were these:
• 144 agents were laid out in a Mo¨bian circle
• PeerPossible behaviour for the agents
• There were twelve features, each having twelve traits
• n%, n ≥ 50% of the agents had their lower six features assigned traits using
the binomial and the upper six features using the uniform distribution.
• The remaining 100−n% had their upper six features generated using the bino-
mial and the lower six generated using the uniform distribution.
It was seen that only when n > 66%, were the final varieties noticeably simi-
lar across simulations with different initial distributions of the same agents. When
50% < n < 66%, one or more arbitrary traits from the smaller group could establish
themselves in the larger group. A similarity between the varieties remained which
did indicate a consensus had emerged.
It should be noted that 66% is a statistically significant number. It is one standard
deviation of the normal distribution and the sum of a large number of binomial
distributions approximates to the normal.
This agrees with the Bramson and Griffeath’s analysis: that the varieties that
emerged from the larger group were consistently in the majority.
2It was decided to operate in base twelve, because twelve has more divisors than ten which helped
to simplify the calculations.
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7.3.3 Sequences of Interaction
It appears then that with a suitable choice of topology and an intrinsic bias in the
population a consistent consensus can be achieved. It was decided that an investiga-
tion into the effects of the sequence of interaction between agents was unnecessary.
This may not be so easily dismissed in a real culture where the choice of agents who
may interact with others may be biased towards particular individuals. This is worth
further investigation, but, for the time being, it is assumed that the agents chosen to
interact with one another can be safely assumed to be uniformly random.
7.3.4 Collective Choice
Referring to the discussion of the theory of collective choice §6.4.1, the Mo¨bian
circle topology has the attractive property of being able to reduce collections of issues
to just two and thus appears to reduce choice systems to one of simple majority and
thereby circumvents the limitations imposed by Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, as
summarised in [Eav99a].
Referring again to the political structure of the United States, it would appear
to display the characteristics of this circular topology. There are just two dominant
political ideologies and the states neighbour each other in different circular topologies
on the different political issues presented to them. The net effect is a superposition
of pairs of different behaviours all of which can be encompassed by the two political
parties’ platforms. This construction bears a great deal of similarity to the dynamic
analysis of the Tiebout model by Kollman et al. [KMP95].
7.4 Summary
Protocol adoption This chapter has shown that large systems where individual
agents make choices constrained by a simple, rational behaviour can lead to stable
behaviour for the system as a whole. This result, it is claimed [Axe95], helps to
explain the emergence of de facto standards. Axelrod’s analysis was prompted by the
evolution of different Unix standards, but it might be applied to different Internet
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protocols. For example, 90% of Internet traffic is carried over TCP connections rather
than in UDP datagrams. TCP has very useful technical advantages over UDP: it,
unlike UDP, is rate–adaptive, does not require an application programmer to fragment
his own data, transparently recovers from IP packet loss and the arrival of IP packets
out of sequence — in summary, it provides a relatively simply session layer. UDP
is however to easier to manage: it requires no connection management — simply
one listening endpoint from each party for each connection — it is therefore easily
adaptable to multi–cast protocols and it is easier to define rules for screening firewall
routers. Had it been the case that a sufficiently capable session layer were available
to application programmers early in the development of the Internet, UDP might
have become the de facto standard for IP communications rather than TCP. Similar
arguments can be made for the domination of other protocols: the Sun Micro-systems
RPC protocols based on the portmapper, could have been supplanted by the Domain
Naming Service based Hesiod protocol from MIT.
Protocol adoption and behaviour The number of incompatible standards (meta–
behaviours) that can emerge is a function of topology; how long the system takes to
arrive at a stable set of standards is a function of the choices — features and traits
— available. The behaviour that each agent employs when making choices controls
the rate of migration of the traits and the number of conflicts over their selection:
Egoistic behaviour allows traits to migrate quickly but introduces proportionally more
conflicts to resolve, PeerPossible behaviour the converse.
It has also been argued that PeerPossible should be a more consonant voting
behaviour than Egoistic and, when coupled with a Mo¨bian topology allows very ho-
mogeneous cultures to evolve. This cultural system also has the attractive property
that it does not remove any intrinsic bias in population.
Engineering behaviours A point that has not been addressed is how behaviours
like Egoistic and PeerPossible would be engineered so that they may be used to simplify
policy choices in working systems. A simpler example than access control policy
evolution might be IP address allocation. Looking at figure 7.10, it could be the case
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that a hundred small separate networks at t0 have interacted with one another and
joined each other’s networks to yield a few larger networks by t1100. The criteria for
the features they might employ would include some of the following:
• Connections to different types of carrier network: some networks may consist
almost entirely of single–homed 100BaseTX on the same subnetwork; some may
have a number of dual–homed routers with access to ATM or SDH leased lines
linking to other subnetworks.
• Different protocols used for communication: some networks may make extensive
use of multi–cast, point–to–point IP routes, or Generic Router Encapsulation
(GRE) tunnels.
• Traffic types: some networks may be simply web–browsers; some may use re-
mote file-store.
• Screening subnets: it may be the case that some networks must not be visible
to one another.
There could be a very large set of traits for each of these and others.
For an operational protocol, one must consider resource–locking. Each individual
would operate autonomously from every other, but would need to acquire locks on
their neighbours when they are about to make the decision to change their configu-
ration. This is quite a difficult lock–acquiring exercise since dead– and livelock are
distinct possibilities.
Population statistics The key point about the behaviours Egoistic and PeerPos-
sible is that they operate locally and can, consequently, adapt very quickly to their
neighbours. The entropy measures that have been introduced are population mea-
sures and, in a working system, would be expensive to compute. They are, as has
been seen above, a very useful guide to the operational state of the system — whether
anarchic, collectivistic, oligarchic or authoritarian. A system administrator could use
the entropy measures to determine if a system has simplified itself enough to be al-
lowed to continue to fulfil its chosen function: more efficiently and with less conflicts
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than before it organised itself. To obtain an accurate statistic, it may be necessary for
the administrator to quell all interactions and request the status of all the individuals.
Migration of access rights The results obtained in this chapter give us confi-
dence that a self–organising system that allows access rights to be migrated from one
individual to another should be predictable. Some of the metrics developed could be
used to monitor the migration.
The cultural model gives us a reference model of behaviour. When one designs a
system, one can attempt to reduce its operation to that of the simulation described
in this chapter. This then gives us some expectations for its behaviour.
Chapter 8
Self–Organising Permissions Policy
System
The findings of chapters 6 together with the small–scale behaviours investigated
in chapter 7 can be used as the basis for a self–organising permissions policy sys-
tem. In chapter 6, integrity checks and distance measures for preference hierarchies
were introduced. In chapter 7, a cultural model illustrated how a system of inter-
acting agents with a fixed set of choices using a simple behavioural rule based on
a distance measure would have reasonably predictable large–scale behaviour so that
agents within cultures should segregate themselves into large groups.
To assure ourselves that a system will behave like the cultures described in 7, it
must have the same construction:
• A small–scale behavioural rule
• A fixed set of discernible features with traits
• A distance measure for two feature sets
• A fixed topology, preferably in two dimensions
Before discussing how a self–organising permissions system might work, a simpler
example of a self–organising set of newsgroups will be developed.
Eaves, Ph.D 2000 Page 179
8.1 Self–Organising Newsgroups
One application of this system as proposed would be a set of self–organising news-
groups or mailing lists. The problem with USENET newsgroups is they have a very
low “signal to noise” ratio. There are lots of postings of dubious worth, some nothing
more than advertisements. Very often the quality of debate degenerates to a squab-
ble. Often cliques of users develop threads of discussion which are of no interest to
anyone else. Cross–posting is another problem: subscribers send the same message
to a number of newsgroups simultaneously.
Newsgroups could be self–organising: so that squabblers will be moved to their
own groups as would persistent advertisers. Cross–posting will be limited by using
managers who may choose to refer a posting to another group rather than have it
posted in their own.
There are three types of newsgroup management in place for the USENET.
Moderated every posting to the newsgroup is vetted by a moderator.
Managed subscribers are only allowed to post if they have applied for permission
to do so from the newsgroup manager. The newsgroup software then checks if
each posting comes from an allowed subscriber.
Unmanaged Access is completely open.
Moderation is usually too burdensome. Managed newsgroups are quite rare (but
common for mailing lists), so the usual form is an unmanaged newsgroup. The system
proposed will be a sophisticated managed newsgroup.
To put newsgroup postings under some sort of control, a preference hierarchy
needs to be developed from some norms. This would then be used to partition the
subscribers to the newsgroup into sub–groups and to rank the newsgroups with respect
to one another. This section will continue with a description of how such a self–
managing newsgroup protocol would work and an analysis of it as a cultural model
like that in chapter 7.
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8.1.1 Newsgroup Operation
How it might work
Newsgroups are organised by a set of news administrators who require a group of
people to issue a charter and have a number of newsgroup subscribers sign it before a
group is propagated within the USENET hierarchy. Discussions around an operating
system, such as Linux, in the comp.os hierarchy has been split into these groups:
comp.os.linux.advocacy
comp.os.linux.announce
comp.os.linux.hardware
comp.os.linux.software
comp.os.linux.setup
comp.os.linux.networking
etc.
Within the comp.os.linux.advocacy newsgroup there will be a number of post-
ings comparing Linux with the Microsoft Windows operating system. The Linux
vs.Windows debate is an interest which all of the comp.os.linux newsgroups share,
but only comp.os.linux.advocacy would usually discuss it, but a debate comparing
Windows network interface card driver support vis a` vis that of Linux would be of
interest to the comp.os.linux.networking newsgroup.
A self–organising set of newsgroups for comp.os.linux should finally evolve a struc-
ture similar to that above, but it would use who takes part in which debates to evolve
the structure, rather than having one imposed on it.
The operation of a self–organising newsgroup has only a small amount of informa-
tion to use: postings from subscribers to particular threads. There are four procedures
involved in self–management:
1. Initial group allocation
2. Posting using subscriber referral and access management
3. Generating group allocations
4. Posting using group referral and access management
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5. Repeat from 3
Protocol A protocol of some kind has to be imposed on the newsgroup to yield
more information from the postings.
• When a subscriber initiates a thread, it must be followed up for it to considered.
• A subscriber cannot follow up himself.
• A follow–up must be followed-up to be considered.
• A follow–up is closed if it is acknowledged by the subscriber who initiated the
thread.
This set of rules makes for civilised debate, a simple example of which might be:
1. p initiates thread a
2. q follows up a
3. p acknowledges q
p’s initiation of the thread a counts as a statement of his preferences because q
followed it up. q’s follow up is counted as a preference, because p acknowledged it. A
more complicated scenario might be:
1. p initiates thread a
2. q follows up a, creating a′
3. r follows up a′
4. q or p acknowledges r on a′
5. p acknowledges q on a
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Probably, the simplest discipline is to allow the initiator to acknowledge all con-
tributors, except those he considers irrelevant. If any of the contributors follows a
thread that the initiator feels is irrelevant then that subscriber who followed up the
irrelevant thread can acknowledge it and form a new thread. So, in the interaction
above, if p does not acknowledge r, then q must acknowledge his contribution and
their contributions count to the sub–thread a′.
Initial Grouping
This is the first phase of generating a preference hierarchy. It is used to derive
a partitioning of the subscribers to the newsgroup. As each subscriber posts to a
thread, it generates a preference. If, for example, there are three threads: a, b, c and
an apathy thread is added to this so that all the threads can be related, call it ∅, then
if a subscriber posts one or more times to threads a and b and not to thread c then
the preference ordering is a = b > c = ∅.
Newsgroup partitioning by thread interest A preference hierarchy for each
of the subscribers would be generated. It would then be aggregated using the tech-
niques described in §6.6.3. The preference hierarchies would be just two–ply — those
subscribed to and those not — but it might be the case that global indifferences
emerge from the I–graphs. For example, everyone who posts to a will always post to
b. Thread a would then be merged with b and would form a new sub–newsgroup.
In the aggregation there would almost certainly be cycles — a cycle such as a >
b = c = ∅, b > a = c = ∅ and c > a = b = ∅ could arise. These would have
to be removed by merging threads or by removing subscribers who introduce cycles.
Using some set nomenclature, {s| < ordering >} is a statement of set membership for
subscribers s who have ordered the preferences in the specified way. For the example
of three initial threads, all of the possible new sub–newsgroups that could emerge are
given below:
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ga = {s|a > b = c}
gb = {s|b > a = c = ∅}
gc = {s|c > a = b = ∅}
and gab = {s|a = b = ∅ > c}
gac = {s|a = c = ∅ > b}
gbc = {s|b = c = ∅ > a}
and gabc = {s|a = b = c > ∅}
(8.1)
There are only 7 rather than 13 groups that table 6.5 would suggest. This is
because the simplification discussed in §7.1.4 has been used. These 7 groups repre-
sent all the valid shades of opinion there might be. This has been achieved in the
newsgroup system by only allowing two–ply preferences for the subscribers.
In more colloquial terms the subscribers have been partitioned into “one interest
only”, “two–interests” and “interested in all” groups.
The Entry Group This group is used by all groups to post new threads and
by people who wish to join the newsgroup to see what threads are being discussed.
A thread that is never followed up would stay in the entry group, when there is a
follow–up, it would move to one of the sub–newsgroups. The group is called the entry
group.
Every subscriber is a member of the entry group. Every subscriber may initiate
a thread in the entry group.
Ordering Subscribers and Appointing Managers For each sub–newsgroup
generate an ordering of the subscribers based on the number of times they have
posted to the threads of their sub–newsgroup. Form the most active members into a
collective that acts as the sub–newsgroup’s access managers — it might be the top 5%
of subscribers for each group, for example. (This, incidentally, is one of the problems
of this system’s design: a sophisticated group of subscribers can make themselves
managers of groups by answering each other’s threads. This is similar to tactical
voting. It will be seen that an entropy measure can be used to determine how much
support managers have.)
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New postings
When an existing subscriber initiates a new thread, it would be posted to his sub–
newsgroup and also to the entry group. Followups to the new thread would appear
only in the sub–newsgroup. If a subscriber in another sub–newsgroup wants to follow
a new thread in a sub–newsgroup, he would be able to review the postings for that
new thread but not make any.
If he did want to make a posting to that thread, his mail would be sent to the
access managers. They would then decide whether to permit the posting and would
thus grant to the new subscriber membership of their sub–newsgroup. He would then
be allowed to initiate a thread in that sub–newsgroup as well as submit postings.
Group Preference Hierarchy
After a number of new threads have been started, the subscribers can be re–
partitioned and, additionally, a hierarchy of the groups can be generated. This hier-
archy expresses a norm of behaviour between the groups.
Norm of behaviour It is best to explain this by example: if a member of sub–
newsgroup ga, the one containing all those who chose a > b = c, chooses, via the entry
group, to join group gb for two threads, b
′
1, b
′
2 and only takes part in one thread in
his own group a′1 then he has the following preference orderings:
• An ordering between threads as before: a′1 = b
′
1 = b
′
2 > any others
• An ordering between sub–newsgroups: group(gb) > group(ga) > group(others).
The latter preference is formed because the subscriber has posted twice to threads
originating in group gb = {s|b > a = c = ∅} and only once in ga = {s|a > b = c = ∅}.
The ordering between threads will be only two–ply, as before, but that between
newsgroups can be as long a chain as there are newsgroups.
The ordering between threads represents a subscriber’s current interests and the
ordering between newsgroups relates his current interests to his past interests. (The
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relative strengths of his interests are not used in forming his preference hierarchy,
these are used in the aggregation across the newsgroups.)
This forms a norm of behaviour. One would expect a subscriber in group ga to
post subsequently solely to that group, but if he posts to gb as well, this would suggest
he should join gab.
For all the members of a particular newsgroup, the ordering between sub–newsgroups
is aggregated using the maximum likelihood preference ordering procedure described
in §6.8.3. This yields an ordering across the newsgroups that is specific to each news-
group. The newsgroup effectively decides who its neighbours are. If one considers a
three thread system, the arrangement of the newsgroups will develop from that given
in figure 8.1.
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Figure 8.1: Newsgroups: implied topology
New postings with a group hierarchy
When a subscriber posts a new thread in his own group, it will be sent to the
access managers of the groups adjacent to his own group in the preference hierarchy
of groups. They can then choose to accept it or not. If they do, then the interested
members in the neighbouring groups will post to the new thread and make their group
more similar to the thread initiator’s group.
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8.1.2 Summary
The preference hierarchy generated decides the order in which the groups refer
to one another in figure 8.1. There is an order imposed: when a subscriber posts to
both ga and gb he indicates that he would prefer to join a group gab.
The access managers are the most frequent message posters to their own groups
and they are responsible for vetting the subscribers allowed to join a debate and thus
a newsgroup. In this way, very active subscribers to a particular set of threads will
find themselves acting as access managers for groups that discuss mostly their sort of
interests.
The groups derived from the first set of postings are not tied to discussing debates
concerning the subject or subjects they first expressed an interest in. Each group
will be constantly redefining itself: both in the subscribers it has and the issues it
discusses.
The use of automatic referral between newsgroups adjacent in the hierarchy makes
access management easier and allows for the migration of traits. Using the entry group
to initiate a thread will be relatively rare.
This system is self–organising in a rather subtle way. The access managers are
representative of the subscribers to the group. In the example of a permissions’
policy management system, it will be seen that this authority by which subscribers
are allowed to join a group can be determined from another preference hierarchy.
8.1.3 The Cultural Model and Stability
Now the self–organising newsgroup system has been defined, a structural iso–
morphism has to be made to ascertain which entity in the newsgroup system fulfils
which function in the cultural model.
When that is done it will be possible to make some predictions about the behaviour
of the system using the analysis of the dynamics of the cultural model.
The Cultural Model Referring to Axelrod’s model in §7.1.2 and figure 8.1, the
simulation model has only three entities — agents, features and traits. An agent has
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a set of features, each feature can take any one of a number of different trait values.
(Each trait is therefore an object of a particular feature class.) The set of traits for
the different features is the identity of the agent.
Agent
has
−−−→ SetOfFeatures
Trait
is−example−of
−−−−−−−−−→ Feature
SetOfTraits
is−kind−of
−−−−−−→ Identity
These are equated with entities in the newsgroup system in the following way.
Newsgroup
has
−−−→ SetOfInterests
Posting
is−example−of
−−−−−−−−−→ Interest
SetOfPostings
is−kind−of
−−−−−−→ Identity
The agents would be the newsgroups referred to in (8.1) not the subscribers. They
are located with respect to one another given by figure 8.1.
Interests as meta–threads as features One might ask what is an interest in
the context of the newsgroups. An interest within a newsgroup manifests itself as a
thread of discussion and a thread of discussion is nothing more than a set of related
postings — they are related by their common interest. All the newsgroups do have
the same set of interests, whether they foster any interest in any particular subset is
what the postings determine.
Distance Function The access managers of the group and the existing subscribers
determine which postings to accept within a newsgroup. The access managers accept
new threads, the existing subscribers choose whether to follow them up. Together
they act as the distance function does in Axelrod’s model (7.3). The mechanics of the
distance function are very different: the access managers and the existing members
vote and the maximum–likelihood preference ordering is used to determine which of
its neighbours each newsgroup is compatible with.
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Topology There are a number of possible topologies for the system. It can be
either as in figure 8.1, which for three interests gives each one three neighbours and
the central point six. This could be simplified to that given in figure 8.2.
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Figure 8.2: Newsgroups: implied topology with fewer neighbours
This latter topology implies that subscribers to the single interest group only
become interested in all three issues after they have become interested in two of
them. The number of neighbours is two, three and three for the single–interest, two–
interest and every–interest groups. It is a more appealing topology because it gives
each agent fewer neighbours and can easily be formed by using a binary tree.
Dynamics The system described in figures 8.1 and 8.2 is not particularly complex.
Following the argument given in §7.1.4, if one only allows seven different opinions to
be held regarding the preferences across three meta-interests then one need only set
#(F ) = 3 for the meta–groups ga, gb, gc and have a trait set of #(T ) = 2. The playing
field can have only 7 different newsgroups, using (7.10). This would mean that every
subscriber would be allocated to one primary group which could be either a single–,
dual– or every interest one.
This is a fairly simply model and it does usually reduce to just two or three
varieties regardless of which of the two topologies is used. The more connected graph,
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figure 8.1, usually reaches stasis faster. It hardly ever develops a limit cycle. Typical
patterns are fairly predictable, whichever variety starting at ga, gb, gc asserts itself in
the middle point gabc usually asserts itself over at least one other interest, so, for
example, if the variety starting at ga reaches gabc first, it might arise that gb takes on
the same variety so that, effectively, a = b.
More typical systems Usually newsgroups will have more than three interests,
looking at the comp.os.linux hierarchy, the newsgroup administrators were expecting
to keep debate focused on about six broad subjects. This is a more complex system,
but easily derived using the spanning tree construction of §7.1.4 (which was used for
figure 8.2). The size of the playing field would be 62: Σ6i=1
(
6
i
)
. These 62 newsgroups
represent all the different shades of opinion there are allowed to be.
With a feature set of #(F ) = 6, we might say that subscribers have 3 interests
(they are hoping to pair the six meta–threads to form the simpler spanning tree), this
would give them a trait set of #(T ) = 13, from table 6.5, if we ask them to state their
preferences on the three pairs they have chosen using a weak ordering. This would
mean that when re–partitioning the subscribers, the preference ordering would be a
chain that is three–ply in length: i.e. a > b > c.
This then gives quite similar parameters to the Axelrod cultural model analysed
in chapter 7 and the dynamic behaviour can be expected to be the same.
A PeerPossible System Peer-Possible behaviour can be implemented in effect in
the newsgroup system. As each subscriber makes a posting, if he is not already a
member of the group with the thread, it must be shown that he is a member of a
neighbouring group to the one he wishes to make the posting in.
This makes the access managers’ job easier and should lend to the system some
of the properties that PeerPossible behaviour was deduced to possess in the cultural
model.
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8.2 Self–Organising Permissions Policy System
It now remains to apply what has been learnt from the newsgroups example to
a system to simplify preference hierarchies for access control systems to produce a
self–organising permissions policy system for healthcare.
8.2.1 Newsgroups: Summarised
The newsgroups example had the following similarities to the cultural model.
• The subscribers were not the agents that interacted in the cultural model, but
rather the groups that they belonged to.
• The individual subscribers acted as traits for a feature. A group collected
members which formed its identity.
8.2.2 Roˆle–based Access Control System
Little mention was made in the newgroups example of the target technology for
the access control system to the newgroups. In this discussion of the self–organising
permissions policy system a roˆle–based access control system will be the target tech-
nology. This is because it can be adapted to suit all types of access–control system
in current use and its information model, §2.4, has the key entities needed to manage
the system: the roˆles and constraints objects.
8.2.3 Healthcare
Within the healthcare sector, the collegiate organisational model described by
Anderson [And96b] applies. Within each college — that is, every clinic or surgery —
the security rights are well–defined, but they will almost certainly not be consistent
across the colleges.
An example: receptionists in different practices The rights given to recep-
tionist in one general practice may only entitle them to view the records of patients
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who are visiting their general practitioner on that day — such a system might be
wholly electronic with access policies defined within a relational database that holds
all patient records; another surgery may allow their receptionists to see all records
of all patients at all times — a paper–based system where the receptionist is given a
key to the records room.
The difficulty here is that within their own colleges, the receptionists have been
assigned the same nominal roˆle, but the roˆle has different rights and privileges within
each college.
It would probably be the case that the surgery that has the paper–based system
needs more trustworthy receptionists because they would have access to so much
more information. Consequently, the qualifications and experience of the reception-
ists would need to be qualitatively better than those of receptionists working in the
surgery that has a better protected electronic system. Because these better qualified
receptionists are considered more trustworthy, they might be given more rights and
privileges in other colleges.
Simplification of the Roˆle Space
A system administrator, if he were to define this roˆle across the practices1, would
need to know what the rights and privileges associated with the roˆles are and the
quality of the people assigned the roˆle before he can determine who should be given
the federal roˆle. The system administrator would find it expedient to divide the roˆle
of receptionist into a number of other sub–roˆles. Some roˆles would require that an
individual assigned to the roˆle must meet certain requirements that would give one
more confidence that the individuals will be trustworthy.
A roˆle, as a data structure, is probably best represented as an ordered pair
〈rinitiator, racceptor〉 — the roˆle of the initiator and the roˆle of the acceptor. The total
number of roˆles in the federation is Nr =
∑N
i=1 ci, where ci is the number of roˆles in
1Anderson makes it clear that this scenario is not one that would arise: the receptionist roˆle would
be constrained to allow only access to records in the receptionist’s own practice. This scenario is
though, in miniature, the problem that would be faced in allocating access rights across all parts of
the healthcare sector.
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one college of the N there are. The total number of federal roˆle pairs will be less than
N2r . The hope is that by simplifying them and eliminating the irrelevant alternatives,
it may be possible to reduce them to a more manageable number.
Roˆles and Interactions
When one analyses the operation of the newsgroup system, one sees that each
posting to a newsgroup by a subscriber is an interaction between newgroups: the
newsgroup that the subscriber belongs to and the newsgroup the subscriber posts to.
Within healthcare, interactions are between individuals in one of their defined
roˆles: when a general practitioner refers a patient to a consultant, he is known as the
referring physician and the consultant is the consulting physician; within a hospital
a doctor present at the treatment of a patient by another doctor is fulfilling the roˆle
of attending physician. There are a number of other such roˆles played by physicians
within hospitals; these are currently being codified for the proposed HL7 standard
[Unk01b]. HL7 also defines roˆles that are not medical: administrative, auditing and
clerical roˆles are also defined.
In addition to the roˆles defined within HL7, there are other roˆles that do not fall
into its remit, but one would expect them to be defined within the federal system: in
particular, medical researcher and comptroller.
With regard to the referral process: an interaction takes place when a general
practitioner refers a patient to a consultant, whether his referral is accepted or re-
jected, an interaction has taken place. Similarly, when a medical researcher requests
access to a set of records in a database, this constitutes an interaction.
Distance Measure The HL7 roˆles are already well–defined, they would in fact form
part of the distance measure between roˆles and would be axiomatic pre–conditions
for an interaction.
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Features, Traits and a Data Structure
Figure 8.3 illustrates a proposed data structure for a patient record. Its design
is intended to illustrate an instance of one of the four broad classifications of access
that were introduced in in §2.1.
They are constituted in the following way using three branches of the patient
record tree: naming, history and status. These correspond to synonymous, anony-
mous and eponymous in the following way. Synonymous information is any combi-
nation of facts from the naming branch of the tree that would allow a patient to
uniquely identified. The anonymous branch, history, contains the history of the pa-
tient: these records are all of the same type which is generically called event. The
eponymous branch, status, contains summary statements — age group, sex, diabetic,
allergies, body–mass index and so forth. It should not be possible to identify a patient
uniquely using sets of anonymous and eponymous information. This means that the
inference threats that Denning describes in [DSW90] are protected against, probably
by a query system enabled in the way Denning describes.
A fourth class of access is synonmous: this is viewed as being knowledge of a set
of anonymous facts and a set of eponymous facts, but it is also possible to uniquely
identify the patient in question. This would be used by another physician to ask
the custodian of the patient’s record for additional information. This is typical of
the referral process that physicians employ; they initially discuss a patient under an
assumed name, passing on what they consider to be salient facts before the consulting
doctor assumes responsibility and is told the patient’s identity.
Finally, the reason for choosing a numbered tree structure is that every entity —
be it a field or linked historical record — can be given a unique vector relative to the
id. The type of a linked record is given a unique vector identifier; this is concatenated
with the id of the record of having the contents. The id fields in linked records would
be informative. They might specify a date, in which case it would be possible to
limit historical access to dates within a range. Essentially, the tree structure is a
linked structure of all the normal forms2 of the records in a database that pertain to
2A record is decomposed into a composite record with links to records in other files. Each of
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a patient.
Between different roˆles under different contexts different views of patient records
will be granted. As patient record views are defined they can be compared with one
another as trees: when one roˆle grants access to another they agree on a standard
view; one of those roˆles may in a later interaction with another roˆle decide that the
current roˆle is entitled to the same view as the previous one. They may choose to
standardise or diverge, but a number of standard representations in different contexts
will emerge.
The definitions of anonymous, eponymous and synonymous access will differ for
each roˆle. Their meanings in each context will be refined and generic types will emerge
between roˆles.
The set of facts permitted for each class of access constitutes a trait for that
feature. This is the first set of features and traits defined for the permissions policy
system.
Ontological Features and Traits
In addition to the views that are granted between roˆles, the context in which the
interaction takes place must be defined: these are the ontological features:
Administrative Some of these may be administrative: working in the same clinic,
the same hospital, health district and so forth.
Discipline In healthcare, this would usually be derived from the medical clinic:
pædiatric, oncological, genito–urinary and so forth. It may also be derived
from affiliations to professional organisations.
Procedural The procedure that is being followed. Whether a referral, consultation,
prescription, treatment and so forth. Many of these procedures are defined
within HL7.
these should be in a normal form which depends wholly upon each primary key for that file; all of
fields within the record are either atomic or a link to another record, see [Wie83] for a discussion of
normal forms and the construction of database keys. The key would be the id field described in the
text.
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It may well prove expedient to introduce others.
Inconsistencies and Distance
In more conventional database access control systems, the problem that a security
rights administrator faces when a new object is put under his jurisdiction is whether
to grant to existing groups rights to access that object or whether to sub–divide
those groups to form a new group and grant access rights only to it. The choice
is usually determined by whether an inconsistency results: if the right granted to
an existing group gives them information that would allow them to compromise the
existing group structure then they should not be granted that right. For example, if
the right to grant read access is given away too freely, then a number of groups might
disappear because they effectively become the same group. Or, it might be the case,
that one group is denied access to a object it cannot function without.
For the tree data structure described above, it may prove the case that one indi-
vidual in one roˆle grants access to a view which would make the system inconsistent
in a similar way. This can be determined by using the take–grant method of analysis
introduced in §3.1.4.
If such an inconsistency would result, then this should contribute to the distance
measure and would introduce an axiomatic inferred rule to its evaluation. (One might
assign an unbroachable distance to it.)
Another contributing factor to the distance measure might be statistical belief in
the authority of an identity. This can be quantitatively stated using the methods
proposed by Maurer [KM00, Mau96].
8.2.4 Collective Choice Expert System
The operation of the permissions policy system is that of a collective choice expert
system3. Whenever an interaction takes place, one roˆle grants a data view to another,
the cultural model is constructed and is allowed to evolve as a statistical experiment
3This is a relatively new software system, Hubermann’s Beehive system, [HK96], is one such
example.
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to determine how stable it is; a desirable outcome may be specified and a sample of
outcomes might lead one to conclude that the proposed data view should or should
not be be granted, depending on whether it is more or less likely that a desirable
consistent configuration would be statistically likely to arise.
Modelling, Statistical Experiment and Comparison The model is constructed
using the current attributes of the individuals in the healthcare business sector: their
roˆles and business relationships are analysed and a set of roˆle assignments is made.
The data view is imposed on the model and it is allowed to evolve under stochastic
inputs. A sample of evolutions would be used to analyse the behaviour of the system.
The trajectory of each cultural evolution experiment would be recorded. The
parameters measured for the trajectory would be the variety and compatibility en-
tropies: S(c) and S(v), §7.1.3, their rates of change, their phase difference and the
activity of the system. These trajectories of the different samples could be compared
to one another. They would also be recorded for comparison with the real system as
it evolves.
With this knowledge, it should be possible to show that, for a large enough group
of roˆles, a degree of stability could be reached and the data views would not allow
inconsistencies and that the system could be shown to be near pareto–optimal in
moving to its next operational state.
Final States The cultural model statistical experiments will either degenerate and
develop an inconsistency or become static or continue to evolve in a limit cycle. All of
these outcomes can be determined from an analysis of the cultural model’s global state
and statistics of its evolution under the stochastic input. The frequency distribution
of stable to unstable outcomes is indicative of the stability of the real–world system.
The state that would normally be considered to be most satisfactory is a static
condition, such as that shown in table 7.1, where the majority group is incompatible
with all the others, their roˆle is isolated, but the other groups are able to continue to
migrate views across one another. The majority group here might be the comptroller
roˆle which is unable to obtain anything more than accounting details in aggregate
Eaves, Ph.D 2000 Page 198
from any of the other roˆles.
A limit cycle condition may also be a desirable, if the dominant roˆles are policy–
making ones: high–level custodians such as ethics committees for hospitals and the
professional organisations of physicians, as well as representative bodies for groups of
accessors4.
Dynamics Hopefully there will be a similarity in the trajectories of the cultural
model evolutions. The rate of change of the entropies and their rate of change with
respect to each other is an indicator of when the final state will appear. These metrics
may also serve as an indicator of how complex that final state might be.
The rates of change of entropy can be measured in the permissions policy system
as it evolves; it might then be possible to show that it is following a similar trajectory
to a cultural model experiment.
That cultural experiment could then be re-run with revised starting parameters
to see how it evolves. The process of analysis and comparison could be repeated with
more statistical certainty.
Generating Rules If it becomes apparent that a large roˆle will be dominant and
will be isolated from the others then it could be imposed as an axiomatic data view
within the system and be enforced through the distance function.
Second and Subsequent Phases of Resolution The process could then be re-
peated with the large isolated majority group’s roˆle eliminated from the cultural
model, but its presence within the system contained as a constraint on the distance
measure. It would then be possible to repeat the process with another series of cul-
tural model experiments until all of the roˆles are clearly defined with respect to one
another.
4It may well be the case that cultural systems having limit cycles are exhibiting another be-
havioural phenomenon examined by Axelrod, the Tribute system, [Axe97].
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8.2.5 Comparison with Newsgroups Operation
The operation of the newsgroup system was as follows:
• Membership of a group entitled its members to make postings to that group.
• All subscribers belonged to an entry group.
• Subscribers were assigned to the group that they contributed to most often.
• Access Managers determined if a new subscriber could contribute to a group
and therefore be a member of it.
• An access manager was given his position within a group because he contributed
most often to a group.
• A finite number of interests were assumed to be expressed.
• The length of the preference ordering across those interests determined how
many different opinions would be allowed.
In the newsgroup example, only three interests were chosen to make illustration
easier and a preference ordering that was only two–ply limited the number of varieties
of newsgroup to 7 (of a total of 13). It was seen that it could be easily extended to
cover six interests, but the preference ordering was limited in length to three ply,
which meant, in effect, that only 62 (of 4683) varieties of opinion were allowed.
The system was bootstrapped by allowing the subscribers to make some initial
statements of interest and they were then allocated to a group. After that, they were
moved from group to group and groups could refer members to one another.
Access Rights for Roˆles Access rule generation is very similar using the collective
choice expert system to assign roˆles and define the inter–roˆle data views.
• The accessors will be placed in access roˆles. These roˆles will be the interacting
agents of the system. A roˆle is entitled to claim certain views from other roˆles.
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• All accessors will have an entry roˆle — unprivileged enquirer.
• Accessors will be assigned to the roˆles which would give them the most utility,
i.e. access to as much information as they can.
• Interactions take place as custodians determine if an accessor can be assigned
a roˆle by determining what data view they may have.
• Custodians will be appointed by the subjects of the views available in a given
roˆle — they are not chosen from the accessors.
• A finite number of ontologies will be allowed to be expressed. The number of
plies for the preference ordering of the roˆles that accessors have been assigned
by the custodians must also be set.
The treatment of the accessors is identical to that of subscribers in the newsgroups
example. It is the appointment of custodians which is different. Custodians do not
have to be chosen from the accessors, they are already in place.
A very important difference in the operation of the two systems must be made
clear: in the permissions policy system being a member of an access group does not
entitle the member to use all of the views the other members of the access group have
acquired, it makes it more probable.
An Example of the Bootstrapping Procedure If accessor a makes an access
request for a particular view of a database then if the custodians C of that database
view grant the access request, they collectively become the custodians of a roˆle created
uniquely for that accessor. Call the access group C(a) meaning custodians C for a.
If accessor a makes another access request for a different view, then the custodi-
ans of that data, D, are also able to take into consideration C(a). With this, the
custodians could make the following access rule:
x : C(x)⇒ D(x) (8.2)
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Re-organisation There is however no explicit need for the custodians to make
such a rule explicit because it is already implicit in the system. When the roˆles
are reorganized, roˆles C(a) and D(a) would be merged, because they have no other
members, so it just an inconvenience to have them appear distinct, but if another
accessor were to be granted access to C(a) but not to D(a) then the groups must be
made distinct. This would also imply that there is an ordering between the groups,
C(a) > D(a), meaning that membership of C(a) grants more access than D(a).
To fully exploit the implicit rules, it must be possible for the system to accurately
compare the trustworthiness of the two accessors without having to call upon the
custodians repeatedly. In the newsgroups example, this was achieved in a democratic
way by having the access managers of the newsgroup be chosen from the subscribers.
In the permissions policy system, the custodians are outside of the system, but are
able to compare accessors. As was explained in chapter 2, each accessor would have
acquired certificates from other permission policy systems and these could be com-
pared. These other policy management systems would also be able to order the roˆles
the accessors were members of.
It would thus be quantitatively possible to compare the amount of trust that has
been placed in two different accessors based on the roˆles that have assigned to them.
Large–scale behaviour The net effect of this procedure will be that accessors will
be classified accurately and will be expected to behave in a particular way and they
can be reasonably safely compared. This will make the generation of explicit access
rules much easier. Explicit access rules will usually be more abstract but essentially
of the same form as (8.2). The explicit access rules would in fact be specified in the
system’s operation and would take on the character of axioms of the system.
Safety It is the responsibility of the custodians to ensure that accessors do not
belong to any access groups which they should not ethically be members of. The
self–organising permissions system only simplifies the management of access rights
for accessors; it does not itself apply the principle of least privilege. It should not
contravene it though. It is therefore important that some meta–data rules be specified
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which state a preference ordering across views.
There is an implicit ordering across database views if they were classified as in table
2.1. In more concrete terms, one could say that a view that contains an indication
of a subject’s age is more confidential than one that does not and, therefore, anyone
who has access to such a view has had more trust bestowed upon them that someone
who does not.
Summary It should be apparent now how different permissions policy hierarchies
inter–work to generate implicit access rules. The custodians are able to compare
accessors by using the permission policy orderings generated in other systems. This
is the procedure that underlies much of modern business where it is often required that
companies have to prove creditworthiness to one another by using bank statements
and asset holdings. The procedures described above simply apply this principle on
less quantitative information than money.
8.3 Conclusions
It has been seen in this chapter that self–organising systems can be easily specified
and designed and should display the useful self–stabilising dynamics of the Axelrod
cultural model of interaction. In the following chapter, the permissions policy man-
agement system will be discussed in relation to the other requirements given in this
dissertation.
Chapter 9
Discussion, Future Work and
Conclusion
In this final chapter, the systems described in the preceding chapter will be more
critically assessed against the requirements. Future work to validate the concepts
discussed in this dissertation will be outlined and a final conclusion on its usefulness
will be given.
9.1 Discussion
It has already been made clear that the permissions policy system makes use
of other permissions policy systems preference hierarchies to be able to compare
accessors against one another. The broad goals of the requirements chapter — the
duties of custodians to their subjects — cannot be directly met by this procedure
but it does make it possible to detect any infringements by the custodians since they
too should conform to a norm of behaviour which could be placed in a preference
hierarchy.
An outstanding question is how safe are the decisions that are made. This hinges
upon the granularity of the grouping. If there are too many groups, then it will not be
possible to establish a reliable norm of behaviour from a preference hierarchy based
upon it. If there are two few groups, the preference hierarchy will not be able to
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generate enough implicit rules and to produce a useful organisation. It is worthwhile
restating the key relationship upon which self–organisation is based.
Ontologies The number of ontologies is fixed at the first organisation of the acces-
sors. In the newsgroup example, the number of interests (or meta–threads) was
fixed at 3 because that made illustrations easier. It could easily be set to any
arbitrary number.
Variety Once the number of ontologies has been fixed, one must then decide how
much variety is allowed. For the newsgroup example, three ontologies could
be combined in seven different ways. But for larger ontologies the number
of combinations becomes very large. For the example of six newsgroups, the
variety was limited by restricting the number of newsgroups expressed across a
smaller playing field of choices. The number of which is given by (7.10). The
assumption in this enumeration of choices is that they are grouped by varying
degrees of indifference and this leads to a binary tree structure.
The underlying relationship between the topology of agents and the complexity
of the preference orderings they hold is the key to understanding organisational phe-
nomena.
In chapter 7, an observation of Axelrod’s in [AAEC96] led to a series of investi-
gations of behaviour, topology of proximity and system size. It was concluded that
some topologies gave rise to more stable and predictable behaviours.
In the discussion above, it was made clear that the only configuration parameters
for a self–organising permission system seemed to be the size of the issue space and its
internal connectedness. A spanning tree leads to systems which can simplify complex
issues very quickly. This is the basis of the work carried out by Miller et al. [Mil95],
but it is well–known from political theory that binary–tree systems can be easily
subverted [Bla58, Far69].
To make a system safe, it should not be possible to subvert it, but it is well-known
that no collective choice procedure can be fair (and therefore safe) from Arrow’s
Impossibility Theorem. Arrow gives a possibility theorem, but it may now be possible
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to have a confidence level for a collective choice procedure based upon the entropy of
the preference hierarchies. What is a significant level of entropy is difficult to decide,
but the analysis of evolving cultures shows that it may be the point where the phase
reverses between the variety and compatibility entropies of an evolving population.
The design of the self–organising permissions policy system only showed how much
interconnectedness is needed to make useful decisions on a quantitative basis about
abstract concepts, such as “trustworthiness”.
9.2 Future Work
There are four outstanding problems with the design of self–organising preference
aggregation systems:
1. Critical entropy for fair collective choice
2. Topologies for self–organising systems
3. Entropy measure for spectral analysis of votes
4. Cross–certification metrics
The last of these has not been discussed at any length within this dissertation,
but it would be fundamental to a high–security system. It requires that different
preference hierarchy systems be able to cross-validate one another. There is already a
means whereby X.509 certification authorities can validate one another, but they all
have the same degree of mutual trust. Recently, research by Maurer [KM00] suggests
that this may be quantified reliably.
A prototype database management system has been presented in this dissertation
which could make use of X.509 certification, chapter 4, and a practicable system for
self–organisation of access was proposed in §8.2. There should be further practical
investigation into the following types of system.
• Secure self–organising mailing list
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• Licencing, surety and insurance systems
• Permissions policy system based on insurance
The self–organising mailing list has already been presented and it would be a good
proving ground for analysing some of the methods described in this thesis. The cross–
certification metrics would ultimately have to be based on risk and the evaluation of
risk demands that liability can be limited. This would require that licences and
sureties be obtainable in the same way as information, i.e. electronically. Finally,
a self–organising permissions policy system could be implemented using risk as the
basis for grading accessors.
Finally, an interpretation of the principles proposed by Anderson [And96a] as eco-
nomic goals should be made. The system that Anderson proposes for resolving the
access decision issues of a collegiate healthcare sector is a widely applicable model of
an economic market. They are essentially fair, which might imply they are pareto–
optimal. A pareto–optimal system cannot be said to exist by Arrow’s impossibility
theorem, but Arrow’s analytic choice system is based upon a memoryless system.
It may be the case that a pareto–optimal system exists if a best–of–N vote is al-
lowed. There are some interesting games theory scenarios that suggest this may be
so [BCP94].
9.3 Conclusion
This thesis has looked at the problem of providing a secure environment for col-
laborative computing. This reduced itself to the problem of providing safe and secure
access to databases. Secure access is already mature technology, but safe access relies
upon access control. This can only be decided with foreknowledge of the information
flow. The information flow can only be determined by classifying all subjects and
objects within the system. Such an information system would be very large and it
could not be reliably managed without using some self–organising technology. This
would require an adaptive discretionary control mechanism.
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The method proposed in this dissertation would be based on aggregating the
information flows specified by different subjects for the objects they own. Such a
system has been shown to be self–organising because it is essentially a voter model:
these have been analytically proven to be ergodic for one–ply information flows and
simulations indicate they are also self–stabilising for an arbitrary number of plys, but
take exponential time to stabilise.
It is well worth continuing the investigation of organisational structure using quan-
titative techniques based on the degree of information flow. This is fundamentally an
entropy measure where the degree of uncertainty about an individual’s behaviour is
the random variable in a maximum likelihood estimate.
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Appendix A
Glossary
Pareto–optimal An allocation of goods amongst consumers which possesses the
property that should any one consumer change his consumption level, then the
effect upon all other consumers is undifferentiated, they may all gain or may all
lose, but, with respect to one another, they are unchanged. Pareto–optimality
can be developed quantitatively [Bal97] and used as a measure of fairness.
Possibility and Impossibility Theorems These have been well–known in quan-
titative disciplines and are, respectively, the proof of the existence of a mathe-
matical function and its non–existence. In this dissertation, the most important
possibility and impossibility theorems are due to Arrow [Arr63]: in which he
shows that under a weak–ordering there is a “fair” means of choosing between
two different policies, but there is no “fair” means of choosing between three or
more policies. The former is a possibility theorem, the latter an impossibility
one.
Preference Relations A partially ordered set, poset, where the relations between
entities are >,<,= . Whether =, used as an indication of indifference, is permit-
ted is a specification of the ordering of the poset. A poset is the mathematical
structure best used to represent authorisation chains or lattices, which are fun-
damental to access control systems.
Strong and Weak Ordering A strong ordering does not permit indifference, only
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a > b, b > a are valid expressions in a two–policy system; under a weak or-
dering a > b, a < b, a = b are all valid expressions. A weak ordering is more
expressive, less decisive and, because it introduces so many more permutations
of preference, harder to analyse.
Normality In a statistical context: normality implies that the sum of a set of in-
dependent identically distributed random variables will have a aggregate dis-
tribution that will tend toward the Normal Gaussian distribution N(0, 1) —
when properly scaled. This is the basis of statistical quality control and least
mean square estimation. A least mean square estimation assumes normality.
Normality can usually be assumed when the mean and the standard deviation
are related as in the Tchebysheff inequalities1.
Maximum Likelihood and Entropy Maximum likelihood is a method of statis-
tical analysis which can be used to fit data to frequency distributions where
the sample mean is not normally related to the population mean2. It is conse-
quently “non–linear” because it cannot make the assumption that the relation
between the mean and the standard deviation that the Tchebysheff inequal-
ities require3. Essentially, the underlying probability distributions are either
not independent or not identical or both. It is possible to decompose many
probabilility distributions based on posets into the sum of a set of uniformly
distributed indicator probability distributions[SBM97]. This then allows one
to assume that all constituent probability distribution functions are sufficiently
similar that only interdependence cannot be disregarded.
Maximum Likelihood Preference Relations An aggregation of similarly formed
— weakly or strongly ordered — preference relations of voters is said to be max-
imally likely if the hamming distances between each and every set of individual
preference relations with respect to the aggregate is symmetrically distributed.
1See [Pap84], pp. 540.
2See [Pap84], pp. 535.
3See [Pap84], pp. 540 and pp. 113. Non–linearity is an artifact of the form of the moment–
generating function’s.
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Preference relations of the individuals in a population of voters on issues are
usually not formed independently from one another. Consequently, the tech-
niques of statistical estimation based on normality are not valid. Thompson
and Remage [TR64] developed a method for determining maximum likelihood
preference relations.
Entropy or negentropy Originally developed as a statistical measure of the order
within a system; most famously embodied by Schro¨dinger in his function giving
the quantum energy available within an atomic nucleus. This statistical measure
has since been applied fruitfully in many fields and is the basis of information
theory developed by Shannon. The most pertinent applications of entropy for
this dissertation are topological entropy [AKM65] and maximum likelihood es-
timation [TR64]. Within information system design, entropy can be thought
of as the degree of confusion within the system. This manifests itself in an
information system when it becomes less and less decisive [SBM97]. Irrelevant
alternative policies proliferate introducing instability: behaviour is not conven-
tionally predictable — it cannot be assumed to be statistically deterministic or
markovian.
Collective Choice Expert System An information system designed to aid group
decision–making. A collective choice expert system would have many of the
same functional requirements as a conventional expert system — the ability to
provide a justification and determinacy under the same fact set, for example
[Unk01a]. It would be developed as a cross–disciplinary study of decision theory
[Fis91], information theory, games theory and information technology.
Access Control Systems There are variety of these: mandatory access control,
lattic–based access control and discretionary access control mechanisms. All
of these systems are modelled to comprise objects, which are accessed, and
subjects, who access them. Each access attempt is mediated and a decision as
to whether access should be granted is based upon a lookup in an access control
matrix.
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Mandatory Under mandatory access control. Each object has a pre-defined
access control matrix, each operation, (read, write, execute etc.) is a
row, each subject has its own column, but subjects are defined in a linear
hierarchy, so that the form of the matrix can be made upper–triangular.
Objects can be similarly organised into an hierarchy.
Lattice–based Is an extension of mandatory access control. The subjects and
objects are arranged in a tree hierarchy and the access control matrix used
to determine access is formed from the least–upper bound of the subject
and the object in the tree hierarchy.
Discretionary This is the most flexible and the most common access control
mechanism. Subjects are allowed to grant access rights to other subjects
for objects they own. The access control matrix is constructed as the
system operates.
Role–based Access Control Systems These were formalised by Sandhu [San98].
They differ from other access control mechanisms because they have a more
sophisticated information model: rather than just have subjects and objects,
roˆle–based systems allow subjects to take on a number of roˆles simultaneously
within a session and a roˆle is a defined interface onto an object. These constructs
allow some of the vagaries of discretionary access models to be more precisely
specified and managed. In particular, it is possible to define a different roˆle for a
subject when she administers the access rights of objects she owns, when she uses
an object of her own and when she creates and destroys them. Sandhu presents a
number of roˆle–based systems which provide mandatory access control, lattice–
based and discretionary systems.
Collegiate Structure Used by Anderson [And96b] to describe the organisation of
the healthcare sector with respect to the allocation of access rights. Rights
allocated within one college for a particular roˆle are respected in other colleges.
This is achieved by mapping a roˆle defined within one college to a different roˆle
within another. This requires a federal superstructure that defines the roˆles
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and fairly administers them. Anderson argues that although individual colleges
may apply any access control scheme they wish, the federal system will be a
discretionary one: it is argued in this dissertation that the discretionary access
model used within the federation will be a roˆle–based model with constraints:
roˆles defined within each will map to a set of abstract roˆles within the federation.
Roˆle–based access control with constraints Roˆles provide a convenient means
of implementing constraints which are context–sensitive. These constraints can
be used within collegiate structures of access systems. For example, general
practitioners are entitled to prescribe drugs to any member of the general pub-
lic; but a receptionist working in a general practice, although able to access
medical records for patients within her own practice may not access medical
records for patients in another practice. The general practitioner roˆle has the
right to prescribe in any general practice — an unconstrained permission; the
receptionist roˆle only has the right to inspect records in her own practice — a
constrained permission.
Custodian, Subject, Accessor and Owner Roˆles that are defined within the fed-
eral superstructure of a collegiate structure of organisations. These are abstract
roˆles which are used to define the relationships between members of different
colleges. A preliminary information model is given in §2.5. In the example of
a general practitioner prescribing drugs and a receptionist accessing records:
the general practitioner is acting as an owner, creating drug presciption records
which are then associated with subjects who have custodiants. The receptionist
of the general practitioner acts as an accessor, but is constrained to only those
subjects’ records the general practioner she works for is the custodian of.
Ontologies Within a collegiate access control structure, ontologies are the naming
systems used to define objects and subjects and define what roˆles subjects can
take and objects can offer. An ontology must be respected within two col-
leges before roˆles in each college can be aligned to a roˆle with federally defined
constraints. In the general practitioner and receptionist example, the doctor’s
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right to prescribe is federal, the receptionist’s right to interrogate a record is
only enforceable in her own college. An example of an ontology in a field out-
side of medicine might be the Library of Congress cataloguing system. Within
medicine the classification of diseases by the World Health Organisation is such
a universally recognised classification system. Other classifications such as those
developed for hospital administration — the HL7 attribute model — will prove
invaluable in establishing a common understanding of roˆles across medical spe-
cialities.
Federation A concept similar to the collegiate structure proposed by Anderson, but
used in the discussion of the design of information processing systems [ISO95b].
Institutional Design A branch of quantitative political science that aims to pro-
duce a set of government institutions which are optimal for the operation of a
federation of entities submitting to a collective will. The methods of institu-
tional design can be used to produce constitutions which specify the institu-
tions of government [Kni92], whether they are collectively–managed (a cabinet)
or solely–managed (a president’s office). Other codes of practice that are con-
sidered are: federal and state inter–relationships; bi–camerality; requirements
for holding office; rights of appointment and right of veto to an appointment;
duration of office and sequencing of elections; requirements for rescinding an ap-
pointment . Modal logics, in particular deontics, have been used to analyse ways
in which institutions interact [BC96, RL95]. Econometric analysis and adap-
tive systems have been developed which show that different institutions emerge
given different conditions [Tie56, KMP95], but a consensus forms around meta–
norms of what are considered irrelevant alternatives. In this dissertation, it is
hoped that a properly designed set of deontic interaction protocols can be used
to evolve a fair federal superstructure for a collective access control system.
Irrelevant Alternatives In the theory of collective choice, this is one of the sus-
ceptibilities a collective choice function may suffer from. The problem is that
the presence of a particular policy generates confusion over the ordering of is-
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sues. This is, it is argued, the principle confusing factor in the operation of an
information system and can be thought of as an increase in the disorder, the
entropy, of the system.
Entropy and Consenus One of the difficulties in collective choice is that an ag-
gregate social choice of a = b may indicate either most individuals have stated
a = b or that many individuals have chosen a > b and an equal number b > a.
In the former, where a = b is the choice of many, there is a consensus and, in
a statistical experiment of selecting one voter and comparing his choice to the
social choice, the outcome is predictable, so entropy is low, the system is highly–
ordered. In the latter, where an equal number have chosen a > b and b > a,
the outcome is not predictable, the system not highly ordered. Low entropy
indicates a high degree of order, and therefore consensus, within a population.
Colliding Particle Systems A useful model for the operation of a complex sys-
tem originally developed to solve problems in statistical thermodynamics. The
model of the system is of interacting particles which exchange some quantity
between themselves. Heat conduction is a well–documented area in which this
model is used. Colliding particle systems can be either consonant: the par-
ticles collide and become more like one another; or dissonant: colliding and
becoming more unlike one another. In consonant systems, entropy decreases,
the system becomes more ordered and may stabilise; in dissonant systems, en-
tropy increases and the system is unlikely to find a stable state that is not
some kind of limit cycle. In this dissertation, the colliding particle model is
used as the basis for the simulation of the evolution of cultures: cultures that
evolve around different norms of behavior — norms of behaviour for the use of
medical records. Analysis of colliding particle systems is very difficult [Mat77];
consequently, Monte Carlo simulations using cellular automata are often more
insightful in real systems.
Cellular Automata Originally proposed by von Neumann [vN66], these computa-
tional entities are now part of the field of evolutionary computation
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example [MD94]. An intuitive description of the different methods of evolution-
ary computation can be found in [Dav91], a pre´cis of which follows: the problem
a statistician faces, in curve–fitting to empirical data, is comparable to finding
the highest point in Australia using only kangaroos (sic).
steepest ascent requires that the statistician trains the kangaroos to climb
the steepest obstacles the kangaroos find themselves presented with.
simulated annealing asks the kangaroos to do the same, but under the influ-
ence of alcohol, the effects of which wear off gradually.
genetic algorithms asks the kangaroos to find high places; they are expected
to interbreed and migrate. The algorithm periodically culls all those kan-
garoos below a certain altitude.
cellular automata Following this analogy, one could argue that the cellular
automata method operates in the same way as a genetic algorithm, but,
as well as interbreeding, the kangaroos cull one another, with success more
likely for those who live uphill. In this dissertation, a cellular automata
playing field is developed which measures the degree of homogenisation
within a consonant colliding particle system — of very simple kangaroos
whose interaction protocols are defined within complete a modal logic.
Modal Logic and Kripke’s semantics A modal logic introduces to first order ex-
istential logic a degree of relative existence — a statement of prepositonal logic
shows that something exists, a statement in modal logic says that something
exists exists somewhere. Modal logics are widely used within computer science.
Stirling [Sti95] has developed a temporal modal logic which can be used to de-
termined if a state exists at a certain point in the execution of a program. A
modal logic is the basis of one of the most useful methods of formal proof of au-
thentication protocols [GNY90], which concerns itself with the relative position
of secrets at different points in the execution of a protocol. Recently, autho-
risation mechanisms have been based on modal semantics [ABLP91, Dul01].
The Kripke semantics [Kri63] provide a more intuitive way of visualising modal
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systems that can be more easily applied to distributed systems: the semantics
are of a connected graph, where a modal truth is immediately recognised as an
existential truth possessed by a neighbour node in the graph. The two modal
systems described in this dissertation are egoistic and peer pressure. Both of
these have very precise Kripke representations and have been implemented, op-
erated and evaluated in a common programming language.
Egoistic interaction protocol This protocol is used within a cultural playing field
to form a consonant colliding particle system. A cellular automaton accretes a
characteristic that one of its neighbours possesses only if a Hamming distance
measure reports they are already relatively consonant. Egoistic systems con-
verge rapidly; rarely fall into limit cycles; but their final state is not readily
predictable from their initial one. Within modal logic they can be characterised
as permissive. An egoistic interaction protocol allows each cellular automata
to evolve a norm of behaviour. Similar automata emerge and their norm of
behaviour becomes more common.
Peer Pressure This is an alternative to an egoistic interaction protocol. A cellular
automaton accretes a trait from a neighbour, only if another neighbour possesses
the same characteristic. Peer pressure systems are slower to converge; often fall
into limit cycles; but seem to be easier to predict than egoistic ones. Within
modal logic they can be characterised as permissive, but a peer veto is respected.
A peer pressure protocol forces cellular automata to evolve a norm of behaviour
in the context of a meta–norm of behaviour enforced by their peers.
Norms and Meta–norms These are best explained with an example: the tragedy
of the commons. In Britain, after the acts of enclosure, most villages were
given a piece of land which was a common grazing area. There were no explicit
regulations that limited the amount of grazing a particular farmer could do
on the common land. The norm of behaviour that emerged was to graze as
much as one could, because someone else was almost certainly going to do
the same. Consequently, common grazing land was constantly overgrazed and
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quickly became a liability: the tragedy of the commons. If a punishment system
is introduced, but there is no obligation to punish, then systems emerge which
either punished a great deal or not at all, but were still unfair in the use of the
common land. If a further punishment were introduced which allowed farmers
who did not punish to be punished for not doing so, then and only then did a
system emerge which achieved a degree of fairness in the use of the common
land. Systems display one of three emergent properties [Axe97]:
• Overgrazing with very little informing — farmers mutually agree to not
make use of the punishment system.
• Unfair grazing with much informing — farmers who overgraze a lot punish
farmers who overgraze a little.
• Fair grazing with little informing — farmers seem to respect one another
and do not overuse the punishment system — this meta–norm emerged
only when the secondary punishment was introduced.
In the cultural playing field model developed in this disseration, the meta–norm
is enforced by the interaction protocol, which is either an egoistic one or one
that is subject to peer pressure.
Appendix B
Aidan Project Software System
B.1 Aidan Project Software System
This appendix describes the software that was prototyped as part of theAidan project.
The project’s goals appear at[ECJT95]. The software used and developed is archived
on CD-ROM.
Software Documentation
1. A Process is an instance of an application program.
2. If a something is a prototype, it is under development and may only have a
skeleton implementation.
3. Classes, and objects, are marked in the following manner:
• Imported Style: when the implementation has been imported, it is a stan-
dard Java or Jigsaw object, or class for an object, then it is marked thus:
H
Database-Manager.
• Exported Style: when the implementation can be exported, it has been
developed for the Aidan project,
H
Database-Manager.
This should help in finding documentation for the classes. There is no docu-
mentation for exported classes.
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4. Attributes are marked in the following manner: Age. There are some properties
that attributes can possess.
class This type of attribute belongs to the class and there is only one instance
of it for all objects instantiated from that class.
object This type of attribute belongs to each object and each object has an
instance of it.
persistent This type of attribute can be either class or object and indicates
that the attribute can store its changed value on destruction of the object
or unloading of the class.
5. Environment variables are presented thus: CLASSPATH, and can have mixed case.
B.2 Application Programs and Their Configura-
tions
B.2.1 Web-server
The web-server used was Jigsaw [Jig]. On-line documentation is available. The
following are outputs of the configuration information obtained by printing the Jig-
saw frames.
1. Version Information, see figure B.1.
2. Aidan Directory Resource, see figure B.2.
•
H
Putable is the directory containing the results of user enquiries. One
directory for each user.
•
H
QueryByNames is the only database enquiry resource. It allows queries to
be submitted to the database using surname and, optionally, a fore-name.
•
H
Reference is an unused directory resource.
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Attributes of General w3c.jigsaw.http.GeneralProp
identifier: general
w3c.jigsaw.server: Jigsaw/1.0a5
w3c.jigsaw.checkSensitivity: true
w3c.jigsaw.root: /user/eepg/eepgwde/
src/java/Jigsaw/Jigsaw
w3c.jigsaw.host:
w3c.jigsaw.port:
w3c.jigsaw.root.store: true
w3c.jigsaw.root.name: root
w3c.jigsaw.publicMethods:
w3c.jigsaw.trace: true
w3c.jigsaw.docurl: /User/Reference
Table B.1: Version Information
Existing resources of Aidan
Parent: root
w3c.jigsaw.resources.DirectoryResource:
Putable:
QueryByNames:
Reference:
ResourceAdder:
UserRepository:
eg-1.html:
ladies.html:
new.html:
tester.html:
Table B.2: Aidan Directory Resources
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•
H
UserRepository This is the database that contains the names of all the
legitimate Aidan users and control information about them.
•
H
ResourceAdder is a prototype resource that is intended to allow different
database resources to be added and generate a new
H
QueryByNames.
• The files suffixed HTML are test files and can be ignored.
3.
H
QueryByNames Resource, see figure B.3.
Attributes of QueryByNames
Parent: Aidan
Resource url: /Aidan/QueryByNames
identifier: QueryByNames
quality: 1.0
title:
content-language:
content-encoding:
content-type: text/plain
last-modified: Sat Dec 05 17:38:00 GMT+0 1997
icon:
maxage:
filename:
putable: false
override: false
convert-get: true
DatabaseURL: jdbc:postgres95://h2ws-
03.brunel.ac.uk/aidan;user=eepgwde
View: select * from patients view
Owner: eepgwde
Table Caption Fields: SURNAME FORENAMES
Table Title Fields: SURNAME FORENAMES
DATE OF BIRTH
Table B.3: Database Enquiry Resource
• aidan.jigsaw.AidanQuery is the name of the class on the CLASSPATH of the
Java compiler.
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• Resource url is the location of the resource relative to the root of the HTTP
server.
• DatabaseURL this is the resource locator for the database. This is a rela-
tively rare form of URL and can be read as follows: use protocol “JDBC”
with sub-protocol “Postgres95” on host “h2ws-03.brunel.ac.uk”, use data-
base “aidan” and operate under user “eepgwde”. A password could also
be passed.
• View This is the view that will be used by object, when instantiated.
• Owner Owner of this class.
• Caption Fields, File Title Fields These are used for formatting the output.
• Other attributes are inherited from the superclass and are either generated
automatically or can be left unspecified.
4.
H
UserRepository Resource, see figure B.4.
• aidan.jigsaw.UserRepository is the name of the class on the CLASSPATH of
the Java compiler.
• Table This the table containing the user information.
• RealmDirectoryName This is the name of directory that will contains the
directory having the name UsersDirectoryName.
• UsersDirectoryName This the name of the directory that the will contain
users’ directories.
• headers These are accessible but currently are not used.
• Other attributes are as for
H
QueryByNames.
5.
H
filter-0 Resource, see figure B.5. This is a class that, when instantiated, can be
used to provide filter requests using the basic authentication method of HTTP.
• group This is the name of a group within the realm.
• realm This is the name of the super-group.
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Attributes of UserRepository
Parent: Aidan
Resource url: /Aidan/UserRepository
identifier: UserRepository
quality: 1.0
title: Database Resource Listing Aidan Users
content-language: en
content-encoding:
content-type: text/html
last-modified: Sat Dec 06 17:49:59 GMT+0 1997
icon:
maxage:
DatabaseURL: jdbc:postgres95://h2ws-
03.brunel.ac.uk/aidan;user=eepgwde
Table: users
Owner: Walter.Eaves@brunel.ac.uk
RealmDirectoryName: Aidan
UsersDirectoryName: Putable
Realm: Aidan
headers: user-agent accept referer Authorization
ChargeTo
Table B.4: Database of Users
filter-0
Parent: root
w3c.jigsaw.resources.DirectoryResource:
Identifier:
methods:
realm: Aidan
shared-cachability: false
private-cachability false
public-cachability false
users:
groups: main
Table B.5: Authorisation Filter
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• Other attributes are as not, as yet, relevant.
6. eepgwde is an instance of the user class used by the
H
GenericAuthFilter. Figure
B.6 just illustrates that user information can be edited remotely. Users are
added to a realm, so the realm information for this user is known.
Attributes of eepgwde
identifier: eepgwde
email: Walter.Eaves@brunel.ac.uk
comments: Researcher
ipaddress:
password:
groups: main
Table B.6: A user account
• ipaddress Users can be limited to logging on from a web-browser running
on a particular machine — or through a particular firewall proxy host.
• groups The groups to which the user belongs.
• Other attributes are self-evident.
B.2.2 Database
Databases are added in the same way as other resources.
B.2.3 JDBC Driver
JDBC drivers are added as resources as well.
Appendix C
Relations
These definitions are mostly from [GKHK77], except the some of the relation types
which are from [A˚qv84].
Definition C.0.1 (Relation). A relation R on a set S is a set of ordered pairs of
elements of S. If (a, b) ∈R, one also says that R holds for the ordered pair (a, b) and
sometimes one writes a R b.
Definition C.0.2 (Support, Range, Domain).
SuppS , {x ∈ S|(x, y) ∈R for at least one y in S} (Support)
RanS , {x ∈ S|(y, x) ∈R for at least one y in S} (Range)
DomR , SuppR ∪ RanR (Domain)
DomR ⊆ S
Definition C.0.3 (Simple Types of Relations). These are standard definitions
of a relationR. The variables x, y and z range over a non-empty setW. The statement
x R y means that the the tuple (x, y) exists in the relation R. The symbols ∨ and
∧ are logical symbols meaning disjunction and conjunction of the logical existence
conditions (not of underlying sets). ¬ means non-existence. Order of operators is
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(highest) ¬, then R, then ∨ and ∧.
∀x∃y(x R y) (Serial)
∀x, y, z(x R y ∧ y R z ⇒ x R z) (Transitive)
∀x, y, z(x R y ∧ y R z ∧ x 6= z ⇒ x R z) (Weak Transitive)
∀x, y, z(x R y ∧ x R z ⇒ y R z) (Euclidean)
∀x(x R x) (Reflexive)
∀x(¬(x R x)) (Irreflexive)
∀x, y(x R y ⇒ y R y) (Almost Reflexive)
∀x, y(x R y ⇒ y R x) (Symmetric)
∀x, y(¬(x R y ⇒ y R x)) (Asymmetric)
∀x, y(x R y ∧ y R x⇒ x = y) (Anti-symmetric)
∀x, y, z(x R y ⇒ (y R z ⇒ z R y)) (Almost Symmetric)
∀x, y, z∃w(x R y ∧ x R z ⇒ y R w ∧ z R w) (Incestuous)
∀x, y(x 6= y ⇒ (x R y ∨ y R x)) (Connected)
∀x, y, z(x R z ∧ y R z ⇒ x = y) (Left Unique)
∀x, y, z(x R y ∧ x R z ⇒ y = z) (Right Unique)
It might appear that, in effect, a Euclidean relation is the same as a transitive. This
not so. For a group of three, X , Y and Z, with an initial topology that X can see Y
and Y can see Z, then for a transitive relation X must be given a view of Z as well;
for a Euclidean relation there no change is needed.
If X can see Y and Z, then to be Euclidean, Y must be able to see Z and Z must
be able to see Y . For a transitive relation no change would be needed.
Definition C.0.4 (Equivalence Relation, Partition, Class). An equivalence re-
lation on a set S is a relation that is reflexive, symmetric, transitive and has a support
S — also just reflexive and Euclidean. An equivalence relation R on S induces a
partition of S into classes, which consist of those elements between which the relation
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holds. A partition if a set S is a family P of non-empty subsets of S, called the classes
of the partition, with the following two properties:
1. Any two distinct classes are disjoint
2. Every element of S line one class
Definition C.0.5 (Quasi-, Partial and Total Ordering Relations). A relation
R on a set S is called a quasi ordering on S if R is reflexive and transitive; partial if it
also anti-symmetric and, if R is also connected, it is called a total or linear ordering.
Appendix D
Current Technology
D.1 Distributed Processing
D.1.1 Computational Design Guidelines
These are common design guidelines, which one should bear in mind when consid-
ering how set of entities in a system interact. Protocols are designed at a computa-
tional level, but usually must consider the engineering and technological dimensions.
Any emphasised phrases, such as binding, are defined in [ISO95a].
Domains (or Paradigms) A client or a server is a computational object that
represents an end-user in a processing domain. A processing domain is determined
by the resources it uses. A “costed” domain — access to objects is costed — uses
money; a confidential domain uses keys — access to objects is granted on presentation
of a key. The computational object is an abstract object that behaves in a certain
way in one domain. Where it is located is an engineering issue, how it is implemented
is a technological issue. The computational object has to resolve the engineering and
technological conflicts in the computational domain before performing a computation
in its own domain.
Properties This is the set of properties that clients and servers are defined by.
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Association A binding[ISO95b] between client and server. At a high-level it may be
something like an account number, which both share. At lower-levels, crypto-
graphic keys and session numbers. Goodness of maintaining associations means
that the client or server can be relied upon to instantiate a binding without
have to create it again. The most important entities shared between clients and
servers are names.
State A binding with the environment. It may include all previous associations if the
object having this state is operating under a name that has existed before. The
environment binding is usually the end-user (for clients) and is effectively the
identity of the end-user in processing system domain. Goodness of maintaining
state means that the clients or servers can be relied to have the same state from
instantiation to instantiation in the domain. There is an initial state which
exists prior to an object making any bindings. There is often a default state
which usually forms the initial state.
Interface A means of accessing an object that may change the state of an object.
Interfaces are expected to be invariant if the implementation changes.
Implementation A piece of technology that implements the expected behaviour of
an interface.
Role If an object provides an interface, it assumes a role in a system, which is a
prescribed behaviour.
Autonomy An object that is autonomous is accountable for its behaviour to itself
alone. An object that is not autonomous has at least one controller. It is
generally desirable for that object to have just one controller — to avoid conflicts
in policy.
Relocation If an entity relocates, it moves from one environment to another. This
is rarely done while computations are in progress, but it may be demanded in
some domains.
Eaves, Ph.D 2000 Page 245
Clients Observations about the nature of clients. Clients . . .
1. outnumber servers.
2. are technologically heterogeneous in implementation.
3. do not align implementations with one another.
4. do not align interfaces with servers or with one another.
5. are autonomous.
6. freely relocate.
7. are specific to a user not one role.
8. have at least two roles: user as personal role, user in professional role.
9. are bad at maintaining state.
10. are bad at maintaining associations.
Servers This is a set of observations, which one would hope a server should comply
with. Servers . . .
1. are less numerous than clients.
2. are technologically less heterogeneous
3. do align implementations with one another
4. must align interfaces with one another
5. perform a specific role.
6. are not autonomous.
7. are good at maintaining state.
8. are good at maintaining associations.
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Agents Are essentially servers to clients and clients to servers. The point of an
agent is to group clients and couple them to servers. Agents . . .
1. can be as numerous as clients.
2. are technologically less heterogeneous than clients.
3. have two roles: server to the client and client to a server.
4. are not autonomous.
5. are bad at maintaining state when acting as a client, because they track their
clients, but are good at maintaining state for their clients.
6. are good at maintaining associations.
Appendix E
Graph–Theoretical Treatment of
Preference Lattices
This appendix describes how preference lattices can be represented with graphs. It
follows the treatment given by Miller in [Mil77]. Only the descriptive parts of Miller’s
text is used. His treatment is based on that given by Harary et al. [HNC65]. It also
refers to Christofides’ compendium of algorithmic methods [Chr75] and to Skiena’s
very practical treatment [Ski90] for use with Mathematica [Wol99], which was used
to test some of the methods employed. Skiena’s nomenclature is used for Miller’s
descriptions.
E.1 Definitions
Definition E.1.1 (A Digraph and its Components). A directed graph or digraph
is a collection of “points” — also nodes or vertices — and of “directed lines” — also
arcs or edges — between these points. A graph that allows a number of edges between
vertices is a multi–graph and the directed form is a multi–digraph.
Vertices V is the set of vertices, {x, y, . . . , z, t, . . . , w}.
Edges E is the set of edges, which are expressed as tuples between vertices: {(x, y), . . . , (t, u), . . . , (t, w)}.
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Definition E.1.2 (Domination). If there is a directed edge from vertex x to vertex
y, this can be written: x > y, x→ y or ~xy; and one says that x dominates y.
The set of all vertices that x dominates is written D(x).
A vertex x is undominated if no other vertex dominates it.
Definition E.1.3 (Paths, Cycles and others). Some common definitions:
Path is a sequence of vertices and directed edges from vertex to another: x→ y →
z → · · · → t. The length of the path is also called its cardinality. A path
of cardinality zero is a path from the vertex to itself and is also known as a
self–loop.
Complete (or Hamiltonian) Path includes all the vertices in a digraph.
Reachable A vertex y is reachable from another vertex x, if there exists a path from
x to y. Associated with each vertex is a reachable set, the set of all vertices
that can be reached from that vertex.
Source A vertex x is said to be a source if every other vertex is reachable from x.
Sink A vertex x is said to be a sink if every other vertex can reach x.
Cycle A pair of paths are said to form a cycle if, for a pair of vertices, x, y: y is
reachable from x and x is reachable from y.
Complete Cycle is a cycle that visits all the vertices of the graph.
Semi–path is a path if the graph were undirected. That is, some of the directed
edges point the wrong way, viz.x→ z ← v → y is a semi–path from x to y.
Semi–cycle is a pair of semi–paths from one vertex to another and back.
NB. If there is a path from x to y, x only dominates y if the path has one edge,
i.e. the two nodes are adjacent.
Definition E.1.4 (Types of Digraph and their properties). Definitions of com-
mon properties of graphs and digraphs:
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Connected a digraph is said to be connected if there exists a semi–path between
every pair of vertices.
Tree a digraph is said to be a tree, if it has one source and no semi–cycles or,
equivalently, one vertex is undominated and every other is dominated exactly
one.
Complete a digraph is complete, if every vertex is adjacent to every other.
Asymmetric a digraph is asymmetric, if for every pair of vertices, x and y, if x→ y
then not y → x.
Tournament is a digraph that is both complete and asymmetric.
Transitive a digraph is transitive if, x→ y and y → z it is also true that x→ z.
Strong Ordering If graph is transitive and has no cycles, it is a strong ordering.
Definition E.1.5 (Indifference). In addition to specifying that one vertex domi-
nates another, it is possible to specify that a pair of vertices do not dominate one
another, by stating that one is jointly indifferent to them: x = y.
Indifference is symmetric and a graph that is transitive, has no cycles is a weak
ordering.
Definition E.1.6 (Partially Ordered Set or Partial Order). If a set of elements
is in some way ordered, then the set is partially–ordered.
The set can be represented as a graph and may prove to be either strongly or
weakly ordered
Definition E.1.7 (Transitive Closure). The transitive closure C(G) of a graph G
contains an arc {u, v} whenever there is a directed path from u to v in G.
Graphs can be simplified by condensing them. Usually, the condensation takes
sets of connected vertices and treats them as one vertex.
Eaves, Ph.D 2000 Page 250
Definition E.1.8 (Condensed Graph). A condensed graph reduces a set of ver-
tices to one “super–vertex”.
Definition E.1.9 (Independent Set). An independent set of a graph is a subset
of the vertices such that no two vertices in the subset represent an edge in the graph1.
The maximum independent set is a maximal set of vertices that meet this criterion.
E.2 Conditions and Deductions
Theorem E.2.1. A digraph with no undominated point has a cycle.
Theorem E.2.2. Every tournament has at least one complete path and every tour-
nament has an odd number of such paths.
Theorem E.2.3 (Decomposition of Partial Orders). For any partial order, the
maximum size of the anti–chain equals the minimum number of chains which partition
the elements of the partial–order[Dil50].
E.3 Representations
E.3.1 Illustration
A set of preferences, see table E.1 can be mapped to a directed graph, see figure
E.3.1, if indifferent then no arc, except for each policy with itself, i.e. the central
diagonal. The figure contains three individual acyclic graphs which under simple
majority rule form a cyclic graph for the society. Each diagram is a transitive closure
of the preference relations.
1[Ski90] p. 242.
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Voter Ranking
A a > b > c
B b > c > a
C c > a > b
Table E.1: Preferences
a
bc
a
bc
a
bc
a
bc
Individuals
Social
Figure E.1: Preferences as Graphs
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E.3.2 Adjacency Matrices
Each one of the individual’s graphs can be transformed to a matrix representation
using an adjacency matrix2, which simply states if two vertices are connected by a
directed edge. For the graphs of figure E.3.1 these are:
FA =


1 1 1
0 1 1
0 0 1

 , FB =


1 0 0
1 1 1
1 1 0

 , FC =


1 1 0
0 1 0
1 1 1


E.3.3 Transition Matrices
The system can be modelled using transition matrices. The preferences are as
before, table E.1, but the direction of the edges of the graph is to the state most
preferred (i.e. is reversed) and contains the probability with which that transition
takes place. For this simple choice system, it is fairly clear what each voter’s preferred
position is, but because of the transitivity, it is possible to go from the least–preferred
vertex to either of the two more preferred, unfortunately one has to make a choice
— or one is describing a different system — so the most preferred vertex is chosen as
the one to transit to.
FA =


1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0

 , FB =


0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0

 , FC =


0 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 1


E.3.4 Reachability and Reaching Matrices
Definition E.3.1 (Reachability Matrix). A reachability matrix, R, is a square
matrix having as many rows as there are vertices. The entry in the matrix at rij = 1
if vertex xj is reachable from vertex xi
3.
2[Chr75] , p. 13
3[Chr75], p. 18
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Definition E.3.2 (Reaching Matrix). A reaching matrix, Q, is a square matrix
having as many rows as there are vertices. The entry in the matrix at qij = 1 if vertex
xj can reach vertex xi
4.
E.3.5 Chains and Anti–Chains
(Note that Christofides uses the term chain for a semi–path.)
Definition E.3.3 (Chains and Anti–chains). These are complementary concepts5
defined on a partially–ordered set:
1. Chain
A chain in a partially ordered set is a set of elements u1, u2, . . . , uk such that ui
is related to ui+k, i < k.
2. Anti–Chain
An anti–chain is a collection of elements no pair of which are related.
Chains partition the elements of the partially–ordered set. There may be a number
of anti–chains as well, but they do not partition the set unless the set is in some way
degenerate. Each element of each anti–chain will be contained in one (and only one)
chain.
4[Chr75], p. 18
5[Ski90, p. 243] for the definitions and the method of finding the largest anti–chain.
Appendix F
Modal Logic
F.1 Overview
A modal logic can be used to express how truths are held between members of
groups [Che80]. Modal logics have been studied extensively and used for a number
of purposes in computer science [Sti95].
Remark F.1.1 (Propositions). Modal logic usually concerns itself with proposi-
tional logic statements. These can be interpreted denoting the instantiations of vari-
ables, e.g.whether an entity like cost(x, y) is held at all, and, if it is, whether it has
the same value as that held elsewhere.
When a set of variables has been instantiated, say cost(x, y) = 100, then this
can reduced to a statement in propositional logic, A, if need be using the following
method. Firstly, a typing system needs to be established because the proposition in-
volves a function; the function can be written as having four parameters: the function
signature, cost, the result of the function call, 100, then parameters, f1 = x, f2 = y.
A logical proposition A can then be defined as a statement in the type system of
2 argument functions: A , 〈cost, 100, x, y〉; this in turn can be reduced to an un-
typed logical statement by stating: type(A) = two argument functions, signature =
cost, result = 100, arg1 = x, arg2 = y1.
1This is a well–known technique in formal logic analysis which allows many seemingly more
complex systems to be reduced to typed argument comparisons, see Hodges contribution to [GG84]
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Now ¬A could mean any statement that is not A in any way, for example:
cost(y, x) = 100 or even sin(a) = b
4
. For the purposes of this discussion it is best
to think of A as being a typed statement from a class of function results, something
like cost(x, y), so that ¬A would at least agree on the name of function, cost, which
arguments x and y, but not the result. As will be seen, the point is to provide a lan-
guage that can ensure that different entities have the same instantiations of variables.
Notation F.1.1 (Modal Operators). These operators are:
♦ expressing the notion of possibly.
 expressing the notion of necessarily.
They can be explained, fairly informally, thus: an agent occupies a “world of
beliefs and values” x ∈ W and can see other such worlds around him, W ′ ⊆ W. If
the agent observes that the proposition A is held in at least one world he observes,
then ♦A is true and if it is held in all worlds he observes, then A.
Only one of the operators ♦, need be primitive, it can then define the other,
thus: ♦A , ¬¬A.
These operators will be used to define inference rules and whether ♦ or  is
specified is a matter of choice for system designers, the notation [♦ | ] will be used
to indicate this.
Notation F.1.2 (Models). The concept of a model U and the |= operator needs to
be introduced. The details of its definition can be found in [Che80]. For now, these
examples and their meanings should suffice:
U
|=
x
A and
U
′
|=
y
A (F.1)
U
|=A and |=
C
A (F.2)
A model U = 〈W, . . . ,P〉 contains a set of worlds W and a set of atomic proposi-
tions P distributed among the worlds. There can be different kinds of model and each
model belongs to a class, such as C, a class of models is differentiated from another
class by the axioms that are in force.
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1. (F.1)
(a) The first form means in model U in world x proposition A is held.
(b) The second form means in model U′ in world y proposition A is held.
2. (F.2)
(a) The first form means: is valid everywhere in this model. A is valid in all
worlds because of the distribution of the atomic truths.
(b) The second form means is valid in all models of this class. This means
that A is an axiom or theorem of the model and is not dependent on the
distribution of truths.
NB.The terminology of modal logic will be used, but bear in mind the application
of the modal logic in this context:
1. Agent or Organisation = World
2. Supra–organisation = Model
3. Behavioural type of supra–organisation = Class
F.2 Values and Beliefs
Notation F.2.1 (Values and Beliefs). A proposition can be held in a number of
ways in a modal logic:
Values These are propositions that are local to a world, e.g.
U
|=
x
A, x believes A.
These have no modal qualification in what is known as a normal form, i.e. it is
not possible to rewrite the truth as either ♦A or A.
Beliefs These are based on how neighbouring worlds report their values. These can
be written in their normal forms, which can, on reduction, be one of either
U
|=
x
♦A or
U
|=
x
A.
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Immutable Values Propositions that are globally held. There are two forms of
these:
1.
U
|= A: propositions that are global to the model: these would be a set of
atomic propositions which every world must possess and are immutable,
and any theorems that are based solely on them.
2. |=
C
A: these are propositions and axioms that are global to the class of
models. There are just two propositions (the definitions of true and false),
and a set of theorems, the axioms, that define the model, these may contain
modal operators.
• Values are private, in that only the world holding them knows whether they are
true or false.
• Beliefs are jointly held by the worlds that observe the same set of worlds.
One can also think of values and beliefs in terms of entity relationships between
a subject and an object. “A subject has a belief about the value of an object” is
diagrammed in figure F.1: the subject owns a value; the object owns another value.
The subject has a belief about the value that the object holds. The belief is in the
subject’s domain, but is associated with a value in the object’s domain.
A subject may never know the true nature of the value, but it can obtain corrob-
orating beliefs from other sources, it can become more and more certain of the value
the object holds. In figure F.2, the subject has obtained more beliefs — based on the
beliefs of others — about the value the object holds.
Remark F.2.1 (Observation and Lying). Worlds that observe others can only
observe what the observed world admits to. In short, the observer poses a question
and the observed answers it. There are two problems:
1. The observed world has no a–priori value that it can return in answer to the
question
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subject object
value
belief
value
Subject’s Domain Object’s Domain
Figure F.1: Relationship between a belief and a value
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subject
value
belief
object
value
Subject’s Domain Object’s Domain
subject
value
belief
belief
Figure F.2: Corroborating beliefs about a value
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2. The observed world misrepresents itself and therefore:
(a) Claims to have no value, in which case apply 1 above
(b) Negates the value it holds
There is no way in which the observing world can ascertain the observation it
makes truly reflects the values held by the observed world without obtaining some
corroboration from elsewhere. This point will be addressed in more detail later, but
for the time being one can assume that worlds report their truths truthfully.
F.3 Deontics
Modal logic can be used to formalise laws of behaviour, in which case the logics
are part of the field of deontics, see [A˚qv84] for a summary.
• Prohibition
• Permission
• Obligation
Appendix G
KQML and KIF
G.1 Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language
KQML is an unusual language because it provides services with a means of in-
teracting with one another that is similar to the way in which business is conducted
amongst business organisations: with KQML services may advertise themselves, rec-
ommend one another and recruit one another. It also provides a high–level database
access language, with primitives like insert, delete and so forth. It can also be used
for low–level data streaming and redirection.
Performatives KQML is not a programming language or data access language, but
a simple set of primitives that are used more for their semantic connotation than for
their effect — an invocation language. A list of the performatives currently defined
— and their meaning — is given in two tables: G.1 and G.2. Some entries refer to a
VKB, which is a Virtual Knowledge Base, or a database of rules.
The performatives are invoked by a sender on a receiver. Performatives require
parameters which are defined next.
Parameters The parameters to KQML performatives are fixed, their meanings are
given in table G.3.
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Name Meaning
achieve S wants R to do/make something true in its
environment
advertise S is particularly suited to processing a perfor-
mative
ask–about S wants all relevant sentences in R’s VKB
ask–all S wants all of R’s answers to a question
ask–if S wants to know if the sentence is in R’s VKB
ask–one S wants one of R’s answers to a question
break S wants R to break an established pipe
broadcast S wants R to send a preformative over all con-
nections
broker–all S wants R to collect all responses to a perfor-
mative
broker–one S wants R to get help in responding to a per-
formative
deny the embedded performative does not apply to
S (anymore)
delete S wants R to remove a specified sentence from
its VKB
delete–all S want R to remove all matching sentences
from its VKB
delete–one S wants R to remove one matching response
from it VKB
discard S will not want R’s remaining responses to a
previous performative
eos end of stream of responses to an earlier query
error S considers R’s earlier message to be mal-
formed
evaluate S wants R to simplify the sentence
forward S wants R to route a performative
generator same as standby of a stream–all
Table G.1: KQML Performatives (A to G) for sender S and recipient R
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Name Meaning
insert S asks R to add content to it VKB
monitor S wants updates to R’s response to a stream–
all
next S wants R’s next response to a previously men-
tioned performative
pipe S wants R to route all further performative to
another agent
ready S is ready to respond to R’s previously men-
tioned performative
recommend–all S wants all names of agents who can respond
to a performative
recommend–one S want the name of an agent who can respond
to a performative
recruit–all S wants R to get all suitable agents to a per-
formative
recruit–one S wants R to get another agent to respond to
a performative
register S can deliver performatives to some named
agent
reply S communicates an expected reply to R
rest S wants R’s remaining responses to a
previously-mentioned performative
sorry S cannot provide a more informative reply
standby S wants R to be ready to respond to a perfor-
mative
stream–about multiple response version of ask–about
stream–all multiple response version of ask–all
subscribe S wants updates to R’s response to a perfor-
mative
tell S admits to R that a particular sentence is in
its VKB, usually issued in reply to an ask
transport–address S associates a symbolic name with transport
address
unadvertise a deny of an advertise
unregister a deny of a register
untell S admits to R that a sentence is not in S’s
VKB, in response to an ask
Table G.2: KQML Performatives (I to U) for sender S and recipient R
Eaves, Ph.D 2000 Page 264
Name Meaning
content the information for which the performative ex-
presses an attitude
force whether the sender will ever deny the meaning
of the performative
in-reply-to the expected label in a reply
language the name of the representation language of the
content parameter
ontology the name of the ontology (e.g., set of term def-
initions) used in the content parameter
receiver the actual receiver of the performative
reply-with whether the sender expects a reply and, if so,
a label for the reply
sender the actual sender of the performative
Table G.3: KQML Parameters for Performatives
G.2 Knowledge Interchange Format
KIF provides a means whereby relationships and facts can be expressed as meta-
knowledge which can then be translated and passed to executive agents - typically
expert systems. Essentially KIF provides for: the representation of knowledge about
the representation of knowledge; representation of non-monotonic reasoning rules; the
definition of objects, functions and relations.
Its syntax is a cross between and Lisp and Prolog, but is used like Z, in that it
is only used to define entities. It has as its verbs all of the logical and arithmetic
operators.
Knowledge about the Representation of Knowledge KIF defines knowledge
representation as lists.
(defobject read-request :=
(or (or (listof requestor target))
(listof requestor requestor-location target)))
Which defines an object that is a “read-request”, which is either a list of request-or
identity and the target identity or the request-or identity, his location and the target.
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Non-monotonic Reasoning Rules Facts can be defined:
(believes http-agent ’(valid-user sybase))
(believes http-agent ’(non-interactive sybase))
(believes http-agent ’(read-access-only sybase))
States that the HTTP-agent believes sybase is a valid user who will only operate
non-interactively and will only make use of read-only access. Such facts can then be
reasoned upon.
(=> (believes http-agent ?p) (believes page-agent ?p))
Which states that whatever the HTTP agent believes, the page agent believes.
Definitions For example:
(defrelation grant-right-to-read (?x ?o ?g) :=
(and (member ?x ?g)
(forall (?m)
(=> (member ?m ?g) (has-right-to-read (?m ?o))))))
Defines a relation that grants to an entity “x” the right to read an object “o” if
all of x’s group are already able to read o. The relation “has-right-to-read” is defined
elsewhere.
